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In agricultural labor exchange, farmers temporarily pool their labor into teams and 
complete a task on each team member’s plot in succession.  Labor time is exchanged 
between team members under strict reciprocity and without pay.  The use of agricultural 
labor exchange in developing countries is widespread, but has received little attention 
from economists.  This dissertation investigates the motivation for the formation of labor 
exchange teams by considering the individual farmer’s decision to participate.  The 
analysis focuses on the two most prominent motivations for labor exchange: credit and 
labor market imperfections and the technological benefits of teamwork.  A theoretical 
model of demand for labor exchange under factor market imperfections generalizes 
existing models of the organization of agricultural production by allowing for returns to 
teamwork and labor exchange.  This generalization accounts for empirically relevant 
modes of production that were previously ruled out.  The model establishes positive 
marginal returns to teamwork as a necessary condition for labor exchange when non-
household labor exhibits moral hazard.  The empirical analysis tests the implications of
the model using primary data on agricultural households from Indonesia.  Production 
function estimates demonstrate positive returns to teamwork for a sample of rice and corn 
farmers, establishing the necessary condition for labor exchange.  Estimates of the 
farmer’s decision to participate in labor exchange subject to unobserved working capital 
constraints are estimated for alternative constraint status assignment rules and via the EM 
algorithm.  Results show that the effect of working capital holdings on the probability of 
participating in labor exchange has the inverted-U shape predicted by the model for 
working capital constrained households.  Also, labor exchange use is responsive to wages 
in the paid labor market, and is constrained by the local distribution of land and crop 
choice.  These findings imply that labor exchange operates in conjunction with paid labor 
markets; that labor exchange is a source of productivity growth for poor capital 
constrained farmers; and that the institution of labor exchange is likely to persist much 
later into the process of development than suggested by previous studies.  
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A common agricultural labor arrangement in many developing countries is labor 
exchange or work sharing.  Under a typical form of labor exchange, farmers temporarily 
pool their labor into teams and complete a task such as planting, weeding or harvesting a 
crop on each team member’s plot in succession.  Labor time is exchanged between team 
members under strict reciprocity and without pay, with the possible exception of a mid-
day meal.  Under this type of labor exchange, the entire exchange is completed in a 
matter of days or weeks.  In another variant of exchange labor, the terms of the
reciprocation are not clearly specified at the outset, so that the eventual completion of the 
exchange can be for different activities and over a longer period.
Researchers disagree about the origin and age of labor exchange as an agrarian 
institution.1    This disagreement has arisen in part because the use of labor exchange is 
often overlooked, even where it is widespread.  Nonetheless, there is considerable 
evidence of labor exchange teams operating in many parts of the developing world, 
currently and throughout the twentieth century.2  Although labor exchange typically 
1 Swindell (1985) speculates that labor exchange is a relatively recent phenomenon that must have 
developed in Africa, for example, only after the decline in slavery there at the end of the nineteenth 
century.  However, Homans (1960) and Kuznesof (1980) provide evidence of the latter type of labor 
exchange in thirteenth century England and eighteenth century Brazil, respectively.
2 For evidence on the use of labor exchange, see Geschiere (1995) on Cameroon; Fafchamps (1993) on 
Burkina Faso; Swindell on the Gambia (1985); Stone (1996) on Nigeria; Worby (1995) on Zimbabwe; 
Barnard (1970) on Malaysia; Ganjanapan (1989) on Thailand; Fegan (1989) on the Philippines; Geertz 
(1965), Hart (1980) and Naylor (1991) on Indonesia; Guillet (1980), Chibnik and de Jong (1989), and 
Jacoby (1992) on Peru.  Erasmus (1956) provides first-hand evidence of labor exchange in Haiti, Colombia, 
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constitutes a small share of total labor supply for a given crop, it can account for a 
considerable fraction of labor traded for certain activities.  Moreover, modern labor 
exchange teams are often found operating in areas with active labor markets.  
In the sociological literature that has dominated research on labor exchange, factor 
market failures are the most prominent economic motivation for labor exchange, in part 
because exchange labor has been common as a pre-market form of trade in 
underdeveloped rural areas (see, for example, Moore, 1975; Guillet, 1980; and Geschiere, 
1995).  When labor markets are thin or cash holdings are limited, labor exchange 
provides a mechanism for circumventing markets and gathering a team of laborers 
without the commitment of cash or food stores.  This argument is consistent with the 
principles of transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson 1979, 1986) wherein 
the institution of labor exchange arises because transaction costs in labor or credit 
markets make reliance on the paid labor market prohibitively expensive for the task at 
hand.  Under this hypothesis, we should expect greater reliance on labor exchange during 
peak periods of labor demand, in areas with few agricultural laborers, or in regions where 
farming is not highly commercialized.  
Another significant economic motivation for labor exchange is as a source of team labor 
for tasks that exhibit returns to teamwork (Moore, 1975; Goethals, 1967; and Wong, 
1971).  The team component to exchange labor allows tasks to be coordinated by several 
Ecuador, Peru and Chile.  He cites other evidence, mostly for the early twentieth century, from many other 
countries, including China, Guatemala, Mexico, South Africa, and Sudan.  In personal correspondence, 
Markus Goldstein confirmed the presence of labor exchange in Southern Ghana for a sample of farm 
households in 1997-98.  For an introduction to the sample, see Goldstein (2000).  Kimball (1949) provides 
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workers and enables faster completion of time-sensitive tasks, such as transplanting rice 
seedlings.  Other possible motivations that have received some attention include 
improvements in work quality (Worby, 1995; Stone, 1996), presumably due to less costly 
monitoring or improved incentives (Moore, 1975); access to tools or bullocks owned by 
teammates in interlinked exchanges; and psychological or motivational benefits from 
working with others (Moore, 1975; Goethals, 1967).  
Casual observation of agricultural households in Indonesia provides some evidence for 
these competing motivations for labor exchange.  In a sample of 1494 households on 
which this research is based, labor exchange was common in the more remote regions of 
South Sulawesi and West Nusa Tenggara, where average cultivated area was 1.7 and 1.9 
hectares, respectively, and few household heads are employed regularly as agricultural 
laborers.  However, labor exchange is also prominent in the densely populated areas of 
rural Central Java.  There, farm sizes average only 0.65 hectares and labor markets are 
active and have shown no imperfections (see Benjamin, 1992; Hart, 1986).  Among all 
farmers in the data, the use of labor exchange is most common for planting (43%) and 
harvesting (24%) activities.  These activities exhibit the greatest returns to teamwork.  
However, they also represent the periods of greatest demand for agricultural labor, when 
search costs in the labor market are high.
The prevalence of labor exchange is also determined by its structure.  Most importantly, 
team members are required to have control rights over a plot of land.  They also must 
evidence of exchange labor teams among Michigan farmers in the 1940s, and Gröger (1981) describes their 
persistence in Aveyron, France.
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match on-farm exchange labor demand with household labor supplied off-farm to other 
team members.  In labor exchange teams requiring immediate reciprocity, members must 
have considerable homogeneity in crops grown, plot size and quality, timing of tasks, and 
use of mechanization.  This suggests that the adoption of exchange labor may be highly 
dependent on the nature of local production technology and the distribution of land and 
other endowments.
These economic motivations and constraints for labor exchange are not well integrated in 
existing literature, and their relative importance has never been tested.  In addition, the 
role of the economics of incentives in rural organization has been mostly ignored.  If 
household members as residual claimants have the strongest incentives to supply effort, 
then the reduction in the share of household labor in total on-farm labor demand that 
accompanies labor exchange can only be justified by some positive returns to teamwork.  
These effects have important implications for who joins labor exchange teams and for the 
tasks to which exchange labor is applied.
Since Erasmus (1956, 1961), many have predicted that the prevalence of labor exchange 
will decline during the process of economic development, as markets develop and 
agriculture becomes more commercialized.  However, Guillet (1980), Chibnik and de 
Jong (1989), and Stone (1996) emphasize its persistence and argue that predictions of the 
demise of labor exchange are mostly unrealized.3  These arguments hinge on the 
importance of factor market failures as a determinant of labor exchange and on the 
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interplay of labor and credit markets during the process of development.  Although the 
growth of cash cropping and increased access to credit are likely to reduce exchange 
labor demand, the role of the labor market is unclear.  If increased commercialization of 
agriculture increases demand for labor, it could stimulate development of rural labor 
markets and reduce demand for exchange labor.  However, in their classic models of 
economic development, Lewis (1954) and Ranis and Fei (1961) characterize the process 
of development by a surplus labor force moving out of agriculture into industrial 
production.  This process would be accompanied by increasing demand for exchange 
labor as the pool of paid workers for hire in the labor market shrinks.
Agricultural labor exchange also has implications for theories of population growth and 
agricultural change.  Boserup (1965) describes how, in communities with low population 
density and extensive agricultural systems, population growth leads to agricultural 
intensification with shorter fallow periods and higher labor-to-land ratios.  In this setting, 
labor exchange can assist farmers in adjusting to intensification by reducing the time 
spent at a given task on each plot and by harnessing productivity gains from teamwork.4
By suppressing demand for a large household labor force, the availability of labor 
exchange could also reduce fertility in this setting.  This would indirectly slow the 
process of agricultural intensification. 
3 There is evidence of a resurgence of labor exchange in response to increased commercialization of farm 
output in Peru (Chibnik and de Jong (1989)) and following agricultural intensification in Zimbabwe 
(Worby (1995)).
4 Stone (1996) argues that this was the role of exchange labor used by the Kofyar in Nigeria.
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As a mature and significant non-market institution for reciprocal labor exchange, 
agricultural labor exchange teams can provide insights into the performance of labor 
exchange in other settings and of exchange relationships in general.  Many of the 
defining characteristics of agricultural labor exchange teams, including the reciprocal 
swap of labor time (either immediately or delayed), joint production by team members, 
the absence of monetary payments, and the rotating accrual of benefits from pooling 
factors rather than output across economic units are found to varying degrees in many 
other settings.  Barn raisings, for example, which are still conducted by the Amish 
peoples in the United States, are organized very similarly to agricultural labor exchange 
teams.  They involve the reciprocal exchange of unpaid labor over time for team 
production in identical activities, where the output from one production cycle is privately 
owned.  Childcare swaps, in which parents trade time caring for each other’s children
also involve the unpaid exchange of labor time in the production of private goods (in this 
case, children), but the production is not through teams.  This makes it possible that the 
time exchanged is not reciprocal on a one-to-one basis.  In some more organized 
childcare swaps, parents caring for others’ children earn chits that can be called in for 
labor services provided by another parent.  In this case, the absence of team production 
makes it possible for the labor exchange to become monetized.  The organization of work 
teams in many advertising agencies and law firms also exhibit aspects of reciprocal labor 
exchange.  In a typical large law firm, for example, a team of attorneys serves each 
client.5  The positions of lead attorney, second chair, etc., on a case are usually assigned 
by a partner in the firm based on seniority, importance of the case, and past performance. 
5 I would like to thank Anthony O’Donnell, J.D., for a very useful discussion about the organization of 
labor in large law firms in the United States.
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These positions are sometimes rotated from case to case, so that the lead attorney on a 
case may serve under his second chair on another case.  Although all attorneys are 
compensated for their time, the lead attorney typically earns more non-pecuniary (e.g., 
reputation) benefits within the firm from favorable team performance.6  That is, the lead 
attorney enjoys the greatest private rewards from joint production.  Moreover, each team 
member’s noncontractable effort contribution is a function of how the lead attorney is 
expected to perform when the roles are reversed.  Although this form of teamwork tends 
to derive more from specialization and to be more hierarchical than agricultural labor 
exchange, the non-pecuniary rewards in this system of rotating, reciprocal exchange 
closely mirror the rotating rewards of agricultural labor exchange.7
More generally, exchange relationships between agents with heterogeneous resource 
endowments raise a number of significant economic issues concerning exchange 
relationship formation and duration, factor allocation and welfare distribution.  These 
issues have been studied to a limited extent for some forms of reciprocal exchange 
relationships, such as rotating savings and credit associations (see Besley et al, 1993, 
1994).  The role of reciprocity in exchange relationships has also begun to receive more 
attention.  Kranton (1996) develops a model explaining the persistence of reciprocal 
exchange relationships despite the presence of money-based markets.  In this model, 
6 The lead attorney on a successful case may also receive more pecuniary benefits than other team members 
in the form of larger bonuses and faster promotions.  As long as a larger share of the benefits from team 
production accrue privately to the lead attorney, these arrangements have the central characteristics of 
reciprocal labor exchange.  This interpretation of these non-salary gains to the lead attorney is incorrect 
only if all of the benefits accruing to him can be attributed to his effort and managerial ability, which is 
unlikely in team production.
7 See Leibowitz and Tollison (1980) and Blair and Stout (1999) for general descriptions of team production 
in legal partnerships.  These studies focus on the role of the organization of teams in determining incentives 
to work.
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personalized reciprocal exchange can persist for goods that are close substitutes if thin 
spot markets lead to high search costs for market exchanges.  As spot markets develop, 
these search costs decline, making reciprocity in exchange relationships more difficult to 
enforce.  In the agricultural labor setting, Kranton’s analysis implies that high labor 
market transaction costs can contribute to the persistence of agricultural labor exchange, 
but that the popularity of personalized labor exchanges may also inhibit the formation of 
a spot market for labor.  Agricultural labor exchange teams provide an excellent context 
in which to investigate the determinants of reciprocal exchanges because the structural 
attributes of agricultural labor exchanges have been shown to be robust: they have 
persisted in the face of market development and have been repeated in disparate areas in 
developing countries.
The remainder of this chapter describes the operation of labor exchange teams in greater 
detail, summarizes the literature on the motivation for the use of labor exchange, and 
introduces the purpose and contribution of this research.
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1.2 The Operation of Labor Exchange Teams 
Every participant in a basiru (labor exchange) task both knows that his 
contribution will be exactly matched in kind by the eventual return and 
can determine from knowledge of the group’s size what expenditure and 
what benefits he will incur through participation.  (p. 44)
--Goethals, 1967
Most labor exchange teams in agriculture can be classified into one of the two categories 
mentioned above, which Erasmus (1956) labeled “exchange labor” and “festive labor”.8
The two can be distinguished primarily by the degree of reciprocity involved and by the 
size and quality of the meals and other in-kind payments provided.9  In exchange labor, a 
team member is obligated to supply as much labor time on the farm of each teammate as 
he receives from that teammate.  Although the work is performed as a team, the 
reciprocity is individual-specific, so that the exchange of labor time between each pair of 
team members represents the two sides of a single labor transaction.  Typically, a farmer 
who cannot meet his labor obligation to a teammate can send a family member in his 
place.10  Otherwise, he must compensate the teammate whose labor he did not reciprocate 
either in-kind or with cash at the prevailing wage rate (Goethals, 1967).  In a completed 
8 Erasmus (1956) and Moore (1975) provide comprehensive overviews of the prevalence and design of 
labor exchange teams and detailed discussions on the motivation for their use.  This section on the design 
and operation of the teams relies on their accounts.
9 A third form of cooperative labor involves labor pooling for public good provision such as construction of 
public buildings or roads, or farming communal plots.  The reciprocity inherent in these arrangements is 
relatively diffuse and is oriented toward public good provision.  This motivation makes these arrangements 
distinct from the private exchanges considered here, so they will not be addressed.  The latter setting is 
similar to an agricultural cooperative with output pooling, which has been studied extensively elsewhere.
10 Goethals (1967) notes that, for a village in West Sumbawa, Indonesia, the substitute worker must have 
comparable productivity for the task.  For example, a man who cannot complete his harvest labor exchange 
obligation could be replaced by his wife, but she would not be considered an adequate substitute if the work 
were swidden clearing.
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labor exchange transaction, no payments are made between team members.  The only 
exception is that the host member may serve food, particularly if the work is performed 
over a full day or if the field is remote.11  Alternatively, team members may agree to 
bring their own mid-day meal or to break for members to return home to eat.  If a meal is 
provided, it is typically average, although it may include a small premium in quality or 
quantity.  In any case, its value would be a fraction of the daily wage.  The convention on 
supplying meals is agreed to in advance, so that the exchange of equivalent meals is 
reciprocal too.
In a festive labor arrangement, the host assembles a large team for the work and supplies 
a large meal, often in a festive atmosphere, when the work is complete.  In some cases 
music and drinking begin while the work ongoing, and team members are regarded as 
both workers and party guests.  There is at most a weak implicit obligation for the host to 
reciprocate labor to team members in the future.  Therefore, the meal and festivities alone 
constitute payment for the work.  This claim is supported by the fact that the invitation to 
join a festive labor team is often open.  The absence of reciprocity and the large in-kind 
payments suggest that festive labor teams operate more like wage labor than reciprocal 
labor exchange.  They are more common where wage labor markets are thin and decline 
more rapidly than exchange labor as labor markets develop (Swindell, 1980).  Because 
the focus of this research is reciprocal non-market exchange labor arrangements, festive 
labor arrangements are not studied in detail here.
11 The “host” member or farmer is the one on whose plot the work is currently being performed.  In 
exchange labor teams, this position is rotated in the course of the exchange so that each team member 
11
Many other characteristics of exchange labor teams are conditioned by the reciprocity 
and by the technology and nature of farm work.  For example, reciprocal exchange 
requires that all team members must have control rights over land.  Although it is 
possible for the activities performed to differ across farms, the seasonality of farming and 
homogeneity of agroclimatic conditions in an area covered by a labor exchange team 
suggest that both activities and crops grown are likely to be the same for all team 
members (Erasmus, 1956).  There is evidence of labor exchange being used for all 
agricultural activities, including land clearing, plowing, planting, weeding, harvesting, 
threshing and transporting crops (eg, Goethals, 1967).12  However, various sources cited 
in Erasmus (1956) indicate that it is most commonly used in agriculture for planting and 
harvesting crops.  Due to costs associated with organizing team activities and traveling 
between plots, exchange labor teams tend to be small, typically with less than ten 
members.  Team size is also affected by plot size and the activity.  For the Indonesian 
sample used in this research, average team size, where reported, ranged by province from 
4.5 farmers in East Java to 10.3 in less-densely populated South Sulawesi.  It is common 
for teams to be formed so that the task on each plot can be completed in one day or half 
day.  Some labor exchanges are organized around the use of farm equipment such as a 
plow owned by one of the team members (Goethals, 1967).  In other cases, the machinery 
itself is co-owned by several farmers, which facilitates labor exchanges to use the 
machinery (Kimball, 1949; Gröger, 1981).  This interlinkage of labor and equipment 
changes the requirements for labor reciprocity when only one person owns the 
equipment, reducing his labor obligation to other team members.  
serves as host once.
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The order of rotation of hosting a labor exchange team is determined either by random 
draw or by seniority of membership (Weil, 1973), with exceptions made for a team 
member with a compelling reason for hosting at a particular time.  If there are benefits to 
the timing of the activity within the season (eg, it is better to plant as close to the 
beginning of the rainy season as possible), then the outcome of the hosting rotation can 
have consequences for the distribution of the team labor productivity among team 
members.
An important determinant of the membership of a labor exchange team is proximity of 
fields, in order to limit the time cost of travel between fields (Stone, 1996; Hudson and 
Hudson, 1967).  Subject to this restriction, the composition of a labor exchange team may 
be based in part on friendship or family ties (Hudson and Hudson, 1967; Weil, 1973).  A 
number of sociologists have noted that labor exchange teammates exhibit considerable 
homogeneity in social status and ethnicity, and possibly age and gender as well (see 
Erasmus, 1956; Jay, 1969; Stone, 1996).  A common argument for this observation is that 
it is easier to enforce reciprocity norms among team members of identical socio-
economic status or ethnicity because their shared experiences contribute to common 
values and norms of behavior and because they are more likely to participate together in 
other transactions that build trust and reinforce these norms.  An argument for 
homogeneity of age and gender composition that receives less attention is that people of 
similar age and the same gender are more likely to have comparable labor productivity.  
12 In some areas, labor exchange teams are also common for some non-agricultural activities, including 
house construction.
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These regularities in labor exchange team membership may have developed as partial 
solutions to problems of adverse selection based on farmer ability.  Weil (1973) observes 
an alternative age composition of labor exchange teams in the Gambia, where each team 
includes one experienced elderly woman, several stronger prime-age adult women, and a 
few young, inexperienced women.  This mode of organization capitalizes on 
specialization between knowledge and physical strength, and pools labor endowments in 
part to teach the young.  This alternative age composition appears to be less common than 
age homogeneity.
Possible motivations for labor exchange teams and their characteristics offered in the 
sociological literature are reviewed in the following section.  These motivations are tested 
empirically in Chapter 4 using the Indonesian data.
1.3 Literature Synthesis on the Economic Motivation for Labor Exchange
It does seem that cooperative labor is, ceteris paribus, relatively common 
in areas where there is very little cash cropping, where farmers’ incomes 
are relatively low, and where there is no substantial landless labor force.
--Moore, 1975
In remote, underdeveloped rural areas characterized by subsistence farming, many of the 
important determinants of agricultural labor exchange are evident.  Sales of surplus crops 
are uncommon and non-farm incomes are low, so farmers do not have cash to pay wage 
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laborers.  Landholding is widespread and population centers are distant, making wage 
laborers scarce.  As noted by sociologists, labor exchange may offer the only means for 
gathering a labor force larger than the immediate household in this setting (Moore, 1975; 
Geschiere, 1995).  Underdeveloped credit and labor markets, with high transaction costs 
for market-based exchanges, provide a significant motivation for agricultural labor 
exchange in these areas.  Similarly, where commercialized farming is more prevalent and 
a landless labor force exists, we expect the prevalence of labor exchange to decline as 
wage labor becomes more affordable relative to the time costs of organizing exchange 
labor teams.  
A review of the evidence on the prevalence of labor exchange teams provides some 
support for the hypothesis that credit rationing and high labor market transaction costs are 
responsible for the use of exchange labor.  However, other evidence indicates the 
limitations of this argument.  For example, the two activities in which exchange labor is 
most commonly used are planting and harvesting.  Credit market constraints may be 
important contributors to exchange labor demand during planting, but they cannot explain 
its use during harvesting activities, when laborers can be paid immediately with a share 
of the output or soon afterward when crops are sold.  Also, Stone (1996) and others 
provide important examples in which labor exchange teams operate simultaneously with 
wage labor and in areas that appear to be well along the path toward economic 
development.  
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In order to reconcile the evidence, we consider the other primary motivations for 
agricultural labor exchange, which derive primarily from technological benefits 
associated with returns to teamwork and from effort incentives.  Two motivations for 
labor exchange teams that derive from benefits to teams in agricultural production 
include what Erasmus (1956) refers to as ‘time and weight’.  ‘Time’ concerns the need 
for fast completion of time-sensitive tasks (see also Moore, 1975; Goethals, 1967).  
Transplanting rice seedlings and planting of certain vegetables requires careful water 
management that dictates that the task be completed within one day.  Gains here derive 
from reducing the duration of agricultural activities.  ‘Weight’ refers to classical returns 
to the number of workers, which can be important for moving large or cumbersome 
objects (see Moore, 1975; Weil, 1973).  One example is land clearing, where teamwork 
simplifies the task of moving large logs and reduces the need to cut the timber to a size 
manageable for one person to move.  Another example concerns a team-oriented 
technique for planting rice, as described somewhat sardonically by Hudson and Hudson 
(1967) for farmers in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia:
In the actual planting work, the men form a row and go back and forth 
across the field, punching holes in the ground with dibble sticks.  
Following close behind comes a second row composed of gossiping 
women, jostling children, and a few unmarried men….  The people in this 
second row cast rice seed into the dibble holes. (p. 103)
Many of the timing advantages of labor exchange derive from improved scheduling of 
the activity within the season, combined with the benefits of shorter task duration
mentioned above.  However, scheduling benefits accrue with ex ante uncertainty about 
the precise timing of task completion.  For example, if there are efficiency gains from 
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planting a crop as soon as the rains begin, labor exchange offers team members a lottery 
over completing this task as close to the start of the rains as possible (Swindell, 1985; 
Worby, 1995).  This scheduling benefit of labor exchange is similar to the benefits 
enjoyed by members of rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), as modeled 
in Besley et al (1993, 1994).  ROSCA members saving for a large purchase pool their 
savings at regular intervals, allowing one member to make the purchase at each interval, 
and sooner than if he had waited until he had saved enough money on his own. This 
motivation for labor exchange is explicitly recognized in one of the names for labor 
exchange in Indonesia, arisan kerja.  Arisan is the word in Bahasa Indonesia, the national 
language, for rotating savings schemes and kerja is the Bahasa word for work.  
In the case of irrigated farming, the scheduling benefits of labor exchange can be 
combined with the timing of access to irrigation.  If each farmer has access to local wells 
on a different day, exchange labor and water deliveries can be coordinated so that the 
team plants each plot on the day it receives its water.  Another potential advantage of 
improved scheduling derives from a shorter growing season.  Team members whose plots 
are planted early will be able to harvest their crop sooner, increasing the opportunities to 
grow another crop or to rent the land.  This advantage is likely to be greater for irrigated 
fields, where the timing of the growing season is not as dependent on the rains.
These scheduling benefits to labor exchange are limited in their ability to mitigate 
common risks within the team.  In the first case discussed above, labor exchange reduces 
the risk from the timing of rains by providing a lottery on which farmers can get their 
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fields planted closest to the optimal period.  However, a similar common risk such as 
crop spoilage due to heavy rains just prior to harvest cannot be reduced through labor 
exchange.  In this case, a risk averse farmer will prefer to harvest as much of his crop as 
possible in autarky rather than join a labor exchange team and risk losing everything.
Many researchers cite the psychological and motivational benefits from working with 
others as motivation for labor exchange (Moore, 1975; Goethals, 1967; Geschiere, 1995).  
Anthropologists characterize this effect as an inducement derived from the social or 
festive nature of the work.  Another interpretation that has received less attention is the 
strength of incentives created by the immediate reciprocity of labor traded.  The sources 
of incentives to supply effort in exchange labor include individual reciprocity, group 
monitoring, and repeated interactions.  On the first plot in a labor exchange rotation, each 
team member has an incentive to work hard in order to encourage similar effort from the 
host in subsequent rounds due to individual reciprocity.  Group monitoring leads to both 
direct incentive effects and signaling effects.  Group monitoring directly encourages 
effort in each round because team members do not want to be reported as shirking to the 
host.  In addition, by working hard a team member sends a signal to other non-hosting 
team members about his desire to exchange a high level of effort.  Each of these sources 
of incentives decline in later rounds because team members who have already hosted 
have no immediate inducement to supply effort.  In a game-theoretic framework, a farmer 
who has already hosted in a one-time labor exchange has no incentives to supply effort 
on his teammates’ farms.  This is where repeated exchanges become important.  Because 
team members usually come from the same village or kinship group, each member has a 
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high probability of future exchanges with other members of the team, either through 
subsequent labor exchanges or other transactions.  These repeated game or reputation 
effects may also be an important source of incentives.  In this way, reciprocity and 
reputation can mitigate against shirking by non-hosting team members who otherwise 
have low incentives to supply effort because they are not the residual claimant.  
Reseachers who highlight the motivational benefits of teamwork often ignore other 
incentive problems that arise in teamwork.  Because labor exchange arrangements 
typically involve teams of moderate size, they are also subject to the same difficulties of 
monitoring effort that arise elsewhere in teams.  However, because the benefits of team 
effort accrue to only one team member, the host farmer, at each turn in the rotation, labor 
exchange teams do not suffer from the same weakening of incentives that arises in output 
pooling teams.
Finally, Geschiere (1995) emphasizes the cultural underpinnings of labor exchange, 
particularly norms about sharing, mutual help and contributions to social welfare.  If 
these non-economic motivations for participation in labor exchange are significant, the 
prevalence of labor exchange may persist in even where there are active labor markets 
and little gain from teamwork.
There are few attempts in existing literature to integrate these motivations for labor 
exchange teams.  Erasmus (1956, 1961) provides some indications of which motivation 
should dominate for certain activities.  Overall, these discussions are limited and 
qualitative in nature.  Nonetheless, there is considerable debate about the changing 
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prevalence of labor exchange during the process of development.  Based on the relative 
prevalence of labor exchange in subsistence agricultural settings, Erasmus (1956) argues 
that labor exchange will decline during development as market transactions replace barter 
or exchange transactions of all kinds.  Others claim that this process will lead to the 
eventual demise of labor exchange altogether.  
The decline of labor exchange during the development process is consistent with early 
models of the organization of agricultural production develop by von Thünen (1826) and 
Chayanov (1925).  In von Thünen’s model of an “isolated state”, land use patterns are 
determined by location, with intensity of cultivation rising with proximity to a population 
center at the village level or proximity to the residence at the farm level.  The intensity of 
labor use is similarly affected.  If development is accompanied by reductions in 
transportation costs, von Thünen’s model would predict greater labor intensity, which 
would presumably operate through the market.  Chayanov (1925) describes a process of 
increased mechanization and commercialization of agriculture that leads to a move away 
from subsistence toward commercial farming, with more labor and land transactions, the 
development of a landless labor force, and growth of non-farm incomes.  The occurrence 
of labor exchange in subsistence settings is also consistent with claims by Coase (1937) 
and Williamson (1979, 1986) that non-market institutions develop to substitute for 
market transactions until market trades become affordable.  
Whether exchange labor is ultimately supplanted by increased commercialization of 
factor and output markets depends on the costs and benefits to each transaction and the 
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possibility of an equilibrium in which they can coexist.  Kranton’s (1996) model of 
reciprocal exchange describes the conditions under which exchange transactions can 
persist in the presence of anonymous market exchange.  In an economy with limited 
market transactions, search costs for market-based transactions are high.  Individuals 
engage in repeated exchange transactions, strengthening reciprocity and reducing the risk 
of future reliance on exchange.  However, the presence of a spot market offers an 
alternative to those engaged in an exchange relationship.  As markets grow, a potential 
customer sees growing numbers of suppliers in the market, which reduces the punishment 
costs of reneging on a reciprocal exchange.  A socially efficient equilibrium is one in 
which only one of these modes of transactions exist because the two have negative 
external effects on each other.  Kranton shows that reciprocal exchange is more efficient 
when goods or services traded are close substitutes, but that market exchange dominates 
otherwise.  However, when the division of transactions between the two modes of 
exchange is endogenous, inefficient equilibria can arise in which a large spot market 
makes exchange transactions unenforceable or successive repeated exchanges drive up 
spot market search costs.  Kranton’s model can help explain both the demise of labor 
exchange and its persistence in the presence of a functioning wage labor market.  In an 
example of the latter case, search costs for hired labor during peak periods of labor 
demand can foster continued exchange labor transactions in areas where uniformity of 
crop mix and the timing of activities make labor substitutable across farms.
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1.4 Purpose and Contribution of this Research
The presence and persistence of the institution of labor exchange has important 
implications for research on the performance of rural factor markets and therefore on 
rural development.  If labor exchange arises primarily as an institutional response to 
imperfections in rural labor and credit markets, then the prevalence of labor exchange in 
a region provides an indicator of the depth of factor markets there.  Accordingly, reliance 
on exchange labor should be accounted for in analyses of the welfare costs of market 
failure or the potential benefits of the commercialization of agriculture.  Under this 
“market imperfections hypothesis,” the importance of labor exchange should fade as 
markets develop and transaction costs are reduced.  If, on the other hand, technological 
considerations relating to teamwork dominate the decision to use exchange labor, demand 
for this institution will be closely related to the characteristics of local production (e.g., 
crop choice, water use) and may persist even as markets develop.
Although labor exchange has existed for centuries and in many regions of the world, it 
has received almost no attention from economists.  This oversight cannot be due to the 
infrequency of labor exchange.  In the sample of Indonesian farmers used for this 
research, nearly 15 percent of farm households use labor exchange, while 18 percent use 
sharecropping, a land-labor institution that has received substantial attention from 
economists.  Sociologists, anthropologists and demographers have provided considerable 
documentation of the existence, design and operation of labor exchange teams.  In a few 
cases, their research has included detailed accounts of possible economic motivations for 
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labor exchange.  However, these motivations have never been subjected to a rigorous 
economic analysis.  In particular, there is no existing theory to explain the use of 
agricultural labor exchange.  The models of ROSCAs by Besley et al (1993, 1994) can be 
adapted to explain some of the benefits of labor exchange, but divorced from the context 
of agricultural production, possible returns to teamwork, and competition with market-
oriented substitutes.  Kranton’s (1996) model provides a compelling explanation for how 
labor exchange, as a reciprocal exchange transaction, can coexist with a spot market for 
labor.  However, this issue warrants more attention in the specific context of agricultural 
labor exchange.  In addition, there is very little quantitative data documenting the use of 
exchange labor.  Some quantitative evidence may exist in the large number of agricultural 
household surveys conducted over the last forty years.  If so, these data have been 
ignored.  Moreover, there is no quantitative analysis of farmers’ decisions to participate 
in labor exchange.
From the existing literature, it is difficult to assess the relative strengths of each of the 
explanations for labor exchange described above.  The primary contribution of this thesis 
is to provide a more rigorous assessment of these motivations by developing a formal 
model of labor exchange and testing the theory using primary data on farm households in 
Indonesia.  In the theoretical model, an agricultural household decides whether to 
participate in labor exchange given a production technology with positive returns to 
teamwork, possible rationing in the credit market, and transaction costs for labor 
transactions.  In addition, paid and exchange labor are subject to moral hazard and must 
be supervised in order to be productive. 
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From this model it is possible to contrast the technology-based explanations for labor 
exchange with arguments based on market failure.  Results show that returns to teamwork 
are a necessary condition for labor exchange when non-household labor exhibits moral 
hazard.  Labor time employed on farm through labor exchange must be reciprocated with 
household labor time off farm.  This results in a net decline in effective labor hours on 
farm due to supervision costs arising from moral hazard.  The inability of labor exchange 
to increase labor hours on farm makes it a limited substitute for market labor, effectively 
substituting only for team labor demand from the market.  Therefore, market transaction 
costs alone cannot explain the use of exchange labor.  However, where labor and credit 
markets have failed, exchange labor will be more common.  The model also predicts that 
the effect of endowments (including farm size, household size, and asset holdings) and 
local labor market conditions (such as the size of the labor force and wage rates) on the 
decision to use labor exchange will differ systematically depending on whether the 
household is constrained in its holdings of working capital.  Endowments, for example, 
will play a larger role for households that are working capital constrained.  Results also 
show how the interplay of these market imperfections and technological determinants of 
labor exchange help to explain both the prevalence and persistence of this institution in 
developing countries.
The model developed here is a generalization of the models of the organization of 
agricultural production by Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) (following Roemer (1982)) and 
Carter and Zimmerman (2000).  An important implication of the multiple market failures 
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in these models is that the distribution of land (and capital) endowments determines the 
resulting organization of production as defined by the pattern of labor use. Stark 
predictions are derived concerning how households can be classified in an activity 
continuum, moving from being wage laborers, to laborer-cultivators to self-sufficient in 
labor use to employer-cultivators as access to capital increases.  A secondary contribution 
of the theoretical model is to demonstrate the effect of labor exchange and returns to 
teamwork on the organization of production.  The presence of labor exchange adds 
another dimension to the organization of production that interrupts this stark 
classification, so that activity choice is not uniquely determined by farm size.  Returns to 
teamwork make it optimal for farmers to enter both sides of the labor market, hiring in 
and hiring out labor for the same activity.  This practice is explicitly ruled out in the 
models of Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) and Carter and Zimmerman (2000) and Feder 
(1985), but there is empirical evidence that such a practice exists.13  By accounting for 
this empirical regularity, this paper completes the “class structure” derived by Eswaran-
Kotwal.14
One of the predictions of the Eswaran-Kotwal model is that due to multiple market 
failures redistribution of land endowments can lead to improvements in efficiency.  
Results in this paper suggest that a significant limitation of the institution of labor 
exchange in this respect is that it preserves the status quo, since all team members must 
13 In the Indonesian data, for example, there were 5128 observations on households hiring in labor by 
season and activity, where activities were coded as land preparation, plowing, planting, weeding, 
harvesting, or milling.  For 14.7 percent of these observations, household labor was also supplied off farm 
during the same period of activity.
14 Of course, other reasons for the practice exist.  Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Benjamin (1998) suggest that 
intrahousehold specialization could lead a household to enter both sides of the labor market as highly 
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have access to land and differences in yields arising from heterogeneity in land quality 
are not pooled within teams.
The empirical portion of the dissertation tests the assumptions and predictions of the 
model of labor exchange using the 1998-99 Indonesian PATANAS survey, an 
agricultural household data set that I helped collect.  I first estimate a production function 
to test for returns to teamwork for the subsample of rice and corn farmers that represent 
the most likely pool of participants in labor exchange teams.  Empirical evidence of a 
productivity advantage to team production is relatively rare (see Hamilton, Nickerson and 
Hideo, 2003; Leibowitz and Tollison, 1980), particularly so in agriculture.  The 
estimation procedure separates out the incentive effects inherent in the piece rate and 
output share contracts that are more common under team production from the pure team 
effect.  The results provide evidence of substantial returns to teamwork for this sample of 
farmers.
The model of labor exchange predicts that the importance of endowments, transaction 
costs, and market conditions in the decision to use labor exchange depends critically on 
whether the household is working capital constrained, which is unobserved.  The 
empirical strategy presents several alternative formulations of an empirical model to 
investigate how different divisions of the sample into working capital constrained and 
unconstrained regimes affects the model’s ability to explain predicted behavior.  First, I 
assume that all households are working capital constrained and consider how the level of 
educated household members attract higher wages off farm while the household hires unskilled labor on 
farm.
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working capital holdings affects the probability of participating in labor exchange.  Next, 
I consider alternative informed, but arbitrary, divisions of the sample into working capital 
constraint regimes based on the observed level of working capital holdings.  This model 
allows the parameters in the decision to participate in labor exchange to differ for 
working capital constrained and unconstrained households.  The model estimated is an 
endogenous switching regression model in which assignment of households into 
constrained and unconstrained cohorts is assumed, and where error terms across 
equations are correlated.  Finally, I estimate the parameters of the switching regression 
model with unobserved sample separation using the EM algorithm, which treats 
unobserved regime assignment as a missing data problem.  The algorithm exploits the 
relationship between the model with unobserved and observed sample separation to 
obtain maximum likelihood estimates for the missing data problem.  Such a regime 
switching model can be difficult to estimate, particularly when the dependent variable of 
interest (in this case, the decision to use labor exchange) is discrete.  The EM algorithm 
makes it possible to obtain improved estimates with some interesting implications for 
determinants of labor exchange participation.
The empirical results lend broad support to the model of labor exchange developed here.  
When the entire sample is treated as working capital constrained, the relationship of 
working capital holdings to the probability of using labor exchange has an inverted U 
shape, as predicted by the model of labor exchange.  At low levels of working capital, 
farmers operate as laborer cultivators and use additional liquidity to expand operated 
area, increasing demand for team labor through labor exchange.  Farmers with higher 
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working capital holdings are autarkic in labor use or are net hirers of labor.  For this 
group, an increase in working capital holdings can reduce the probability of using labor 
exchange by making market labor alternatives relatively cheaper.  When only households 
with no working capital holdings are treated as constrained, land endowments and 
household size affect the probability of using labor exchange in a manner consistent with 
the model for constrained and unconstrained households.  Also, maximum likelihood 
estimates obtained using the EM algorithm show that working capital holdings have no 
effect on the probability of using labor exchange for unconstrained households, as the 
model suggests.  Among other results, the roles of transaction costs and technology as 
labor exchange determinants are also confirmed by these estimates.  One of the most 
significant determinants of participation in labor exchange is the cost of finding 
teammates, which is a function of the distribution of land within a village.  Results show 
that the probability of a farmer joining a labor exchange team increases sharply with the 
number of other plots in the village similar in size to his plot.  Use of simple pump 
irrigation has a positive effect on use of labor exchange.  The results suggest that labor 
exchange use is compatible with low-level irrigation technology, but is not relevant 
where more technical irrigation is employed. 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 presents the model of 
labor exchange and demonstrates the relationship between returns to teamwork, labor and 
working capital constraints, and the decision to use labor exchange.  In Chapter3, I 
introduce the data and investigate the use of labor exchange for this sample of Indonesian 
farmers.  Chapter 4 develops and tests an empirical model of the farmer’s decision to use 
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labor exchange based on the model from Chapter 2.  The implications of the estimation 
results for the model of labor exchange use are discussed.  Concluding remarks are found 
in Chapter 5.
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2 A Model of Labor Exchange with Imperfect Factor Markets
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I develop a model of a farmer’s decision to use labor exchange.  Labor 
exchange is characterized by the simultaneous demand for labor on-farm and supply of 
labor off-farm, with neither transaction involving a payment.  The model demonstrates 
how returns to teamwork and imperfections in the labor and credit markets affect the 
decision to use labor exchange.  It also accounts for the effect of a productivity advantage 
for household labor on farm, attributed to moral hazard, on the exchange labor decision.  
In this model, the decision to participate in labor exchange is a function of resource 
endowments, team production technology, and three possible sources of market 
imperfections: constraints on working capital, moral hazard in non-household labor, and 
search costs for all labor transactions.  
The theoretical framework developed here applies and extends existing models of the 
organization of agricultural production, especially Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), but also 
Feder (1985) and Carter and Zimmerman (2000).  These models demonstrate that 
multiple market imperfections lead to patterns of orientation toward the labor market in 
terms of net labor demand that vary systematically with access to capital.  Due to 
rigidities in factor markets, an optimizing farmer’s endowments of working capital, or 
equivalently land in Eswaran and Kotwal, completely determines his mode of production: 
whether he works some time off-farm, cultivates in self-sufficiency, or hires labor on-
farm, conditional on a constant returns to scale production technology.  These papers 
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formalize earlier models of the organization of agriculture.  Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) 
base their model on Roemer’s (1982) analysis of class structure in which agents are 
classified by their activities according to their access to the means of production.  Much 
earlier, Chayanov (1926) recognized that whether labor is hired in or hired out depends 
on land endowments when credit and land market imperfections make it impossible to 
adjust operated area to account for household size:
We see that, proportionately, as land is insufficient and becomes a 
minimum factor the volume of agricultural activity for all farm elements is 
reduced…But the work hands of the farm family, not finding a use in 
farming, turn, as we will see below, to crafts, trades and other non-
agricultural earnings to attain the economic equilibrium with family 
demands not fully met by farm income or by receipts from crafts and 
trades. (Chayanov, 1926, p. 94, italics in original).
This class of models provides the framework needed to address a farmer’s decision to 
participate in labor exchange.  By allowing for the possibility of positive returns to 
teamwork, I can investigate how the two primary explanations for labor exchange, 
teamwork and factor market imperfections, interact to determine labor exchange use as 
an alternative labor arrangement not considered by the other models.
I generalize these earlier models by allowing for the possibility of returns to teamwork 
and for non-market exchange of factors through labor exchange.  Returns to teamwork 
make it profitable for a farmer to work off farm as a means to gain access to labor on 
farm, either by entering the labor market to finance hired labor on farm or through labor 
exchange.  As shown below, this establishes returns to teamwork as a necessary condition 
of labor exchange.  In the models by Eswaran and Kotwal and Carter and Zimmerman, 
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supervision costs due to moral hazard make simultaneously buying and selling labor 
unprofitable, a key simplification in the classification of households according to 
activities.  The model developed here offers returns to teamwork as an explanation for 
this common practice and interrupts the tidy classification of households into modes of 
production determined entirely by land endowments.  Moreover, with returns to 
teamwork, optimal labor activities are determined not only by endowments of land, and 
therefore capital, but also by the household’s labor endowment.  This increases the 
explanatory power of the model, making it consistent with Chayanov and with the models 
of Benjamin (1992) and López (1984).  Indeed, Benjamin uses the sensitivity of labor 
supply to household size as a test of labor market imperfection.15
The model also demonstrates that returns to teamwork are not sufficient to explain labor 
exchange, even in the presence of working capital constraints.  Under returns to teams, a 
farmer with limited cash holdings can work in the labor market to pay for hired workers 
on farm.  Labor exchange arises when labor market imperfections rule out such 
transactions.  I model these imperfections as transaction-specific per-unit costs to buying, 
selling, or exchanging labor.  These can be interpreted as search costs for finding market 
laborers, off-farm employment, or exchange labor teammates, respectively.  The analysis 
yields conditions on these transactions costs that determine when each activity will be 
observed.  In the resulting generalized classification of the organization of agricultural 
production, the modes of production are determined not only by access to capital, but also 
by the team production technology and by transactions costs in the labor market.  
15 Although Benjamin cannot reject that labor supply is independent of household size for a sample of
Javanese farmers, this does not weaken the saliency of the theoretical result.  Close proximity of his sample 
32
Another implication of the model is that demand for labor exchange is a function of 
endowments of land, capital and household size only when both working capital and 
labor market constraints are binding.  This endowment sensitivity of the mode of 
production is a central feature of the multiple-market failures in the models by Eswaran 
and Kotwal, Feder, and Carter and Zimmerman.  It leads to a series of testable predictions 
on the effect of endowments on demand for labor exchange that can be used to validate 
the classification of households into working-capital–constrained and –unconstrained 
cohorts for the sample of Indonesian farmers studied in the empirical work that follows.  
The model also generates hypotheses about how labor exchange, as a non-market form of 
exchange, responds to changes in the wage rate, the price of the market alternative.  Tests 
of these results in forthcoming chapters lend considerable support the theoretical model 
developed here.
The effect of teamwork on the organization of production has received increased 
attention after the seminal works by Marschak (1955), Marschak and Radner (1972), 
Groves and Radner (1972) and Groves (1973).  However, their treatments focus on the 
effects of private information on team operation and the optimal incentive structure for 
team production.  Lazear (1998) describes three economic motivations for teamwork in 
production: (i) complementarities arising from joint production by workers, (ii) returns to 
specialization, and (iii) gains from knowledge transfer by workers with privately held 
information about the production process.  The labor exchange teams modeled here are 
primarily taking advantage of the first motivation for teamwork identified by Lazear.  
to major urban centers could explain Benjamin’s failure to reject labor market perfection. 
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These teams are consistent with labor teams discussed by Rosen (1986), in which the 
benefits of teamwork derive from simultaneous work activity by multiple, possibly 
homogenous, workers.  The agricultural work involved is typically homogenous and 
repetitive, so gains from specialization are small.  Also, the private information held by 
team members is not as important as in the works by Marschak, Radner and Groves 
because the work is coordinated and performed jointly.  Other research on the 
significance of returns to teamwork in labor decisions has considered how team 
production technology, modeled as a coordination requirement, affects work schedules 
and market wages (Deardorff and Stafford, 1976; Weiss, 1996; Fitzgerald, 1998).  The 
analysis here shows that returns to teamwork may have even broader implications for 
labor markets by providing an impetus for development of a significant non-market labor 
institution when labor markets fail. 
Gains from teamwork also featured prominently as a motivation for the hierarchical 
relationship between employer and employee when the employee is subject to moral 
hazard in the seminal paper by Alchian and Demsetz (1972).  In this relationship, the 
employer, who is the residual claimant, is required to serve as principal in order to 
monitor the employee and reduce shirking.  Holmström (1982) argues that no monitoring 
is required but that the employer is needed to break the budget in order to eliminate the 
incentive to shirk.  The fundamental role of the employment relationship in both of these 
papers is to assign residual claimancy in order to eliminate shirking that characterizes 
team production when output is pooled.  In this context, labor exchange provides an 
interesting alternative solution to the moral hazard problem in output pooling teams.  
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Rather than pooling output, labor exchange team members pool their labor and reduce the 
incentive to shirk by assigning the role of residual claimant in each round of the rotation.  
Moreover, labor exchange arrangements may provide stronger effort incentives than the 
standard employment relationship.  Rotating the employer role boosts effort incentives by 
adding reciprocity to the effort exchange.  In addition, non-hosting members have an 
incentive to monitor their teammates in order to gain information about their performance 
in future rounds.
Imperfect access to market labor has featured prominently in agricultural household 
models and has mixed empirical support.  Lewis (1954) developed the classical model of 
labor market dualism for economies characterized by surplus labor.  Other models of 
underemployment include Stiglitz (1982) and Bardhan (1984).  Various sources of labor 
market failures have been used to explain the downward rigidity of wages in the presence 
of underemployment in models of efficiency wages (Leibenstein, 1957; Mirlees, 1975; 
Stiglitz, 1976; Bliss and Stern, 1978a, 1978b).  Empirical evidence mostly supports the 
presence of labor market imperfections in rural developing economies (Jacoby, 1993; 
Skoufias, 1994; Bowlus and Sicular, 2003).  Exceptions have been found primarily in 
regions with significant employment opportunities (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1984; 
Bowlus and Sicular, 2003).  Benjamin (1992) tests for rationing of hours worked in the 
labor market in a model of households’ off-farm labor supply for Indonesian rural farm 
households on Java.  He also tests for two other sources of labor market imperfections 
incorporated in the model presented here: constraints to hiring labor on-farm and 
different efficiencies of family and hired labor.  Benjamin emphasizes that these 
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alternative labor market imperfections are not mutually exclusive.  Constraints to labor 
transactions may coexist with moral hazard for hired labor.  Also, households may face 
tight labor markets for hiring-in during the peak season and slack markets for off-farm 
employment in the slack season.  The model I present here differentiates between these 
sources of labor market imperfections because they have different implications for when 
labor exchange will arise as an alternative to market labor.  
In this chapter, I develop the model of a farmer’s decision to use labor exchange as a 
function of endowments, production technology and factor market constraints.  I 
demonstrate how the possibility of returns to teamwork generalizes the potential set of 
observed activities with respect to the labor market and creates the potential for labor 
exchange.  I then present the effects of this generalization on the modes of production 
identified by Eswaran and Kotwal.  This theoretical result is developed because the 
effects of endowments and prices on the demand for labor exchange depend on the size 
of the endowments and on which set of constraints is binding, the determinants of the 
modes of production.  After establishing this intermediate result, I systematically explore 
how working capital, farm size, household size and wage rates affect the labor exchange 
decision for farmers using different modes of production.  Through this approach, I am 
able to explain the role of teamwork, factor market imperfections, labor market 
conditions and the distribution of land in the decision to use exchange labor.
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2.2 A Model of Labor Exchange
Production is a function of land and labor.  At the beginning of each season, households 
have an endowment of land, A , and a labor endowment determined by the number of 
household members, Hn , with total household labor time given by HnT , 1≥T .  Labor 
time on farm comes from three sources, household labor time on farm, H, and external or 
non-household labor time on farm, L, which can be hired in the paid labor market or 
through labor exchange.  In order to highlight the role of teams, consider labor time by 
source as a function of the number of workers, HH nhH =  and EEMM nhnhL += , where 
ih  and in  are hours per worker and number of workers, respectively, for the ith worker 
type, i=H,M,E.  For simplicity, assume hours per worker for external labor is set by 
convention and normalized to one, 1== EM hh .
16  This makes it possible to summarize 
the demand for external labor on farm by the number of market and exchange labor 
workers, so that EM nnL += .  The size of the labor team working on the farm is the sum 
of the number of paid laborers, exchange laborers, and household members,  
HEM nnnN ++= .  
17
16 One interpretation of this assumption is that, for technological reasons, the period over which external 
labor is needed is fixed and the farmer only needs to decide how many workers to employ.  This would be 
the case if use of external workers is required only for labor-intensive tasks, and the time sensitivity of 
these tasks require that they be completed in a specific number of days.  This is a reasonable depiction of 
labor demand for planting irrigated rice, for example, in the sample area in the Indonesian data used here.
17 By the normalization used here, in , i=M,E, represents both the number of workers and the number of 
hours secured on farm through the ith labor arrangement.  Because each household member is endowed 
with 1≥T units of time, Hn  represents only the number of household members.  
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In order to allow for the possibility of returns to teamwork in production, the production 
function takes the form
(2.1) ( )NLHAf ,, + ,
where A is area planted (which may be greater than or less than A ); and labor team size 
enters the production function as a separate argument from total labor time used on-farm.  
The production function is increasing in land and labor time, is linearly homogenous, 
strictly quasiconcave, and twice continuously differentiable in each of its arguments with 
jif ij ≠∀> ,0 .18  The last assumption assures that all pairings of inputs are substitutes.  
Also, both land and labor are essential inputs: ( ) 0,,0 =+ NLHf , ( ) 00,0, =Af .  In this 
specification, returns to teamwork arise as an additional, incremental effect of team size 
on output independent of total labor time.  I define “returns to teamwork” by the sign of 
the partial derivative of the production function with respect to its third argument, 3f .  I 
assume the production function is concave in team size, with 3f  positive, zero, and then 
negative as team size increases, corresponding to positive, zero and negative marginal 
returns to teams, respectively.  With zero marginal returns to teams, team size has no 
effect on output independent of its effect through labor time and the production function 
behaves in a more classical manner with output a function of area and labor time.  
However, this specification of the production function is justified whenever labor time 
18 Subscripts on functions denote partial derivatives with respect to the argument(s) listed.  For example, 
( ) ini xxxgg ∂∂= ,...,1  and ( ) jinij xxxxgg ∂∂∂= ,...,12 .
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per worker is not perfectly substitutable for number of workers, which may be common 
in practice.19  A similar specification of the production function has been used elsewhere 
to model the effects of team production on work schedules and employment (Fitzgerald, 
1998).20
Modeled in this way, returns to teamwork are most easily interpreted as arising from 
returns to team size.  This simplification focuses the discussion while still providing some 
context for general returns to teamwork.  As described in detail in Chapter 1, there are 
many sources of efficiency gains from team production.  In addition to classical returns to 
the number of workers, the benefits of teamwork include returns to specialization, 
increased motivation, shorter duration of time-sensitive tasks, and improved scheduling 
of tasks.  Many of these sources of returns to teamwork are concave in team size, and so 
are captured implicitly in the model developed here.  Returns to team production arise in 
many agricultural settings, where coordination of activities by multiple workers allows 
tasks to be completed more quickly, more efficiently, and with less monotony.  
External laborers secured either from the paid labor market or through participation in a 
labor exchange team are subject to moral hazard.  In this model, moral hazard arises 
because realized output is a noisy signal of input use,
19 For example, if team size has no marginal effect on output independent of labor time ( )03 =f , then 
hours per worker and number of workers are perfect substitutes and a one unit decrease in, say, Hn ,  can 
be exactly offset by a one unit increase in Hh .  However, if there are positive returns to teamwork 
( )03 >f , then output increases by reducing Hh  by one unit and increasing Hn  by one unit.
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(2.2) ( )NLHAfq ,, += ε ,
where ε is a random production coefficient with expected value one, representing 
unobserved stochastic determinants of production.  The presence of ε implies that the 
farmer cannot identify the level of q, A, L, or N simply by knowing the other three (where 
H is assumed known).  In agriculture, a number of factors contribute to this random 
production coefficient.  Although rainfall levels or the presence of pests is observable, the 
full effects of these stochastic events and their interactions on productivity are unknown 
to the farmer, making it impossible to infer the labor contribution.  Because of moral 
hazard, the household must also devote time to supervising external workers, which is 
captured in the supervision function, ( )Ls .21  This is one source of labor market 
imperfections in this model.  Assume 0>′s , 0>′′s , ( ) 00 =s , and ( ) 10 <′s .22  The latter 
assumption ensures that supervision costs alone will not rule out the use of external labor 
in the absence of returns to teamwork.  The second source of labor market imperfections 
is search costs for all labor transactions.  Labor transactions for hiring market labor or 
labor exchange each incur a per-head search cost, Mc  and Ec , respectively, that reduces 
20 See also Roumasset and Uy (1980), where labor quantity and effort are separate arguments of the 
production function, via an intermediate input function, in part to allow for team production.
21 A more realistic characterization of the supervision function would have supervision costs declining in 
household size (eg, ( )HnLs ).  Since this detail does not substantively affect the analysis, I omit it for 
simplicity.
22 Labor exchange may have stronger inherent effort incentives than the average hired labor contract, which 
includes a high share of low-powered time rate contracts.  The characteristics of labor exchange that 
provide effort incentives include reciprocity (Fehr, et al, 1997; Fehr, et al, 1998), mutual monitoring of 
teammates (Kandel and Lazear, 1992, Dong and Dow, 1993), and reputation effects (Fudenberg and Tirole, 
1991; Tadelis, 1999).  If these effects are strong and monitoring technology is inexpensive (teammates 
work close together), then I could incorporate this distinction by modeling lower supervision costs for 
exchange labor than for market labor: ( ) ( )EM nsns ′>′  for EM nn = .  Incorporating these incentive 
differences would increase demand for labor exchange.  For now, I omit this detail from the model for 
simplicity.
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household labor time available for other activities.  Similarly, household off-farm labor 
supply, F, incurs a per-member-equivalent search cost, Fc .  These costs are similar to 
recruitment costs in Bardhan’s (1979) model of wages and unemployment in an agrarian 
economy.  Here, search costs are denominated in the time required to find the workers or 
the employment off farm.
The modes of production that arise are determined in part by constraints on the 
household’s labor time and working capital.  The household time constraint is 
(2.3) ( ) 0≥−−−−−−−− EEMMFEH ncncT
F
cLsHnFRnT ,
where each household member is endowed with 1≥T  units of time.  The household 
allocates the total time of all of its members to leisure, R, household off-farm labor 
supply, F, labor exchange, En , and cultivation on-farm, H.  It also pays a time cost for 
supervising external labor on farm and as search costs for labor transactions.23  Equation 
(2.3) shows that labor time obtained on farm through labor exchange must be 
reciprocated with an equal amount of time spent working on teammates’ fields.24
23 A household facing a per-head cost for entering the labor market, cF, will have some household members 
specialize in market labor, so that the fewest possible number of members enters the labor market.  As 
written in equation (3), a household member spending only a fraction of his time in the labor market pays 
only that fraction of the search cost.  A true per-head cost would require rounding F/T up to the nearest 
integer.  Ignoring this complication has little effect on the nature of the results.
24 Because hours per worker obtained on farm under labor exchange have been normalized to one, En
represents both the number of hours the household supplies off farm in labor exchange and the number of 
labor exchange workers hired on farm.
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The price of land is v and the wage rate for market labor is w.  Demand for factors is 
potentially constrained by holdings of working capital, B .  Sources of working capital 
include savings and credit.  Because access to credit in rural developing economies 
typically requires use of land holdings or other assets as collateral, working capital is 
closely related to asset holdings.  For simplicity, credit taken at the beginning of the 
season does not incur any interest charges.  In order to capture the role of credit market 
constraints, assume credit is rationed in the sense that there is an upper bound on the 
amount of credit that can be obtained.  A farmer can also obtain liquidity during the 
season by working off farm ( )0>F  or renting out land ( )AA < .  Farm income is not a 
source of liquidity because it is not earned until the end of the season.25  Based on these 
sources of liquidity, demand for land and market labor are subject to the working capital 
constraint 
(2.4) vAwnAvwFB M +≥++ .
The constraint requires that farm expenditures on paid labor and land rentals cannot 
exceed working capital, off-farm labor income, and the value of owned land.  Because 
land can be leased in or out, area cultivated is determined by this constraint on working 
capital.  Labor exchange does not enter the working capital constraint because it does not 
earn or cost liquidity.
25 Although labor income may be earned at any point the season, I implicitly assume that workers can 
borrow (costlessly) against this income at the beginning of the season.  Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) suggest 
that consumption loans by employers may be justified if workers have subsistence consumption levels and 
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All households have identical preferences over income, Y, and leisure and utility is 
additive in income and the utility derived from leisure, 
(2.5) ( ) ( )RuYRYU +=, , 
where 0>′u , 0<′′u , and ( )0u′  is infinite. The marginal utility of leisure is infinite when 
0=R , so that some time is always reserved for leisure.  Assuming endowments of A  are 
large enough that cultivation is profitable ( )0>A , the farmer maximizes household 
utility, (2.5), subject to constraints (2.3) and (2.4) and non-negativity constraints on the 
remaining choice variables:26
(2.6)    




















By the assumptions on ( )Ru , leisure always yields positive marginal utility, so the time 
constraint in (2.3) always binds.  The model in (2.6) incorporates this fact, with the time 
constraint rewritten so that household labor time spent on farm, H, is the residual time 
category.  Therefore, the first constraint in (2.6) is a non-negativity constraint on 
consumption affects productivity (see Foster and Rosenzweig, 1994).  However, the presence of such loans 
increases incentives for morally hazardous behavior.
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household labor time on farm.  It is determined during optimization by the selection of 
the other choice variables.  This simplifies the analysis by making it possible to substitute 
the time constraint into the production function.  By the concavity of ( )RYU ,  and the 
quasiconcavity of ( )NLHAf ,, + , the optimization problem in (2.6) has a unique 
solution.  The Lagrangean and first-order conditions for this problem are provided in the 
Appendix equations (A1).  The Kuhn-Tucker multipliers for the first two constraints are 
µ and λ, respectively.  The solution to the problem in (2.6) is a vector including farm area 
operated, leisure and labor supply and demand, each as a function of prices, v and w, and 
endowments, B , A , and Hn .
2.3 The Organization of Production
The availability of labor exchange and the possibility of returns to teamwork generalize 
existing models of the organization of agricultural production.  The models of Eswaran 
and Kotwal (1986), Feder (1985) and Carter and Zimmerman (2000) all rule out a mode 
of production in which working-capital constrained households simultaneously hire in 
and hire out labor (i.e., 0>Mn , 0>F ).  The rationale is that supervision costs for hired 
labor drive its shadow price above the market wage, making it unprofitable for a farmer 
to enter the labor market in order to finance labor expenditures at home.  However, with 
positive returns to teamwork, entering both sides of the labor market can be optimal.  
26 I normalize output prices to one and ignore discounting of farm income earned at the end of the season.
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Lemma 2.1: When external labor exhibits moral hazard, returns to teamwork are a 
necessary condition for simultaneously hiring and supplying labor in the 
market.
Proof:
Assume 0>Mn , 0>F .  By (A1.b)-(A1.d), 
(2.7) ( )Tccsuf FM ++′′+= µ3 >0. Q.E.D.
According to the equilibrium condition in equation (2.7), a farmer can take advantage of 
returns to teamwork by financing hired labor on farm with household labor supplied off 
farm.  At the optimum, the farmer undertakes the two activities until the marginal returns 
to teamwork equal the marginal cost of both finding and supplying off-farm work and 
recruiting and supervising hired workers on farm.  Bardhan (1982) identified contractual 
indivisibilities, specialization and land fragmentation as reasons why farmers may 
simultaneously buy and sell labor.  Sadoulet, de Janvry and Benjamin (1998) develop a 
model with heterogeneous household labor in which skilled household members 
specialize in non-agricultural labor off-farm while other family members hire unskilled 
labor to replace them on farm.  Here, I add returns to teamwork as another possible 
motivation for this common practice.  
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A corollary to Lemma 2.1 is that a necessary condition for labor exchange is returns to 
teamwork.27   Substituting (A1.b) into (A1.e), the analogue to equation (2.7) for labor 
exchange is
(2.8) ( )Ecsuf +′′+= µ3 .
A necessary condition for participation in a labor exchange team is that the marginal 
returns to teamwork equal the marginal cost, measured by the shadow value of household 
labor time spent on teammates’ farms plus the marginal disutility of time spent 
supervising and coordinating exchange labor.  For farmers that also devote some labor 
time to their own crops ( )0>H , equation (2.8) can be rewritten as ( )Ecsff +′= 23 .  
This form of the equilibrium condition shows that demand for labor exchange derives 
entirely from demand for team labor, since on farm labor time is effectively lowered 
through labor exchange.  Moreover, none of the other motivations for simultaneously 
hiring and supplying labor in the market can explain labor exchange.28
Equations (2.7) and (2.8) show that labor exchange implies behavior that is identical to 
simultaneously buying and selling labor in the market if the two arrangements have the 
same search costs.  Because neither activity draws down liquidity, each offers a means of 
taking advantage of returns to teamwork for working capital constrained households that 
cannot hire a paid labor team out of savings or on credit.  However, the joint use of both 
27 This corollary is proven by inspection of (A1.e).
28 The only possible candidate is specialization.  It is possible that farmers pool their labor through labor 
exchange to trade specialized skills.  However, evidence from Indonesia and sociological literature for 
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of these labor arrangements, while narrowly theoretically possible, is empirically unlikely 
so I rule it out.
Lemma 2.2: A farmer cannot simultaneously sell labor, hire market labor and 
participate in labor exchange ( 0>F , 0>Mn  and 0>En ).  
Solving (2.7) and (2.8) together shows that a necessary condition for 0>F , 0>Mn  and 




If the time cost of organizing a labor exchange team is identical to the combined cost of 
hiring labor and of finding work for household members in the labor market, a household 
may engage in all of these transactions simultaneously.  However, this condition is 
unlikely to hold as a strict equality, so this mode of production is formally ruled out.  
For agricultural activities that exhibit returns to teamwork, labor exchange offers an 
alternative to hiring a team by simultaneously buying and selling labor.  Which mode of 
production obtains depends on the relative size of search costs for each type of labor 
transaction.  Search costs for hiring labor through the market are likely to be high during 
peak periods of labor demand or where the supply of landless laborers is small.  
other countries suggests this is at most a secondary motivation for labor exchange.  Most tasks performed 
by labor exchange are homogenous, repetitive tasks that team members perform together in unison.
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Conversely, in a village characterized by surplus labor due, say, to a skewed distribution 
of landholdings, search costs for off-farm employment will be high.  Time costs for 
participation in labor exchange involve finding potential teammates and agreeing to the 
rotation of activities on team members’ farms.  These costs will be high where the share 
of households seeking labor exchange is small or where the size distribution of farms is 
highly variable, since cash payments are required if the exchange of labor time within the 
team is not reciprocal.
A comparison of these search costs determines, in part, which combination of labor 
activities will be observed.  If the search costs of participating in labor exchange exceeds 
those from financing labor purchases through labor sales ( Tccc FME +> ), it will be 
more profitable for a household to enter both sides of the labor market than to use 
exchange labor (i.e., 0>F , 0>Mn 0=⇒ En ).  Likewise, labor exchange has an 
advantage if each labor transaction incurs the same cost regardless of the source, 
cccc FME === , because labor exchange involves only one transaction.  Generally, 
households participating in labor exchange that also sell labor in the market will not hire 
any labor (i.e., 0>F , 0>En 0=⇒ Mn ) whenever labor exchange has lower 
transaction costs ( Tccc FME +< ).  In a village characterized by surplus labor, where 
household members have difficulty finding a paying job ( )00.,. =⇒>> Fcei F , the 
simultaneous use of paid labor and exchange labor may be observed.  Of course, if 
returns to teamwork are not large enough to cover the relevant transactions costs, none of 
these labor arrangements will be observed.  This is a function of returns to teamwork 
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being necessary but not sufficient for labor exchange or for simultaneous market labor 
purchases and sales.
These conditions on observed labor activities, like that in equation (2.9), depend on the 
specification of search costs as variable per-head costs of finding workers or 
employment.  If instead these transaction costs were fixed costs for entry into labor 
exchange or either side of the labor market, other combinations of labor activities may be 
observed.  However, in this model, the behavioral implications of participating in labor 
exchange are identical to those for simultaneously buying and selling labor in the market, 
so Lemma 2.2 still holds if the transactions costs are fixed costs.  A farmer seeking to 
increase team size on his farm without reducing the stock of working capital will either 
use labor exchange or simultaneously buy and sell labor in the market, depending on 
which activity incurs lower fixed transactions costs.  Another alternative specification is 
that search costs are declining in the number of workers employed in each type of 
transaction.  In this case, Lemma 2.2 may not hold.  However, given the farmer’s need to 
screen each worker when external labor exhibits moral hazard, constant per-head search 
costs seem to be a reasonable assumption.
It is now possible to characterize the modes of production that can arise with possible 
returns to teamwork and the availability of exchange labor.  The characterization is 
expressed in terms of the team technology, transaction costs, and which labor sources are 
at the corner solution.  Accordingly, 12 distinct modes of production can be identified.29
29 Note that the necessity of labor in production requires at least one of H, Mn , or En  to be positive.
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These are listed in Table 2.1.   The columns of Table 2.1 correspond to the market labor 
regimes identified in the classification by Eswaran and Kotwal (1986).  They are ordered 
as the set of optimal labor activities that arise with increasing endowments of working 
capital or land.  The rows of Table 2.1 differentiate returns to teamwork and exchange 
labor regimes.  They are listed in increasing order of returns to teamwork by labor 
exchange regime determined by the relative size of labor transactions costs. 
If agricultural production exhibits no returns to teamwork, we are in an Eswaran-Kotwal 
world, with four modes of production:  laborer-cultivators operate their own farms and 
supply labor in the market; self-cultivators cultivate their farms in autarky; small 
capitalists operate their farm using some hired market labor; and large capitalists devote 
all household labor time to supervising hired workers.  Labor exchange does not arise in 
this setting because of the absence of returns to teamwork.  An important result from 
Eswaran and Kotwal is that, with imperfections in the labor and credit markets, the set of 
optimal labor activities depends only on endowments of working capital and land.  Thus, 
with multiple factor market imperfections, the distribution of assets entirely determines 
the modes of production or, in the words of Roemer, the “class structure.”  I show 
presently that this unique correspondence of modes of production to asset endowments no 
longer applies when production exhibits nonlinearities due to positive returns to 
teamwork.30  The addition of transaction-specific search costs for labor transactions also 
30 Kevane (1996) discusses the implications of relaxing the assumption of constant returns to scale on a 
similar typology of agrarian structure.  Here, I obtain similar nonlinearities in the production technology 
while maintaining the assumption of global constant returns to scale by disaggregating the labor input into 
labor time and team size.
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complicates the typology.  Regardless of returns to teamwork, search costs could make 
some modes of production infeasible, shifting farmers among the columns of Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: The Organization of Production With Returns to Teamwork and Labor Exchange
Market Labor Regimes
Team Technology and 
     Exchange Labor Regimes laborer-cultivator self-cultivator small capitalist large capitalist
No returns to teams ( )03 =f  or ci prohibitive, i=E,M, or F
No labor exchange ( )0=En : 0,0,0 =>> MnHF 0,0,0 =>= MnHF 0,0,0 >>= MnHF 0,  0,F H= =
0Mn >
Moderate returns to teams* ( )03 >f








Labor exchange ( )0>En :
Tccc FME +<
0,0,0 =>> MnHF 0,0,0 =>= MnHF 0,0,0 >>= MnHF
Large returns to teams* ( )03 >>f








Labor exchange ( )0>En :
Tccc FME +<
0,0,0 ==> MnHF 0,0,0 === MnHF 0,0,0 >== MnHF
*These modes of production arise when transactions costs are small relative to the gains from returns to teamwork. 
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With the emergence of returns to teamwork, eight new modes of production are possible, 
four at moderate levels of returns to teams and four others if returns to teams in the 
technology are large.31  These new modes of production arise only if productivity gains 
from returns to teams are large enough to cover the search and other costs for the labor 
needed to take advantage of the team technology.  That is, in some areas where 
agriculture exhibits returns to teamwork, the search costs of organizing an exchange labor 
team or of joint purchase and sale of market labor may be prohibitive.  In these cases, 
only the four modes of production identified by Eswaran and Kotwal are observed 
despite the presence of technical returns to teamwork.  I now consider the other modes of 
production that can arise when returns to teams are sufficiently large to overcome the 
transactions costs of obtaining team labor.
At moderate levels of returns to teams, the optimal solution to the farmer’s problem still 
leads to some household labor time spent cultivating crops on-farm ( )0>H .  These four 
modes of production are distinguishable by relative search costs for each type of labor 
transaction and endowments of working capital.  If FME cT
cc
1+< , labor exchange 
offers a more profitable mechanism for taking advantage of returns to teamwork than 
does simultaneously buying and selling labor in the market.  One mode of production that 
emerges for households with small working capital endowments involves time allocated 
to own production, off-farm market labor supply, and labor exchange ( ,0,0 >> HF
31 Positive returns to team size is a characteristic of the technology that is a function of the level of the 
choice variables.  References here to size of returns to teams concern the technological component of the 
marginal productivity of team size.  For example, in a Cobb-Douglas functional form for the production 
function in (2.1), the exponent on team size is the technological parameter that determines the size of 
returns to teams at each level of the choice variables.
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)0,0 >= EM nn .  According to the first order conditions from equations (A1.c) and 












The farmer allocates land and labor to equate the marginal returns to team production 
from exchange labor to the marginal cost in terms of the shadow value of foregone 
wages, relative search costs, and supervision costs for exchange labor on farm.  Similarly, 
farmers with larger working capital endowments and facing moderate returns to 
teamwork will adopt modes of cultivation analogous to the self-cultivator or small 
capitalist modes of production with the addition of labor exchange when FME cT
cc
1+< .  
These modes of production are characterized by 0,0,0,0 >=>= EM nnHF  and 
0,0,0,0 >>>= EM nnHF , respectively.  Alternatively, if FME cT
cc
1+>  with 
moderate returns to teamwork, a single new mode of production arises in which a 
cultivating farmer simultaneously hires market labor and supplies labor to the market 
( )0,0,0,0 =>>> EM nnHF .  With modes of production defined only by technology, 
relative transaction costs, and binding non-negativity constraints on labor activities, this 
single new mode of production obtains in the first three market labor regimes, across 
much of the distribution of working capital endowments.  Within this mode of 
production, three cases can be distinguished by the relative amount of labor supplied off 
farm and hired on farm.  In the face of these relative transactions costs, farmers with 
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relatively small working capital endowments supply more labor off farm than hired on 
farm ( )MnF > .  Others within this mode of production will equate market labor supply 
and demand ( )MnF =  or will hire more labor than supplied in the market ( )MnF < , as 
working capital endowments increase.  These distinctions do not lead to unique modes of 
production by labor activities, but do provide a means of differentiating households in 
different “classes” of working capital endowments by comparison of the depth of their 
utilization of these activities.
If returns to teamwork are sufficiently large, the optimal solution to (2.6) will involve no 
household labor time on farm ( )0=H .  All time not devoted to leisure is more profitably 
spent increasing the size of the team labor force either by working in the labor market to 
finance hired labor on farm (when FME cT
cc
1+> ) or by participating in labor exchange 
(when FME cT
cc
1+< ).  These cases represent the four modes of production described in 
the last two rows of Table 2.1.
This typology indicates the endowment sensitivity of labor exchange.  Under returns to 
teamwork, labor exchange may arise for farmers at various levels of land endowments in 
the first three market labor regimes depending on relative labor activity transactions 
costs.  Labor exchange can be entirely ruled out only for farmers in the fourth market 
labor regime, those with the largest farms.  These farmers can afford to hire the labor 
needed to optimally exploit returns to teamwork.  They devote all of their labor time to 
supervision of this hired labor force.  
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These results demonstrate that, in the presence of returns to teamwork, the tidy 
classification of modes of production by working capital or land endowments alone no 
longer applies.  The team production technology and the cost of labor transactions also 
affect which mode of production is observed.  Moreover, returns to teamwork make labor 
exchange a viable labor arrangement for farmers across much of the distribution of 
working capital endowments.  Interestingly, although the farmer’s land endowment does 
not uniquely determine whether she participates in labor exchange through the 
endogenous selection of the mode of production, it affects her access to labor exchange 
through the village distribution of land endowments.  Because transactions costs for labor 
exchange, Ec , rise in teams of farmers with heterogeneous farm size, a farm’s location 
within the farm size distribution of potential exchange labor teammates affects whether 
labor exchange is part of that farmer’s mode of production.
2.4 Market Imperfections, Endowments and the Demand for Labor Exchange
The typology just developed indicates the conditions on technology, markets and 
endowments in which labor exchange can arise.  For various modes of production within 
this typology, I now consider how credit and labor market failures and household 
endowments of land and labor affect the decision to participate in labor exchange and the 
level of demand for labor exchange.
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The full effect of rationing in the capital market on the decision to use labor exchange can 
be assessed through comparative statics.  When the working capital constraint is not 
binding ( )0=λ , holdings of working capital and land endowments have no effect on the 










ei EE .  If the working capital 
constraint binds ( )0>λ , then savings, access to credit and land endowments shape the 
labor allocation decision.  
Consider the effect of an exogenous increase in working capital, say, through improved 
credit access ( )0>Bd , on the demand for exchange labor by constrained households.32




 for the 
three most prominent modes of production in which labor exchange is used: self-
cultivators using labor exchange, small-capitalist-cultivators using labor exchange, and 
laborer-cultivators using labor exchange.  These are the three modes of production 
involving labor exchange in the middle panel of Table 1, in which the farmer also 
supplies other labor on her own fields ( )0>H .  These modes of production are far more 
common in practice than the three modes of production involving labor exchange in the 
bottom panel of Table 1, in which no other household labor is used on farm.33
32 Because credit and land owned enter the working capital constraint in the same linear fashion, the effect 
of an increase in land endowments on demand for labor exchange differs from these results only by a 
scalar.
33 In the sample of Indonesian farmers from the 1998-99 PATANAS survey, only 6.8 percent of households 
using labor exchange by season supplied no other household labor on farm outside of their work with the 
labor exchange team.
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First, consider self-cultivators using labor exchange ( 0,0,0 =>= MnHF , 0>En ).  
The comparative statics analysis in (A2) of Appendix A shows that the effect of an 















The condition for 0>
∗
Bd
dnE  in (2.11.a) is weaker than the one for 0<
∗
Bd
dnE  in (2.11.b), but 
which condition is satisfied depends on the production and supervision technologies and 

















, then 0123132 =− ffff and 0>
∗
Bd
dnE .35  More generally, the conditions 
in (2.11.a) and (2.11.b) are related to the relative substitutability of labor time versus 
labor teams for land.  Although no concise conditions comparable to (2.11) on the 
relative elasticity of substitution for these factors can be derived, considering these 
elasticities provides some intuition.  The direct elasticity of substitution of labor time for 
land and of team size for land, respectively, are given by 
34 See (A2) in the Appendix for details.






















where LHT +=  represents labor time from any source.36  At a given level of factor use, 
a change in technology that increases 12f  lowers 
D
12σ  and reduces the chances of meeting 
the condition for 0>
∗
Bd
dnE  in (2.11.a).  The technologically-driven increase in 12f  makes 
labor time a poorer substitute for land.  As improved access to credit increases demand 
for land and labor, labor time increases in relative importance to team size as a source of 
labor because it is not as easily substituted for land as before the change.  This leads to 
weaker demand for labor exchange which is only a source of team labor and reduces total 




dnE  in (2.11.a), making it easier for an increase in credit access to lead 
to a rise in demand for labor exchange.  Again, this effect can be understood through the 
effect of an increase in 13f  on 
D
13σ .  The rise in 13f  reduces the substitutability of team 
size for land.  As greater access to credit increases demand for land, there must be a 
larger increase in team size relative to before the change in 13f .  For self-cultivators 
using labor exchange, the increase in team size can only come from labor exchange.  
36 Chambers (1988).
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Whether condition (2.11.a) or (2.11.b) holds empirically depends, in part, on the source 
of demand for team labor.  For example, if returns to teamwork derive from an activity 
that requires speedy completion, such as transplanting rice seedlings in irrigated padi, 
team size is a better substitute for land than is labor time.  Greater access to working 
capital will induce the use of more land and a shift of household labor time from labor 
exchange, for which this land more easily substitutes, toward on-farm cultivation.  This 
lowers supervision costs, increasing the amount of labor time on-farm for each hour of 
household labor supplied anywhere.  For a sufficiently large increase in B , a self-
cultivator using labor exchange may change modes of production and begin hiring labor 
as well.  Initially, this shift will reduce demand for labor exchange because of the 
availability of new wage labor substitutes.
Now consider the effect of an increase in access to working capital on demand for 
exchange labor for the mode of production of small-capitalist-cultivators using labor 
exchange.  Farmers operating under this mode of production employ market labor and 
participate in labor exchange, but do not supply labor in the market ( ,0,0 >= HF
0>Mn , 0>En ).  Improved access to working capital for these farmers relaxes a 
constraint on hiring paid workers from the labor market either to increase labor time or to 
expand team size on farm.  This effect should reduce demand for labor exchange as a 
source of team labor when paid labor alternatives exist.  To illustrate this effect, first-











2 1 λ , 
where I assume search costs in labor exchange and paid labor are identical ( )ccc ME == , 
for simplicity.  The household employs paid market labor and exchange labor until the 
marginal rate of technical substitution of labor time to team size equals their relative cost 
in terms of the shadow value of market labor time divided by the productivity cost of 
reduced household labor time on farm.  Equation (2.13) indicates one of the effects of 
imperfect capital markets.  A decrease in the shadow value of working capital, λ, lowers 
the marginal rate of technical substitution of work time to number of workers at the 
optimum.  This implies higher Mn  and lower En , since a decrease in team size through 
labor exchange increases labor time.  This also demonstrates that exchange labor is an 
imperfect substitute for paid labor, effectively satisfying only the team labor portion of 
labor demand.
However, this substitution effect of paid labor for exchange labor is not the full effect of 
a relaxation of the working capital constraint on demand for exchange labor in this mode 
of production.  Increased liquidity for working capital constrained farmers also leads to 
larger operated land area at the optimum and a general increase in demand for team labor.  
Some of this new demand for team labor may be met through labor exchange, although 
the relative intensity of exchange labor use may decline.  Whether substitution toward 
paid labor dominates the expanded demand for team labor in the effect of additional 
working capital on demand for labor exchange depends, among other things, on the 
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substitutability of labor time for team size and the relative size of search costs for paid 
labor and exchange labor.  The comparative statics analysis in (A3) in Appendix A shows 
that, because of these competing effects, an increase in access to working capital has an 
ambiguous effect on demand for labor exchange for farmers who are small-capitalist-
cultivators with labor exchange.  Nonetheless, some additional insight can be gained by 




dnE  is 1>+′ cs , as shown in (A3) in Appendix A.  Supervision and 
search costs comprise the entire marginal cost of exchange labor.  However, they 
represent a fraction of paid labor costs, which also include a wage component.  One 
effect of an increase in credit access is to reduce the shadow cost of the wage component 
of paid labor costs.  The preceding result states that when, in addition, the incentive and 
transaction cost component is large, greater access to capital reduces demand for 
exchange labor as paid labor becomes relatively more affordable.  This is the negative 
substitution effect of an increase in working capital on demand for labor exchange.  In 
general, when leisure is not fixed, it is not possible to obtain simple sufficient conditions 




 for this mode of production.  The ambiguity of this effect, 
particularly for farmers using paid labor as well as labor exchange, suggests that the role 







 in the laborer-cultivator mode of production with labor exchange.  
Farmers operating under this mode of production use labor exchange and supply labor to 
the market, but do not hire paid labor ( ,0,0 >> HF 0=Mn , 0>En ).  Section (A4) of 
Appendix A shows that the effect of increased access to working capital on demand for 
labor exchange for farmers in this mode of production is positive:














where ijC  is the (signed) cofactor for the ith row and jth column of the Hessian matrix of 
second derivatives of the production function.  Farmers in this mode of production that 
obtain increased access to working capital use the additional liquidity to finance an 
increase in the scale of operation through land acquisition.  This increases demand for 
labor on farm.  The farmers respond by decreasing labor time supplied off-farm and 
devoting more time to own-cultivation.  However, this increase in labor time on farm 
cannot meet the new demand for team labor under positive returns to teamwork.  
Therefore, demand for labor exchange rises. 
Because the working capital constraint is linear in working capital and land endowments, 
equation (2.14) also implies that demand for labor exchange is increasing in land area 
owned for farmers in this mode of production.  These farms are the smallest in the 
continuum of market labor regimes in Table 1.  This result shows that at this low scale of 
operation, labor exchange will be part of the process of development, providing the sole 
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source of team labor as greater access to working capital allows the farmer to expand his 
operated area.
Next, I demonstrate the effect of an increase in the household labor endowment, or 





.  For small-capitalist cultivators 
using labor exchange or laborer-cultivators using labor exchange, it is not possible to 





.  However, for self-cultivators using labor exchange, the 
effect of an increase in household size on demand for labor exchange is given by 







where ∆  is the Hessian matrix for the Langrangean for this problem and is positive by 
the characteristics of the production and utility functions.  See Section A5 in Appendix A 
for details.  The term ( )( )2322 TffcsTu E −+′′′  is positive and represents the role of 
additional household members in raising demand for labor exchange by increasing the 






.  This is the effect of the larger household in substituting for labor 
exchange as a source of team labor.  If this substitution effect of larger household size 
exceeds the time endowment effect, then demand for labor exchange will decline as 
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household size increases.  Whether the substitution effect dominates is an empirical issue 
that will be tested in Chapter 4.  
The effect of household size on demand for labor exchange for self-cultivators depends 
on whether the household is working capital constrained.  If the household is working 
capital constrained, an increase in household size leads to additional labor resources to be 
applied to a farm of fixed size.  The negative substitution effect of household size on 
demand for labor exchange teams may be relatively large in this setting.  On the other 
hand, if the household is not working capital constrained it will adjust to the presence of 
additional labor resources by increasing operated land area at the optimum.  This 
dampens the downward effect of household size on demand for labor exchange because 
some of the additional labor resources are used to create a more extensive operation, not 
only a more intensive one.  For the other modes of production that involve hiring or 
selling labor in the market, demand for labor exchange should be independent of 
household size for households that are not working capital constrained.  For constrained 
households, there are similar substitution and time endowment effects and the net effect 
is an empirical question.  Overall, this implies that household size should have either no 
effect or an attenuated effect on labor exchange use for unconstrained households.  If the 
substitution effect dominates, the effect of household size should be more negative for 
households that are constrained.
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2.5 Conclusion
The model developed here generalizes the multiple market failure model of Eswaran and 
Kotwal (1986) to include coordination benefits from teamwork.  This makes it possible to 
establish the relative importance of the two most prominent explanations for the presence 
of labor exchange teams in agriculture, returns to teamwork and imperfections in labor 
and credit markets.  Returns to teamwork are a necessary condition for the presence of 
labor exchange teams.  Moreover, labor exchange only satisfies demand for team labor; it 
leads to a net reduction in labor time on-farm because it draws more productive 
household workers off farm as a way to attract teams.  The argument that farmers join 
labor exchange teams because they do not have the cash to hire market laborers is fleshed 
out here.  This scenario can only arise for farmers that are already employing both market 
labor and labor exchange when supervision costs for external laborers are high.  For 
farmers that are autarkic with respect the labor market but use some exchange labor, 
greater access to working capital increases demand for land and may increase demand for 
labor exchange, depending on the relative substitutability of labor time and team size for 
land.  For farmers that also work as laborers in the paid labor market, greater liquidity 
unambiguously increases demand for labor exchange as a needed source of team labor as 
the operation expands.  These results show that the effect of credit market imperfections 
on demand for labor exchange are more subtle than previously described in the literature 
on labor exchange.  As credit markets develop and working capital becomes more 
available, labor exchange use will increase among the smallest farmers.  Larger farmers 
that also employ paid labor may reduce their reliance on labor exchange, although this 
66
effect is not guaranteed and depends on the characteristics of the production and 
supervision technologies.  If the process of development is characterized by a reduction 
in population density in rural areas, average farm sizes may grow.  This makes it more 
likely that demand for labor exchange will decline. 
In addition to explaining the determinants of labor exchange, the model developed here 
justifies more of the observed modes of production in agriculture and clarifies the role of 
employment itself in the organization of agriculture.  I show that allowing for returns to 
teamwork in production explains the common practice in agriculture of simultaneously 
employing labor on farm and supplying labor off farm.  Although other explanations for 
this practice exist, only returns to team size also explains the use of this practice through 
the institution of labor exchange.  Where returns to teamwork and labor exchange exist, 
the number of possible modes of production characterized by the pattern of observed 
labor activities is much greater than in the model by Eswaran and Kotwal.  The mode of 
production that is optimally chosen by the farmer becomes a function, not only of access 
to working capital, but also of production technology, labor transaction costs and the 
local distribution of land.  This increases the ability of the model to explain observed 
patterns of labor use.
The returns to team production introduced here are very general.  They are consistent 
with the coordination benefits that Alchian and Demsetz (1972) use as a rationale for all 
employment relationships.  In their seminal paper, employment occurs in order to take 
advantage of these coordination benefits.  The hierarchical employer-employee 
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relationship arises in order to assign residual claimancy, as a method of overcoming the 
weak incentives in output-pooling team production.  The employer then has an incentive 
to monitor the employees and reduce shirking.  These incentives are strengthened further 
in labor-pooling exchange labor teams through reciprocity in the rotation of the role of 
employer and through dynamic incentives for all team members to monitor each other.  
In the model by Eswaran and Kotwal, additional credit is always used to obtain more land 
and increase the scale of operation.  This implies that the reason for the employment 
relationship is so that agents endowed with more land can obtain labor services from 
those with less land, thereby establishing an equilibrium of returns to labor across farms.  
Eswaran and Kotwal reject the teamwork motivation for employment in agriculture as 
empirically irrelevant.37  The model developed here explicitly returns Alchian and 
Demsetz’ motivation of gains from teamwork to the labor relationship.  I show that a 
rather different pattern of the organization of production arises that more fully explains 
observed modes of production.  
37 In Chapter 4, I provide estimates of return to teamwork in agriculture that refute this claim.  
68
3 The Indonesian Survey Data and Preliminary Evidence on the Determinants of 
Labor Exchange 
3.1 The Indonesian PATANAS Survey Data
The empirical investigation into the operation and determinants of agricultural labor 
exchange uses the 1998-99 round of an Indonesian agricultural household panel survey 
data set known by its Indonesian acronym, PATANAS.38  I collaborated with a research 
team from the Indonesian Center for Agro-Socioeconomic Research (CASER) and the 
World Bank to collect the data in April and May of 1999.  The household survey 
provides data on nearly 1500 households from 35 villages from six of Indonesia’s 27 
provinces:  Lampung, West Nusa Tenggara, Central Java, East Java, North Sulawesi and 
South Sulawesi.  This round of the PATANAS survey is well suited to this research.  It 
provides detailed information on agricultural production, asset ownership, savings, and 
credit use.  The on-farm labor demand module of the questionnaire captures labor hours 
by contract type (i.e., time wage, piece rate, labor exchange), by season and activity.  
Individual labor supply is available for all household members.  This sample captures 
much of the diversity of agro-ecological zones in these provinces, and so should provide 
sufficient variation in crop mix and technology to inform how these factors affect the use 
of labor exchange.  It should also contain considerable regional variation in the depth of 
factor markets.  The two provinces on Java are very densely populated and are easily 
accessible from Jakarta, the capital and main commercial center of the country.  The 
38 This Indonesian acronym stands for Panel Petani Nasional, which translates into National Farmer Panel 
Survey.  This is a misnomer because the survey never included more than 8 of Indonesia’s 27 provinces.
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provinces in Sulawesi, on the other hand, are less densely populated and significantly 
more remote.  There is also considerable variability from village to village within a 
province in terms of access to urban centers.  This variability should help to identify the 
role of labor and credit market failures in the decision to use labor exchange. 
The 1998-99 round of the PATANAS sample has the most comprehensive questionnaire 
of an annual household panel survey that covers 1994-99.39  The survey includes village 
censuses in 1994 and 1998, and more limited surveys on selected topics in 1994-95, 
1995-96, 1996-97.  The 1994-95 survey included an agricultural production module, but 
with primary focus on a single plot and with less detail on labor demand than the 1998-99 
round.  The other survey rounds provide some evidence on the prevalence of labor 
exchange, but do not enable a full accounting of the source of exchange labor demand.  
Therefore, I take advantage of the earlier survey rounds to investigate patterns of 
prevalence of labor exchange, but I only use data from these rounds in estimation as a 
source of some retrospective variables.
The sample design was a purposive sample within these six provinces, intended to cover 
much of the substantial diversity of agro-ecological conditions in Indonesia.  The 
sampling approach involved a two-stage clustered random sample with two levels of 
stratification.  First, each province was stratified into up to five agro-ecological zones 
characterized by elevation above sea level and length of the rainy season.  Villages were 
then selected from within the agro-ecological zones to capture the key crops, 
39 CASER first conducted an annual agricultural household survey under the acronym PATANAS from 
1984-88.  This survey used a different sampling frame from the PATANAS surveys of the 1990s.
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topographies and cropping patterns, in number proportional to the size of the zone.  
Within each village, a “block census” was conducted in 1994 over a sub-region of the 
village because funding and time constraints precluded a complete village census.  
Villages in Indonesia consist of a series of kampung or sub-regions differentiated by 
physical borders such as a river or road.  In the first stage, data were collected on each 
kampung concerning primary sources of economic activity, crops grown, and 
topographical characteristics.  CASER researchers then identified an area (or “block”) 
made up of one or more kampung that would provide a census population of close to 200 
households per village.  These blocks served as the sample clusters.  The kampung
chosen for the census were those considered to be qualitatively representative of the 
village population based on commodities grown and share of households with livelihoods 
based in agriculture.  A benefit of this clustered sample for socio-economic research is 
that the households surveyed in each village are likely to have common institutional 
arrangements in land, labor and credit markets due to their proximity.  The 1994 census 
provided basic information on socio-economic, demographic and farm characteristics for 
6585 households in 35 villages in the 6 provinces.  Within each cluster, a random sample 
of approximately 50 households was chosen for the first survey round in October 1995 
from the roughly 200 census households per village, yielding a sample of 1758 
households.  The sample of households selected from the census was stratified by 
landholdings (of 0 ha., 0-0.25 ha., 0.25-0.49 ha., 0.5-1.0 ha., and >1.0 ha.) and farming 
status (primary income source from agriculture or outside agriculture).40  Although the 
sample does not constitute a “representative sample” of rural Indonesia, or of the rural 
40 An Indonesian-language summary of the PATANAS sample design is provided in Soentoro et al (1994).
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areas of the six provinces, it provides a detailed picture of the major agricultural activities 
in these provinces.  
Of the original 1758 households in the 1994-95 sample, 1588 were re-interviewed in 
1999 (an attrition rate of only 9.7 percent in four years).  Enumerators were mostly 
CASER researchers with extensive experience in data collection and in research on 
production and socio-economic activities of farm households.  All enumerators resided in 
the study villages during the enumeration in 1999.  In addition to assisting in the design 
of the questionnaire, particularly the labor modules, I accompanied the research team for 
the pre-test of the survey instrument.  During the enumeration, I visited several of the 
enumeration teams in Central Java, West Nusa Tenggara, and South Sulawesi.  Once the 
data were available electronically, they were carefully checked for errors.  After 
removing observations because of data inconsistencies, the final 1998-99 data set 
includes 1494 households (an effective attrition rate of 15 percent).  Each of the 35 
villages had between 28 and 49 households interviewed, with an average of 43 
households per village.  Table B.1 in Appendix B lists the name of each village, its 
district or kabupaten, and the main crops grown, by province.  Table B.2 provides the 
number of household observations per village for the 1999 sample.
At the same time that the household survey was being conducted, two Indonesian 
sociologists visited a number of the 1998-99 PATANAS sample villages and some 
neighboring villages.  Their main objective was to investigate the effects of the 1997-98 
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Indonesian financial crisis on the households in these villages.41  Through focus group 
discussions and interviews with key informants, the sociologists collected information on 
land tenure arrangements, borrowing and lending behavior, rural household attitudes 
toward asset management and risk, inter- and intra-household relationships, incidence of 
illicit activities, formal and informal institutional arrangements, communal activities, and 
maintenance/upgrading of village infrastructure and social services.  These qualitative 
data provide some useful background information on labor arrangements and on the 
completeness of rural labor markets.
3.2 The Prevalence and Operation of Labor Exchange Teams 
Labor exchange is common in Indonesia.  In the 1998-99 PATANAS sample, labor 
exchange teams were found in 23 of the 35 villages.  The names of these villages are 
listed in bold font in Appendix Table B.1.  I will refer to these as “labor exchange 
villages,” a classification which requires some justification.  Most of the same villages 
had evidence of labor exchange in the 1994-95 round of the PATANAS survey and in the 
1998 village census.  Using data on the primary plot for the 1994-95 sample—the only 
plot for which labor contract type was reported—26 of the 35 villages had the same labor 
exchange classification in both 1994-95 and 1998-99.  Of the remaining villages, only 
two had some labor exchange in 1994-95 and not in 1998-99.  In the seven villages with 
evidence of labor exchange in 1998-99 and not in 1994-95, it is not known whether labor 
41 The World Bank used the PATANAS panel survey to study the effects of the 1997-98 financial crisis on 
rural households.  See Gilligan et al (2000) and Bresciani et al (2002).
73
exchange was used on secondary plots in the first round.  The 1998 village census also 
provides considerable support for a classification of labor exchange villages based on the 
1998-99 sample, but the census data are less complete.  The 1998 census was not 
conducted in the province of East Java due to social unrest there, and in the other 
provinces nearly eight percent of households from the 1995-1999 panel were missing in 
the census.42  Moreover, complete production data were not collected in the 1998 census.  
Only a checklist was used to indicate use of external labor by contract type and activity, 
so I expect these data to be less reliable.  With these caveats in mind, the most significant 
inconsistency for the village labor exchange classification between the 1998-99 sample 
and the 1998 village census is that one village in South Sulawesi, Polo Padang, had 
extensive use of labor exchange in 1998, but no labor exchange in the 1998-99 sample.  
However, of the seven villages not in East Java with no labor exchange in 1994-95 or 
1998-99, only two villages had evidence of labor exchange in the 1998 census, and one 
of those involved only 2 households.  Finally, the 1996-97 PATANAS sample offers 
more support.  Respondents to the survey were asked how the prevalence of labor 
exchange had changed in the past decade, which provides indirect evidence of its 
presence in the village.43  As with the 1998 census, these data are less reliable because of 
their qualitative nature; they likely under-represent labor exchange prevalence.  Still, 
responses in the 1996-97 survey indicate that labor exchange was being used in 17 of the 
23 villages with labor exchange in 1998-99.  Of the 12 villages with no labor exchange in 
1999, only one had evidence of labor exchange in 1996-97.
42 I do not know why these households were omitted from the census.  The incompleteness of the 1998 
census does not seriously affect the sampling properties of the 1998-99 sample, which is based on the panel 
started with the 1994-95 sample and the census conducted in 1994.
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This overview of village-level prevalence of labor exchange in the PATANAS surveys 
shows no use of labor exchange in eight of the 35 villages over a four-year period.  This 
suggests that the institution of labor exchange does not exist everywhere.  There may be 
fixed costs arising from the need to agree on rules of operation as well as learning effects 
that keep labor exchange from operating at all in some areas.  Therefore, I treat those 
villages without labor exchange in the 1998-99 sample as lacking the labor exchange 
institution.  Although early survey rounds indicate that a few of these villages may have 
had labor exchange in the recent past, the 1998-99 survey data are the most reliable so I 
use them to classify villages into those with and without labor exchange.  Farms in these 
“labor exchange villages” form the sample for the empirical investigation of the 
household decision to use labor exchange in the next chapter.  It is possible that a few of 
those villages omitted from the sample should have been classified as labor exchange 
villages, but no farmer in the 1998-99 chose to use labor exchange in that year.  If so, the 
most serious implication for the estimation in Chapter 4 is probably a loss in efficiency.
Table 3.1 lists the proportion of households primarily engaged in farming that used labor 
exchange in 1998-99 by village.  This farming sample includes 1209 households, of 
which 884 live in labor exchange villages.  In all, 201 of these households used labor 
exchange at least once in 1998-99.  This represents 16.6 percent of the entire farming 
sample and 22.7 percent of farming households in labor exchange villages.  The villages 
in which the labor exchange institution was operating in 1998-99 are geographically 
43 Counting only unique responses by households across activities, 71 percent said the prevalence of labor 
exchange had not changed, 22 percent said it was becoming more rare, and 6 percent said it was becoming 
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dispersed.  There are sample villages in all six provinces that have labor exchange, 
although the arrangement is not common in the sample from East Java.  
Table 3.1: Share of Farming Households Using Labor Exchange 
by Village, 1998-99 (%)
Province Village,
by ID Number Province
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Average
Lampung 7.1 14.3 27.9 8.5 18.4 2.4 13.0
Central Java 26.2 17.2 50.0 13.9 0.0 0.0 5.9 19.8
East Java 5.3 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 3.0
West Nusa Tenggara 0.0 7.3 7.1 21.7 47.8 19.0
North Sulawesi 0.0 32.6 0.0 0.0 8.8 9.8
South Sulawesi 0.0 32.5 78.6 0.0 56.1 0.0 27.7
TOTAL 16.6
Labor exchange is a significant source of labor for those households that use it.  On 
average, labor exchange constitutes 47.9 percent of all non-household labor hours on 
farm for households using labor exchange, with an interquartile range of 21.6 - 75.0 
percent.  Of these households, 16.9 percent use no other source of outside labor.  As a 
share of total on-farm labor demand, labor exchange constitutes an average of 14.8 
percent of labor hours by all sources for farms using labor exchange, with an interquartile 
range of 4.0 – 18.4 percent.  
more common.
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Sociologists studying labor exchange generally indicate that a farmer’s reliance on labor 
exchange fluctuates over time in response to changes in economic conditions and the 
time demands of team members (e.g., Erasmus, 1956; Geschiere, 1995).  Indeed, in his 
extensive studies of labor exchange in South American and the Caribbean, Erasmus only 
found one example of the use of permanent or semi-permanent exchange labor teams, in 
Haiti.  Evidence from the PATANAS sample supports this view, as farmers show
considerable variability in their use of labor exchange.  Despite considerable stability in 
the presence of labor exchange as an institution in a village, farmers in labor exchange 
villages move in and out of labor exchange for subsequent activities within seasons, 
across seasons within a year, and from year to year.  The 1998-99 PATANAS survey 
records labor use by plot and season for farming activities grouped into six categories: 
land preparation, plowing, planting, weeding, harvesting, and milling/transport.  For each 
season in which a farmer used labor exchange for at least one farming activity in 1998-
99, 35 percent participate in labor exchange again for subsequent activities in the same 
season.  Table 3.2 presents the distribution of the labor contracts by type across seasons 
in 1998-99.44  The PATANAS survey includes hours of labor demand under labor 
exchange and by four types of paid market labor: daily wage, piece rate, output share and 
tied contracts.45  The survey also recognizes whether it was a team that performed work 
under each of these paid labor contracts, but the size of the team is not known.46  Of the 
44 The timing of the seasons during the year varies by region, but roughly corresponds to the following 
months on the calendar:  dry season I, April−June 1998; dry season II, July−September 1998; rainy season, 
October 1998−March 1999.  
45 Under tied contracts, the worker supplies labor for multiple activities during the cropping season (e.g., 
planting, weeding, harvesting) and agrees to wait for payment for all activities until after the harvest (see 
Mukherjee and Ray (1995) and Caselli (1997)).
46 In many cases, production data were aggregated across plots during enumeration when multiple plots 
were homogenous with respect to crops grown and farming technique.  This aggregation reduces the total 
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826 labor exchange contracts recorded in 1998-99, 58.2 percent took place during the 
rainy season.  Of the 204 households in the full sample that used labor exchange in at 
least one season, 35.8 percent used labor exchange again in another season that year.  
Only one third of the households using labor exchange in 1998-99 reported using it on 
their main plot in 1994-95.  These results understate labor exchange use in 1994-95 
because information on labor contract type is only available for the main plot for that 
year.  However, 109 other households reported using labor exchange on their main plot in 
1994-95, but did not use it in 1998-99.  These patterns indicate that farmers do not make 
rigid commitments with labor exchange teammates from year to year or across seasons.  
Estimates of determinants of labor exchange participation in the next chapter will provide 
evidence of the economic motivations for this observed flexibility in labor exchange 
participation.
As described in Chapter 1, the two primary forms of agricultural labor exchange are what 
Erasmus (1956) termed “exchange labor” and “festive labor”.  The former involves 
immediate reciprocity in labor time and, typically, payments, if any, are limited to meals.  
In the latter, the timing of labor reciprocity is usually unspecified, so side payments are 
larger to compensate for delayed and less certain reciprocity.  The PATANAS 
questionnaire does not specify which form of labor exchange is operating.  The Bahasa 
Indonesia terms used for exchange labor in the survey instrument are sambatan or arisan 
kerja.  Both terms can be applied to either form of reciprocal labor exchange.47  In order 
number of labor contracts in the data, although contract-level observations are still unique by activity and 
form of payment.
47 The Indonesian word sambatan is also used for a third kind of labor exchange, commonly referred to as 
gotong royong, in which neighbors pool their labor for public good provision such as constructing roads 
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to avoid confusion in the following discussion, I will refer to the former type of labor 
exchange as “rotating exchange labor” and the latter as “festive labor”, since festive labor 
does not always include a complete rotation of team members as host.
Table 3.2: Distribution of Labor Contracts across Seasons by Type of 
Contract, 1998-99
Number of Contracts
Type of Seasonal Crops Annual Crops Total









 Daily wage 2546 1437 1896 752 6631
 Piece rate 851 342 578 268 2039
 Output share 391 51 165 21 628
 Tied 45 15 37 0 97
 Labor exchange 481 83 224 38 826
 Daily team 7 1 0 0 8
 Piece team 103 83 82 105 373
 Share team 198 2 64 6 270
 Tied team 3 0 3 1 7
 Other 46 7 22 21 96
Total 4671 2021 3071 1212 10975
A review of secondary sources and inspection of payments made under labor exchange in 
the PATANAS sample suggest that rotating exchange labor is the more common form of 
reciprocal labor exchange team in the data.  Goethals (1967) describes the operation of 
labor exchange teams in Rarak village in West Sumbawa, which is in one of the districts 
in West Nusa Tenggara represented in the PATANAS sample.  According to Goethals, 
rotating exchange labor and two forms of festive labor are used in Rarak, but the former, 
and public buildings.  The word arisan refers to a scheme for periodic contributions from a group with a 
rotating schedule of rewards.  When used alone, the word arisan most commonly refers to rotating savings 
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known there as basiru, is more common and is used for more tasks.  Utomo and Chotim 
(2000), the sociologists that accompanied the 1998-99 PATANAS fieldwork, confirm the 
use of basiru rotating exchange labor teams in some of the sample villages in Lombok, 
West Nusa Tenggara.  However, in contrast to the description of basiru given by 
Goethals, Utomo and Chotim indicate that basiru team members sometimes received 
harvest shares when the basiru rotating exchange labor teams were employed for 
harvesting activities.  This suggests some flexibility in the structure of the organization of 
labor exchange arrangements and that it is not always possible to strictly classify teams 
according to the characteristics of rotating exchange labor or festive labor.  Utomo and 
Chotim also identify the use of conventional rotating exchange labor (without payments) 
in sample villages in Central Java, but in Pakuweru village in North Sulawesi a form of 
festive labor is used.
The pattern of cash or in-kind payments made through labor exchange generally supports 
the hypothesis that rotating exchange labor is more common than festive labor in the 
sample.  In the 1998-99 sample, 82.2 percent of the 826 labor exchange teams employed 
by farmers received some form of payment.  However, only 11.2 percent of labor 
exchanges included cash payments, and 72.1 percent included payments in kind.  
Presumably, most of these in-kind payments were in the form of meals, although some 
may have been harvest shares as indicated by Utomo and Chotim.  If these teams are 
exchange labor, payments should be relatively small compared to local wage rates and 
payments equivalent to those observed should be returned to the farmers in the sample as 
they complete the rotation of work on teammates’ farms.  If the teams are festive labor, 
and credit associations (ROSCAs).  The word kerja means work. 
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payments should be larger, but the labor time supplied on teammates farms and 
corresponding payment may not be observed in the twelve months covered by the survey.  
The data on labor supplied off farm by household members under labor exchange is less 
complete than the data on on-farm labor demand through labor exchange, so it is not 
possible to confirm reliably for farmers hiring labor exchange that reciprocal payments 
were received or that labor received was reciprocated.  
Table 3.3 shows median hourly pay by type of labor contract by province for all external 
labor used on farm in the 1998-99 sample.  The validity of these data is supported by the 
fact that higher incentive piece rate and output share contracts have higher median pay 
than low incentive time rate contracts.  In Lampung, East Java, and West Nusa Tenggara, 
median pay through labor exchange is about half the value of the wage rate.  This is 
consistent with an interpretation of these payments as the value of a mid-day meal for a 
work team providing hard physical labor under rotating exchange labor.  Table 3.4 shows 
the average share of labor payments made in-kind by type of labor contract.  Time rate 
contracts pay roughly one quarter of the wage in kind.  In time rate contracts, these in-
kind payments are mostly meals.  However, since not all time rate contracts supply 
meals, this figure is a lower bound on the share of meals in time rate payments.  
Therefore, largely in-kind payments of half the wage rate seems to suggest that the teams 
operating in Lampung, East Java, and West Nusa Tenggara are mostly rotating exchange 
labor teams.  In South Sulawesi, payments in labor exchange are roughly one quarter of 
the wage rate and in North Sulawesi, the median labor exchange team received no 
payment.  Median wage rates are also higher in these two provinces.  These results are 
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consistent with the general abundance of land and smaller supply of market farm labor in 
these areas.  Again, these figures suggest that rotating exchange labor is more common 
than festive labor in the sample villages in these two provinces.  The exceptional case in 
Table 3.3 is Central Java, where median pay received under labor exchange is equal to 
the median wage rate.  This suggests that some of the labor exchange contracts observed 
in Central Java may in fact be festive labor arrangements.  
Table 3.3: Median Hourly Pay by Type of Labor Contract by Province, 
1998-99 (Rp. ‘000)*
Province
Labor Contract Lampung Central 
Java






Daily wage 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.8 1.7
Piece rate 1.4 1.3 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.0
Output share 3.4 3.4 2.4 2.2 2.6 2.4
Labor exchange 0.43 1.1 0.50 0.63 0.0 0.4
* Payments across activities in tied labor contracts cannot be linked in the data, so these contracts are 
omitted.  The exchange rate in Q1 1999 was Rp. 8,776/$US (IMF, International Financial Statistics 
database).
If a fraction of the labor exchange teams observed in the sample are festive labor rather 
than exchange labor, this does not have serious consequences for this research.  The most 
important implication is that festive labor is less effective at overcoming cash constraints 
for the host farmer, since the party that accompanies festive labor is typically very costly 
and these costs are not recovered immediately through reciprocity.  In addition, the effort 
incentives are weaker in festive labor because of the delay in reciprocity.
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Although the predominance of the evidence supports the hypothesis that most of the labor 
exchange teams in the PATANAS sample are of the rotating exchange labor type, the 
frequency and magnitude of payments made through the labor exchange in the 
Indonesian data indicates that these arrangements transfer meaningful amounts of 
resources other than time.  
Table 3.4: Share of Labor Payment Made In-Kind 










Daily wage 6616 27.2 22.0
Piece rate 1961 1.3 10.4
Output share 619 98.6 10.5
Tied 82 88.5 31.4
Labor exchange 680 86.9 33.3
The PATANAS data provide other evidence on the operation of labor exchange teams 
concerning such issues as interlinked exchanges and team composition.  In describing 
labor exchanges in Rarak village in West Nusa Tenggara, Goethals (1967) states that 
labor exchanges are sometimes arranged as a mechanism for sharing farm equipment 
such as draft animals or plows.  These interlinked arrangements are rare in the 
PATANAS sample.  Only 6.9 percent of labor exchange teams were employed in 
plowing activities that involved animal traction or use of a tractor, and nearly all of these 
were in North and South Sulawesi.  
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The prevalence of female workers in labor exchange is similar to other labor 
arrangements.  In all labor exchange teams hired on farm by households in the 1998-99 
sample (excluding those interlinked with farm equipment), 61.8 percent were all male, 
31.6 percent were all female and 6.6 percent used males and females.  This compares to 
63.6 percent men, 33.0 percent women, and 3.4 percent mixed gender teams in all (non-
equipment) external labor used on farm.  However, labor exchange teams are somewhat 
more likely to be homogenous than work teams hired under other types of labor 
contracts.  The number of labor contracts, other than those interlinked with farm 
equipment, that involve work teams are primarily in labor exchange (N=754), piece rates 
(N=369), and output share contracts (N=270).  The fraction of these teams that included 
both genders was 6.6 percent, 6.8 percent and 38.5 percent, respectively.  Although labor 
exchange teams are just as likely as piece rate teams to be mixed-gender, they are far less 
likely to do so than teams paid by output shares.  Even if exchange labor contracts are 
restricted to those involved in harvesting work, as are all output share contracts, the 
fraction of teams that are heterogeneous rises only to 11.5 percent.  This evidence 
provides some support for the hypothesis that the membership of labor exchange teams 
tends to be homogenous as a means of equalizing productivity or fostering trust in these 
reciprocal exchanges.  However, it is not clear why piece rate teams are similarly 
homogenous, but output share teams much less so.  This pattern would be consistent with 
the hypothesis that teams pooling rewards select equally productive members if piece rate 
teams divide their compensation equally but output share teams pay members according 
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to how much each one harvested.  Unfortunately, I do not have sufficient information 
about the operation of these other team arrangements to confirm this claim.
3.3 Preliminary Evidence on Determinants of Labor Exchange:  Qualitative Evidence 
from Direct Elicitation
The most direct evidence on farmers’ reasons for participating in agricultural labor 
exchange is provided in the 1996-97 round of the PATANAS survey, which focused on 
land titling and agricultural labor relations.48  Farmers who participated in agricultural 
labor exchange were asked to provide the reason for their participation in each activity 
for which they used exchange labor by season.  The reasons coded in the questionnaire 
are unfortunately rather incomplete, but include (i) does not require cash, (ii) wages are 
high, (iii) labor supply is limited, and (iv) local custom.  The frequency of responses is 
listed in the first two columns of Table 3.5.  These responses were given by 183 farmers 
for various activities by season.  Because a farmer might be expected to repeat the same 
response for different activities, I consider the number of unique responses by each 
farmer.  Only 15 farmers varied their response to the question over activities.  The 
distribution of these 198 unique responses over the four reasons is similar to that for all 
responses as shown in the last two columns of Table 3.5.
48 The 1996-97 survey did not gather production data.  The section of the survey instrument that focused on 
agricultural labor relations identifies which type of labor contracts were used and the reasons for their use.  
Because these data were not collected in the context of a broader set of questions on factor demand, they 
are not as reliable an indicator of individual household use of labor exchange as are the data from 1994/95 
and 1998/99.  The 1996/97 survey does indicate reasons for using labor exchange, although possibly with 
uneven coverage of the sample.
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Table 3.5: Reasons for Participating in Labor Exchange, 1996-97
    All Responses Unique Responses
Reason Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Does not require cash 120 23.4 44 22.2
Wages are high 13 2.5 5 2.5
Labor supply is limited 25 4.9 13 6.6
Local custom 355 69.2 136 68.7
Total 513 100.0 198 100.0
Using the unique responses, 22.2 percent of the farmers in Table 3.5 indicate that 
constraints on liquidity induce them to participate in labor exchange.  Another 6.6 percent 
of labor exchange participants claim to use it because labor market imperfections make it 
hard to find workers.  Less than 3 percent of responses state that they use labor exchange 
to avoid paying high wage rates in the market.  This could represent another source of 
labor market imperfections, or it could be that these farmers are simply at a corner 
solution on their labor demand curves at wage rates that clear the market.  Surprisingly, 
when given a choice to identify capital market failures, labor market failures or local 
custom as the primary reason for using exchange labor, nearly 70 percent of households 
claimed that it is customary practice that led them to use labor exchange.  This suggests 
that factor market failures are not the primary source of demand for labor exchange in 
these data, although they are a significant reason identified by farmers.  To some extent, 
the coded response “local custom” is a residual category that respondents may have 
chosen if the need for speedy task completion or some other source of returns to 
teamwork was their main reason for using labor exchange.  However, with so many 
farmers choosing this response, the social obligations and rewards that come with 
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maintaining this customary practice must be an important influence on the decision to use 
labor exchange.  
A better understanding of the role of factor market failures is obtained by considering 
how responses differ by activity.  The first panel of Table 3.6 shows the frequency of 
reasons for using labor exchange by six activities: plowing, planting, weeding, 
harvesting, transport, and milling.  The share of farmers that use labor exchange for 
plowing and planting activities because it does not require cash is around 20 percent in 
each case, similar to this share for all activities.  However, 40 percent of farmers using 
labor exchange for weeding claim that cash constraints are the reason.  This provides 
some validation of farmers’ responses to this question, since we expect cash holdings to 
be lowest for activities just before the harvest.  For harvest activities, only 18 percent of 
responses are for cash constraints, the lowest share choosing this response for any 
activity.
The second panel of Table 3.6 shows the distribution of responses by province.  Cash 
constraints are far more important in West Nusa Tenggara (at 36.2% of responses) than in 
any other province except for neighboring East Java, which has far fewer farmers using 
labor exchange.  Tight labor markets are mentioned as a reason for using labor exchange 
only in Central Java and South Sulawesi, representing roughly 7 percent of responses in 
both provinces.  This is interesting because these two provinces appear to have very 
different labor markets.  Central Java is densely populated, is close to the national capital 
and commercial center, Jakarta, and has an active labor market.  Rural Central Java is 
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often characterized as a classical surplus labor setting.  Reports of labor shortages there 
suggest that workers may be drawn to income-earning opportunities outside agriculture.  
In South Sulawesi, which is much less densely populated and has relatively abundant 
land, tight agricultural labor markets might arise seasonally because of a small 
agricultural labor force.
Table 3.6: Reasons for Participating in Labor Exchange 














Plowing 21 1 2 65 89
Planting 36 3 6 128 173
Weeding 24 2 2 32 60
Harvesting 20 4 5 81 110
Transport 16 3 10 45 74
Milling 3 0 0 4 7
By Province
Lampung 12 0 0 37 49
Central Java 60 12 18 161 251
East Java 5 1 0 2 8
West Nusa Tenggara 38 0 0 67 105
North Sulawesi 2 0 0 0 2
South Sulawesi 3 0 7 88 98
Total 120 13 25 355 513
Other subjective responses on the benefits of teamwork in general were given elsewhere 
in the 1996-97 household survey.  Respondents that worked as laborers were asked if 
they worked as part of a team.  Those who indicated working in a team were asked why. 
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The 90 respondents that worked as part of a team indicated their reasons for doing so in 
the following categories: income is higher (13.3%); difficult to find work individually 
(15.6%); work must be done in a short time period (53.3%); work is joint with machinery 
(7.8%); and other (10.0%).  Higher incomes under teamwork suggest the presence of a 
productivity advantage to team labor among those that responded.  However, the most 
common response was that the task needed to be completed quickly.  This provides 
further evidence of a technologically driven demand for teamwork for farmers in this 
sample.  As shown in Chapter 2, this is a necessary pre-condition for the use of labor 
exchange.  If this source of labor demand is common on farms in these areas, labor 
exchange could serve as a viable source of labor supply. 
Another piece of evidence on the sources of demand for labor exchange teams, in 
particular, is provided by the PATANAS sociologists’ interviews with local farmers 
during the 1998-99 PATANAS survey round.  They indicate that a steep rise in wage 
rates following periods of intense out-migration in Lombok (West Nusa Tanggara) and 
Menado (North Sulawesi) led to the revival of labor exchange activities in these areas 
(Utomo and Chotim, 2000).  This testimony counters to some extent the evidence just 
presented from respondents in the 1996-97 survey, and supports an association between 
conditions in the labor market and demand for this non-market labor institution.
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3.4 Preliminary Evidence on Determinants of Labor Exchange:  A Quantitative 
Summary of Household and Village Characteristics
Before proceeding with a review of the evidence on determinants of labor exchange from 
the PATANAS data, it is important to recognize that some of the vital determinants of the 
presence of labor exchange in a village, and of its use by a household, may have long 
histories that cannot be captured in cross-sectional data or even in a five-year panel.  For 
example, the successful operation of labor exchange teams relies on the strength of local 
norms of reciprocity that have developed over many years.  In addition, there may be 
important information and organizational impediments to the initial introduction of the 
labor exchange institution in a village that present the greatest barriers to its use.  It may 
be that overcoming these impediments to the introduction of labor exchange is a kind of 
public good, forever making it less costly for future groups of farmers to adopt the labor 
scheme because the institutional framework has been established.  Moreover, many of the 
current manifestations of general economic conditions affecting labor exchange use, such 
as the local distribution of land and land tenancy arrangements, the reliance on cash in the 
local economy, and the presence of supporting local infrastructure, have evolved over a 
long period.  In some cases, it is the evolution of these factors more than their status at 
any given point in time that will determine the structure of labor exchange and its 
prevalence.  These dynamic economic issues cannot be captured with the data available 
here; indeed, they are difficult to capture in most settings.  However, keeping these issues 
in mind will assist in providing a more careful interpretation of current economic 
conditions as potential determinants of labor exchange.
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I now investigate village and farm characteristics in the PATANAS data to obtain more 
evidence about the importance of team production and credit and labor market 
imperfections as possible determinants of labor exchange.  The data also identify sources 
of labor transaction costs that help to determine which mode of production from the 
model in Chapter 2 is observed.  Although the associations presented in this section do 
not provide conclusive evidence of the determinants of labor exchange, they will 
establish the context for a more rigorous empirical investigation in the next chapter.  
An examination of village characteristics provides mixed support for the hypothesis that 
the institution of labor exchange arises primarily in villages with high transaction costs in 
the labor market and rationing in the credit market.  Table 3.7 compares means and 
standard deviations of village-level variables derived from the sample of households 
primarily engaged in farming for the 23 villages with labor exchange and 10 of the other 
villages.49  Labor exchange villages have larger farms and are more remote on average 
than other villages, although the difference in means is not significant for either of these 
variables, which may be due in part to the small number of villages.50  If true in a larger 
sample of villages, these differences would be consistent with thinner labor markets in 
villages with labor exchange.  However, labor exchange villages have a larger share of 
adults working as agricultural laborers, suggesting the local labor force may be no 
smaller than in non-labor exchange villages.  
49 Two of the 12 villages without the labor exchange institution are not included in Table 3.7 because they 
had few households whose primary activity is farming. 
50 The t-test for equality of means of each variable across the labor exchange and non-labor-exchange 
villages is based on the assumption of homogenous variance across the two distributions.  If this 
assumption is violated, these hypothesis tests are invalid.  This is the well-known Behrens -Fisher problem.  
Given the mostly exploratory objective of these comparisons, I do not attempt to verify the assumption of 
homogenous variance.
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With regard to credit markets and constraints on working capital, credit use is 
substantially higher in villages with labor exchange.  Households in labor exchange 
villages are more likely to use credit to finance production and investments and they have 
larger loans outstanding, although this difference is only weakly significant (p-value of 
.114).  Perhaps because of the availability of credit, households in labor exchange 
villages have lower savings than in other villages.  Nonetheless, they have larger holdings 
of other assets.  Households in these villages also sell significantly more of their crop on 
average than elsewhere, which suggests that cash constraints may not be associated with 
the labor exchange institution.  
The variability in plot size is generally lower in labor exchange villages, as measured by 
the logarithm of the absolute deviation of observed plots from village mean plot size.  
This suggests that heterogeneity in plot area may conflict with the reciprocal exchange of 
labor time under labor exchange teams.  However, the average share of plots within ten 
percent of the area of the observed plot is significantly higher in villages without labor 
exchange.  This measure is more specific concerning the availability of potential labor 
exchange teammates if homogenous plot size is an important constraint to labor 
exchange.  It suggests that plot area homogeneity is not associated with the presence of 
the labor exchange institution in the village. 
The presence of labor exchange also appears to be correlated with a general lack of 
technical progress, including lower use of high-tech irrigation equipment and slower 
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adoption of high-yielding variety seeds, although the latter difference is not significant.  
Most labor exchange teams in the data operate on plots where rice or corn is grown.  This 
could indicate relatively large returns to teamwork in the production of these crops, 
although it is also consistent with a need for homogeneity of crops grown within a labor 
exchange team.  In the Indonesian data, the presence of labor exchange in the village is 
not associated with rice cropping intensity.  The share of cultivated area planted in rice is 
38.9 percent in villages without labor exchange and 24.7 percent in villages with labor 
exchange, although this difference is not significant.  This argues against relatively 
greater returns to teamwork for production of rice than for other crops.  The share of area 
planted in corn is somewhat higher in labor exchange villages (11.9 percent) than in non-
labor exchange villages (6.3 percent).  Although rice cropping intensity is lower in labor 
exchange villages, rice and corn are among the most common crops in many of the 
villages so that farmers of these crops may be more likely than others to find labor 
exchange teammates if crop homogeneity is required.  
Another statistically significant difference between labor exchange villages and the other 
villages in the sample is average years of education of the household head.  Household 
heads in labor exchange villages average only 4.7 years of education to 5.7 years for their 
counterparts in the other villages.  This suggests that education is negatively associated 
with the development or maintenance of this cooperative non-market labor institution.  It 
may be that education provides other opportunities for farmers outside of agriculture or 
increases their access to markets, so that reliance on labor exchange is not necessary.  An 
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alternative explanation is that education teaches individuals to be wary of others’ 
motives, reducing trust and the desire to engage in reciprocal exchange relationships.
Table 3.8 presents characteristics of the households from the farming sample that live in 
labor exchange villages by labor exchange use.51  Mean area planted was significantly 
higher for households involved in labor exchange.  This could indicate that larger plot 
sizes are required for returns to team size to take hold.  However, it may also support an 
argument based on labor market search costs if the correct interpretation of these data is 
that labor exchange is more common in villages with larger farms that have an abundance 
of land and smaller labor markets.  
51 Table 3.8 presents sample means only for households from the farming sample that had complete data for 
all variables listed.  In this sample with complete data, 32.4 percent of households in labor exchange 
villages joined labor exchange teams in 1998-99.








Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
 Area planted, Ha 1.598 0.782 1.350 0.818
 Ln avg. absolute deviation from village mean plot size -1.420 0.769 -1.922 0.956
 Share of planted area owned by household 0.804 0.115 0.835 0.134
Share of village plots within 10% of plot’s area, avg. 0.114 0.046 0.192 0.109 ***
 Household size 4.635 0.602 4.681 0.443
 Median distance to market 2.173 3.680 1.700 1.855
 Share of adults working as agricultural laborer 0.184 0.128 0.161 0.152
 Number of plantings 1.668 0.483 1.939 0.554
 Share of HHs financing non-consumption with credit 0.183 0.172 0.139 0.151
 Value of farm, land, business & HH assets, Rp. mn. 31.654 12.636 28.292 14.285
 Savings (deposits, gold, etc), March 1998, Rp. mn. 0.829 0.989 1.060 1.032
 Credit taken or outstanding, 1998-99, Rp. mn. 0.772 0.803 0.347 0.240
 Share of output sold 0.668 0.188 0.515 0.232 *
 Share of households using technical irrigation 0.083 0.170 0.336 0.360 ***
 Share of households using simple irrigation 0.118 0.169 0.118 0.123
 Household head education 4.676 1.324 5.730 1.066 **
 Share of cultivated area using HYV seeds 0.341 0.223 0.449 0.277
 Share of cultivated area planted in rice 0.247 0.216 0.389 0.293
 Share of cultivated area planted in corn 0.119 0.170 0.063 0.103
 Share of cultivated area planted in dryland crops 0.279 0.271 0.170 0.218
 Share of cultivated area planted in tobacco or sugar 0.049 0.124 0.024 0.065
 Share of cultivated area planted in tree crops 0.305 0.247 0.354 0.320
   Asterisks indicate p-value for t-test of equality of means across groups where 
     *** indicates p-value <0.01, ** indicates p-value <0.05, and * indicates p-value <0.1.
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Table 3.8: Comparison of Means Across Households With and Without Labor Exchange 
in Labor Exchange Villages, 1998-99






Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
 Area planted, Ha 2.154 0.215 1.655 0.183 **
 Area owned 1.272 0.164 1.254 0.167
 Ln avg. absolute deviation from village mean plot size -1.260 0.151 -1.337 0.158
 Share of planted area owned 0.772 0.044 0.832 0.025
 Share of village plots within 10% of plot’s area, avg. 0.129 0.015 0.110 0.010
 Has some credit or savings 0.767 0.053 0.546 0.049 ***
 Has some savings, 3/98 0.476 0.122 0.288 0.043
 Has some credit outstanding, 1998-99 0.423 0.078 0.382 0.044
Savings, March 1998, Rp. mn 1.430 0.428 0.751 0.190 *
 Credit taken or outstanding, 1998-99, Rp. mn 0.484 0.149 0.640 0.197
 Value of rotating savings pool, 1998-99, Rp. mn 0.265 0.155 0.106 0.031
 Value of land owned net of land credit, 3/98, Rp. mn 22.103 3.167 27.259 2.986
 Value of business assets net of bus. credit, 3/98, Rp. mn 1.031 0.273 1.000 0.232
 Value of HH assets net of HH credit, 3/98, Rp. mn 2.767 0.599 3.364 0.713
 Value of farm assets net of farm credit, 3/98, Rp. mn 2.365 0.446 1.808 0.464 *
 Value of output per hectare, Rp. mn 3.928 0.885 6.042 1.304 **
 Share of output sold 0.568 0.082 0.719 0.034 *
 Number of plantings 1.681 0.136 1.667 0.116
 1 if use technical irrigation 0.081 0.047 0.087 0.039
 1 if use simple irrigation 0.074 0.026 0.113 0.037
 Share of cultivated area using HYV seeds 0.387 0.115 0.342 0.043
 Household size 4.677 0.092 4.723 0.141
 Household head age 46.233 1.013 49.702 0.805 ***









 Share of cultivated area planted in rice 0.328 0.095 0.227 0.044
 Share of cultivated area planted in corn 0.190 0.074 0.104 0.031
 Share of cultivated area planted in dryland crops 0.196 0.051 0.312 0.066 **
 Share of cultivated area planted in tobacco or sugar 0.057 0.044 0.049 0.028
 Share of cultivated area planted in tree crops 0.230 0.051 0.307 0.064
 Household on-farm labor hours per Ha 967.212 203.404 962.955 140.714
 Hired on-farm labor hours per Ha, incl. labor exchange 391.853 55.888 336.135 48.263
 Household off-farm labor hours in agriculture 256.168 69.607 365.425 60.780
    Asterisks indicate p-value for t-test of equality of means across groups where 
    *** indicates p-value <0.01, ** indicates p-value <0.05, and * indicates p-value <0.1.
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For this sample of farming households in labor exchange villages, holdings of working 
capital in the form of liquid savings or credit are somewhat limited.  Nearly 60 percent of 
these households reported some savings or credit; 32.8 percent had positive savings and 
38.8 percent took loans during the 1998-99 season or were paying outstanding loans.  
Less than 13 percent of households had both savings and credit, suggesting that few 
households would protect savings for future use in the face of current and relatively 
expensive demands for liquidity.  As shown in Table 3.8, the evidence on the importance 
of working capital for the decision to use labor exchange is mixed.  Labor exchange 
households are significantly more likely to have some savings or loans outstanding, 
which argues against the importance of quantity restrictions in capital markets as a source 
of labor exchange.  Average credit holdings are smaller than in non-labor exchange 
households, but average savings are significantly larger.  Other indicators offer some 
support for cash constraints being associated with labor exchange use: (i) the average 
value of land and household asset holdings is larger for non-labor exchange households 
(though not significantly so); (ii) yields are substantially higher for farms not using labor 
exchange, and (iii) the share of output sold is higher on these farms too.  
There is also evidence that selection into labor exchange teams is affected by a farmer’s 
plot size and choice of crops.  Labor exchange households show larger average share of 
village plots that are roughly the same size as their plots, although the difference in 
means across cohorts is not significant.  Area devoted to dryland crops other than corn is 
significantly lower on farms using labor exchange and average share of area under rice 
and corn are higher but not significantly so.  Other data show that on 71 percent of plots 
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on which labor exchange was used, rice (43%) and corn (28%) were the commodities 
with the largest share of the value of output.  This probably indicates returns to teamwork 
in production of these crops, but also is consistent with farmers under labor exchange 
growing the same crops in order to facilitate reciprocity in the exchange.
Hired labor time employed on farm, from paid labor and exchange labor sources, is 
higher for households using labor exchange than for other households, but not 
significantly so.  This may indicate some role for labor exchange in relaxing constraints 
on labor demand imposed by labor or credit market failures.  As noted earlier, labor 
exchange is a large enough source of external (47.9 percent) and total (14.8 percent) labor 
demand on average for those households that use it that it could play a significant role in 
relaxing constraints on team labor demand for some of these households.
The prevalence of labor exchange across seasons and labor activities provides further 
evidence on the role of factor market imperfections in demand for labor exchange.  
Returning to Table 3.2, the share of labor exchange contracts that took place during the 
rainy season when labor demand is at its highest (58.2%) is significantly higher than the 
share of daily wage contracts in the rainy season (38.4%).  Part of this greater demand for 
labor exchange during the rainy season may also derive from its ability to reduce the time 
devoted to tasks through teamwork.  Piece rate and output share contracts, which also 
encourage faster task completion, are also considerably more prevalent in the rainy 
season than daily wage contracts.
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Table 3.9 shows the distribution of labor exchange arrangements and other labor 
contracts across tasks.  For labor exchange, 43 percent of the arrangements occurred in 
planting activities, 24 percent in harvesting, 13 percent in weeding and 12 percent in 
plowing.  Although most of these contracts took place during planting and harvesting 
activities when labor demand is typically greatest, a considerable share occurred during 
periods when demand for labor is quite weak.  The prevalence of labor exchange teams 
during planting (at 14 percent of all planting contracts for outside labor) probably reflects 
some returns to teamwork for this activity, but is also consistent with cash constraints.  
Part of the reason that reliance on labor exchange is not greater for harvesting tasks is 
surely due to output share contracts for harvesting, another labor arrangement that 
enables farmers to eschew cash payments.  Harvest share contracts can also be used to 
pay planting labor through tied labor contracts, called ceblokan on Java, in which 
workers agree to participate in both planting and harvesting activities for an elevated 
share of the output.  Because of the significant delay in receipt of payment for planting 
services, this type of contract is often unattractive to workers, but may be more prevalent 
than labor exchange in regions where the landless labor force is relatively large.
An important source of transactions costs for participating in a labor exchange team is the 
time and other costs of finding teammates.  The pool of potential teammates is usually 
restricted to neighboring farmers producing the same crops on plots of similar size.  
Goethals (1967) notes that in West Sumbawa in Indonesia, farmers seek teammates for 
labor exchange with similar sized plots in order to reduce the need for side payments 
from farmers with larger plots to those with smaller ones.  This alone is evidence that
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participants in labor exchange may be cash constrained.  The location of a farmer’s plot 
in the local distribution of plot size may determine whether he has any potential 
teammates and the cost of finding them.  The causation may also run the other way.  The 
historical reliance on labor exchange teams in some areas may help to explain why 
farmers growing the same commodities in a village tend to carve out plots of similar size.  
Table 3.9: Distribution of Labor Contracts by Activity, 1998-99
Type of Task
Contract Land prep Plow Plant Weed Harvest Mill Total
 Daily wage 431 1,437 1,615 1,662 1,296 190 6,631
 Piece rate 103 824 426 153 365 168 2,039
 Output share 1 3 4 6 577 37 628
 Tied 2 3 78 6 8 97
 Exchange 31 95 358 106 202 34 826
 Daily team 1 2 3 2 8
 Piece team 3 31 128 43 160 8 373
 Share team 1 267 2 270
 Tied team 5 2 7
 Other 10 13 20 21 21 11 96
Total 581 2,407 2,630 2,004 2,901 452 10,975
In general, labor exchange will be less common on plots in the tails of the distribution of 
plot size because farmers of these plots will have fewer potential teammates with plots of 
similar size.  In the lower tail of the distribution, plots may also be too small for returns to 
teamwork to take hold.  Farmers owning plots in the upper tail of the distribution may 
have larger farms overall with better access to credit, so these farmers may be less likely 
to use labor exchange as well.  The distribution of plot size for plots on which labor 
exchange is used should lie to the left of the plot size distribution for plots not using labor 
101
exchange.  The distribution of plots on which labor exchange is used also should have 
lower variance.
Figure 3.1 presents nonparametric kernel density estimates of the distribution of plot size 
by village for plots on which labor exchange was used in any activity in 1998-99 and for 
all other plots.  These kernel density estimates were obtained using the Epanechnikov 
kernel function, 






In deriving the kernel density estimates, the bandwidth was allowed to vary with the 
number of observations available in each village.  Land distributions are presented by 
village because most potential labor exchange teammates are farmers in the same or 
neighboring villages as high travel costs quickly render labor exchange teams 
unprofitable.  Land distributions by labor exchange use are only presented for those 
villages in which labor exchange is used and where there are at least 12 plots in each 
category.  Table 3.10 shows the number of plots in each village in Figure 3.1 by labor 
exchange use.  
Several patterns emerge in the graphs in Figure 3.1.  The distribution of plot size for labor 
exchange plots generally lies to the left of the distribution of non-labor-exchange plots in
six out of nine of the villages.  In the middle panel in Figure 3.1 for Sukadamai village on 
Sumbawa Island in West Nusa Tenggara, the area distribution of labor exchange plots 
102
shows substantially less dispersion than that of non-labor-exchange plots.  However, the 
opposite is true for the panel just to the left of that one, which shows the plot size 
distributions in Plampang village, also on Sumbawa Island.  Although we expect the 
upper tail of the distribution to be smaller for labor exchange plots, this is not true in 
several of the villages.  This may be the case in some villages with small farms, where 
even the largest plots are small enough to accommodate rotating labor exchange teams.
In South Sulawesi, the use of labor exchange on large plots may suggest that some 
farmers there are using the larger festive labor exchange teams.  
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Table 3.10: Distribution of Plot Size in Selected Labor Exchange Villages, 1998-99


















Lampung Sumber Rejo 16 63 0.203 0.696
Central Java Cepogo 16 56 0.222 0.194
Kwadungan Gunung 22 25 0.468 0.611
W. Nusa Tenggara Plampang 12 61 0.164 1.739
Sukadamai 25 58 0.301 0.744
N. Sulawesi Rumoong Atas 16 44 0.267 1.348
S. Sulawesi Baroko 18 63 0.222 0.600
Selli 46 45 0.505 0.857
Rumbia 30 40 0.429 0.769
If households with the largest farms are less likely to use labor exchange because of 
greater access to capital, as predicted by the model in Chapter 2, this effect should be 
greatest in a comparison of the distributions of total farm size by labor exchange use.  
Figure 3.2 compares the distribution of total land area owned for farmers that used labor 
exchange on any plot to that of farmers that did not use labor exchange at all.  The panels 
for two villages are omitted because insufficient farm-level observations were available 
for reliable kernel density estimates in these villages.  The graphs in Figure 3.2 show 
clearly that owners of the largest farms are less likely to participate in labor exchange.  
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4 Empirical Evidence of Determinants of Participation in Agricultural Labor 
Exchange
4.1 Introduction
The model of labor exchange with imperfect factor markets developed in Chapter 2 
generated several testable hypotheses about how endowments, technology and market 
imperfections affect demand for agricultural labor exchange.  In particular, the model 
showed how capital endowments, returns to teamwork and search costs for labor 
transactions determine the modes of production a farmer selects by optimally solving his 
joint land-labor decision problem.  The model also explains the conditions that determine 
the switch points between two modes of production.  These switch points serve as the 
thresholds in a farmer’s decision to use labor exchange.  It is this labor exchange 
participation decision that is the primary research topic to be addressed in this chapter. 
Although the factors affecting the level of demand for labor exchange are of considerable 
interest, the first line of inquiry into this mostly unexamined non-market labor 
arrangement should concern the economic motivations for its existence.52  With this goal 
in mind, this empirical investigation begins with its microeconomic foundations, at the 
individual farmer’s decision to participate in labor exchange teams.  
52 I do not attempt to explain the complete pattern of modes of production that arise in the model in Chapter 
2.  With twelve modes of production, this would be an unwieldy exercise and would detract from the goal 
of explaining farmers’ decisions to use labor exchange.  The analysis of the model in Chapter 2 
demonstrates a consistency of the effects of endowments of working capital and farm size on the use of 
labor exchange across several modes of production.  Therefore, it is not necessary to identify the 
determinants of each mode of production in order to explain labor exchange use.  Other studies have 
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In this chapter, I explain a farmer’s decision to participate in a labor exchange team using 
the sample of farmers living in villages with the labor exchange institution in the 
Indonesian PATANAS survey of 1998-99.  I begin by developing an empirical model of 
the farmer’s decision to use labor exchange from the theoretical model in Chapter 2.  I 
then test a number of the hypotheses arising from the theoretical model and the empirical 
model of the participation decision.  Among the results from the theoretical model is that 
returns to teamwork in production are a necessary condition for agricultural labor 
exchange.  The model also relied on three forms of factor market imperfections to explain 
labor exchange use: supervision costs for external labor on farm; transactions costs for 
each type of labor transaction (buying, selling, and labor exchange); and quantity 
restrictions on access to credit as a constraint on working capital.  Another implication of 
the model is that, despite the rigidities in the labor market, working capital and asset 
holdings have no effect on demand for labor exchange if there is no constraint on access 
to credit.  However, if the working capital constraint is binding, the effect of working 
capital holdings on labor exchange use depends on the mode of production, returns to 
teamwork and the supervision technology.  For laborer cultivators using labor exchange, 
larger working capital holdings increase demand for labor exchange.  For self-cultivators 
or small capitalists using labor exchange, the effect of working capital on demand for 
labor exchange depends on technology and supervision costs.  In particular, working 
capital is more likely to reduce demand for labor exchange if team size is a weaker 
substitute for land than is labor time, or if supervision and search costs in labor exchange 
are high.  
presented empirical evidence of the more concise class structure in the model by Eswaran and Kotwal 
(1986) (see Sadoulet, de Janvry and Benjamin, 1998). 
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After developing the empirical model of labor exchange use, I test for the presence of 
returns to teamwork in production for rice and corn farmers, the sub-sample of farmers 
most likely to use labor exchange.  I then estimate the model of the farmer’s decision to 
participate in labor exchange under various assignment rules of households into working-
capital-constrained and -unconstrained cohorts.   As a benchmark, I consider the 
determinants of participation in labor exchange under the assumption that all households 
in the sample are constrained in access to working capital.  The model developed here 
provides a number of exclusion restrictions on working capital and assets that make it 
possible to test the validity of this assumption, and the relevance of the model for the 
sample as a whole.  The estimates for the full sample provide substantial support for the 
model of labor exchange with imperfect factor markets developed in Chapter 2.  
Nonetheless, if not all households are working capital constrained, these estimates are 
biased.  Next, I consider a reasonable assignment rule to divide the sample into 
constrained and unconstrained cohorts and test the determinants of participation in labor 
exchange subject to working capital constraints.  Under this assignment rule, a household 
is working capital constrained in any season if it has no predicted savings, borrowing or 
lending.  I test the robustness of the model to this assignment rule in two ways.  First, I 
estimate the model again under an assignment rule that classifies more of the sample as 
working capital constrained, creating an intermediate case between the “all are 
constrained” and “no working capital” assignment rules.  Second, I estimate the model 
using a procedure in which the assignment of households to the constrained and 
unconstrained regimes is based on the statistical properties of the data in an application of 
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the EM algorithm of Dempster, Laird, and Rubin (1977).  This algorithm treats the 
problem of unobserved working capital constraint status as a missing data problem.  
Starting with predicted constraint status from the model with the “no working capital” 
assignment rule, the algorithm re-estimates the labor exchange and working capital 
determinants.  This creates a new assignment of observations to constraint regimes, and 
the process is repeated through iteration.  I show that the complete-data version of this
model satisfies the requirements for the algorithm to converge.  Despite some limitations 
in applying the algorithm brought on by the data and by the shape of the complete data 
likelihood function, I am able to derive new estimates from the algorithm that improve 
the model in a likelihood sense.  I show that some of these estimates also improve the 
ability of the empirical strategy to satisfy the predictions of the theoretical model of labor 
exchange. 
4.2 Empirical Implementation of the Model of Labor Exchange 
In the model from Chapter 2, the decision to use labor exchange is a function of 
transactions and supervision costs in the labor market; rationing in the credit market; the 
production technology; endowments of land, savings and household size; and prices of 
land and labor.  Such a model would be sufficient for the purposes of measurement of 
participation in, and demand for, paid labor under the common assumption that there is 
an infinite supply of labor available at the market wage rate.  In the case of labor 
exchange, no market price exists and the supply of potential teammates in exchange labor 
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is typically far less robust than the availability of paid laborers.  The potential supply of 
exchange labor available to a given farmer is a function of the distribution of land within 
the surrounding area, particularly the number of other households with control rights over 
plots of similar size to his own.  Empirical implementation of this model requires 
accounting for these supply considerations in the market for labor exchange.  
The supply of potential teammates affects search costs for labor exchange.  For the ith 
farmer with plot size Ai, the pool of potential teammates includes all farmers at or near 
the same location in the village distribution of land, say ( )iAg  where g is the village 
probability density function of plot size.  Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 graphs these plot size 
distributions for several villages in the Indonesian sample, with plots on which labor 
exchange was used separated from other plots.  These graphs illustrate the size of the 
pool of potential teammates across the distribution of plot size.  The search costs are a 
function of the probability, ( )( )iE Agn |Pr , that at least En  other farmers with similar plot 
size will resolve their land and labor allocation problem in equation (2.6) in favor of 
participating in labor exchange.53  The search costs for participation in labor exchange 
become
( )( )( )iEEE Agncc |Pr= .
53 I do not investigate the matching problem inherent in constructing labor exchange teams from the pool of 
potential teammates at a given plot size.  This problem involves consideration of the size of the teammate 
pool and the optimal team size.  I do not devote attention to this interesting coordination problem in part 
because it is likely resolved through reliance on strength of social ties in practice.
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The graphs in Figure 3.1 demonstrate how these search costs increase as plot size moves 
into the tails of the distribution.  They also show how these costs vary substantially by 
village, based on the local distribution of land.  As shown in Chapter 2, in the presence of 
returns to teamwork in production, a farmer with a given endowment of working capital 
will choose to participate in a labor exchange team if 
(4.1) ( )( )( )
T
c
cAgnc FMiEE +<|Pr .
Accounting for the uncertain probability of finding teammates in this way makes the 
decision to participate in labor exchange stochastic through the effects on condition (4.1).  
This decision can be represented in a probit model in which participation in a labor 
exchange team is a function of technology, household endowments, prices, and the 
distribution of land in the village.  As the model in Chapter 2 has shown, the effect of 
these variables on the decision to use labor exchange will depend on whether the 
household is constrained in its holdings of working capital.  This suggests a switching 
regression framework in which the sample is separated into working capital-constrained 
and -unconstrained households with separate probit regressions estimated for each cohort.  
Therefore, the empirical model takes the form
(4.2.a) iii XY 1111 εβ +=∗   if  γii Wu −> ,  and
(4.2.b) iii XY 2222 εβ +=∗   if  γii Wu −≤ ,
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where ∗iY1  is a latent variable representing net benefits from participating in labor 
exchange if the household is working capital constrained and ∗iY2  is similarly defined for 
unconstrained households.  Also, iX 1  and iX 2  are vectors of regressors that explain the 
decision to use labor exchange for constrained and unconstrained households, 
respectively; iW  contains variables explaining whether a household is working capital 
constrained; 1β , 2β , and γ  are parameters to be estimated; and iii uand,, 21 εε  are mean 
zero error terms.  With ∗iY1  and 
∗
iY2  as latent variables and the working capital constraint 
condition unobserved, all that is observed is an indicator variable for whether the 
household uses labor exchange,
(4.3)
( ) ( )
















This yields a switching regression model of the decision to participate in labor exchange 
depending on whether the household is constrained in holdings of working capital.  
Assume that all households bringing outside labor on farm are constrained in the sense of 
facing moral hazard and search costs for each type of labor.  Also assume that the vector 
of error terms in the labor contract choice and switching regressions are jointly normally 
distributed 


















That is, error terms may be correlated across equations in (4.2).  Otherwise, if 
021 == uu σσ , this model is an exogenous switching regression.  Because the working 
capital constraint is not observed, the model represents a simultaneous equations 
endogenous switching regression model with unobserved selection point.54  This model 
has been applied in settings where the dependent variable in the equation of interest is 
continuous by Dickens and Lang (1985), Morduch and Stern (1997), and Hu and 
Schiantarelli (1998).  Applying such a model to the discrete choice setting is a new 
contribution of this research.  Kimhi (1999) implemented an endogenous switching 
regression model for discrete dependent variables, but where the point of selection for the 
switching equation is observed. 
The likelihood function corresponding to the model in (4.2)-(4.3) for the ith farm is
(4.4)
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2
2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1
2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
0
, , , | , ,
         , , , ,





i i u i i u
y
i i u i i u
y
LLF L y X W
X W X W
X W X W
β γ σ σ
β γ ρ β γ ρ




 = Φ +Φ − − ⋅ 
 Φ − − +Φ − − 
∏
∏
54 This type of model is also referred to as a mixture model because the population is treated as consisting 
of subpopulations with distinct regression coefficients.  
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where X  is the matrix whose columns are the non-redundant variables in 1X  and 2X .  
The parameters to be estimated in this model are 1β , 2β , γ , 11σ , 22σ , u1σ , and u2σ .  
Because ∗1iY  and 
∗
2iY  are latent variables, 11σ  and 22σ  are not separately identified from 
the structural slope coefficients, so these are normalized to one.  Notice that 12σ  does not 
appear anywhere in the likelihood function and so is also not identified.  Maddala (1983) 
notes that although the error vector has a trivariate distribution, a function of bivariate 
distributions on a pair of the error terms is estimated.  This is the cause of the failure of 
identification of 12σ .  However, this should not raise concerns about the completeness of 
this model.  Such “reductions” in the order of the problem are common in the discrete 
choice setting.  
Identification of the likelihood function in (4.4) requires that at least one variable in 1X
does not appear in 2X , or vice versa.  Estimation of this likelihood function is a difficult 
exercise and direct estimation may not be feasible.  In order to make the estimation more 
tractable, I simplify the likelihood function by assigning observations to the constrained 
or unconstrained regimes based on their holdings of working capital in the form of 
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In estimation, I begin with an arbitrary assignment rule for (4.5) as discussed in the 
introduction to this chapter.  I then derive improved estimates by applying the EM 
algorithm, using the idea that the likelihood function CL  in (4.6) can be treated as the 
complete data analogue to the incomplete data problem inherent in the likelihood 
function IL  in (4.4).  Using this algorithm, parameter estimates and predicted 
probabilities that each household is constrained are obtained in an iterative procedure that 
reflects the statistical properties of the data.
Zeldes (1989) was the first to use the general approach of estimating a model of liquidity 
constraints by applying an arbitrary assignment rule in his study of the effects of liquidity 
constraints on consumption.  Using U.S. data, Zeldes classified a household as liquidity 
constrained if it had less than two months of income held in liquid assets.  In my 
approach to defining the assignment rule, I tried to identify a liquidity constraint 
threshold that is appropriate to rural agricultural households in a developing country 
where access to credit is generally more restricted than in the U.S.  Following Giné 
(2001), I define working capital based primarily on its distinction from fixed capital.  
Fixed capital remains in place after agricultural production is completed, while working 
capital is consumed in the production process and is fungible across uses.  The two 
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sources of working capital are savings and credit.  In the Indonesian data, liquid savings 
includes the value of bank deposits, bonds, cash, jewelry, and other stored valuables.  
Other forms of savings include stored rice and other food for consumption and stored 
crops.  Constraints on working capital operate primarily through restrictions on access to 
credit.  However, these constraints are made manifest in the household in the absence of 
working capital in any form because it is fungible.  Therefore, in an attempt to separate 
the sample by working capital constraint status, I classify a household as working capital 
constrained in each season if it has no savings, borrowing or lending, either outstanding 
or initiated during the season.  The variable indicating working capital constraint status 
based on this assignment rule is treated as endogenous in the estimation.  In constructing 
these cohorts, I begin with the sub-sample of households with no savings or debt in each 
season and remove those that are currently lending money, since these households would 
have a higher probability of using the funds themselves if they were constrained.  This 
assignment rule for working capital constraints is similar to one used by Jacoby (1994) in 
an application to schooling decisions in Peru.  I also consider a more relaxed threshold 
for classifying households as working capital constrained.  The primary shortcoming of 
this approach is the arbitrariness of the sample separation.  Although the theoretical 
model underlying such problems typically leads to exclusion restrictions that can be used 
to test the accuracy of the predicted assignment of observations to regimes, robustness 
tests are needed to ensure that another separation of the sample would not lead to a higher 
value for the likelihood function.  These tests are limited in most cases, since there are 2n
possible separations of the data.  This highlights the attraction of the EM algorithm for 
this type of problem.  The EM algorithm provides a likelihood-based methodology for 
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selecting alternative separations of the data.  The algorithm iterates between finding 
parameter estimates that maximize the likelihood function for the current separation of 
the data, and choosing an alternative separation based on the predicted probability of 
belonging to a given regime.  The conditions under which this procedure converges 
toward a maximum are discussed below.
I estimate the probability of being working capital constrained as a function of household 
assets, local interest rates and demand for credit, and household demographics that proxy 
for demand for credit for consumption purposes.  Out of 849 households primarily 
engaged in farming with complete data in the sample of households living in labor 
exchange villages, 361 had no borrowing, savings, or lending as they began production in 
the 1998-99 agricultural year.  The classification of households as constrained is based on 
having no borrowing, savings, or lending by season.  These seasons include the rainy 
season (from October 1998 – March 1999), the dry season (from April 1998 – September 
1998) or the entire crop year for annual crops (April 1998 – March 1999). This definition 
of constrained households has considerable intuitive appeal, since an unconstrained 
household is likely to have either savings or credit use.  In this approach to identifying 
constrained households, I am intentionally conservative in selecting households into the 
constrained sub-sample that are very likely to be constrained.  I expect the 
misclassification of households based on this assignment rule to be heavily biased toward 
constrained households being classified as unconstrained.  This approach is intended to 
provide precise estimates of the labor exchange decision for constrained households.  
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However, as a benchmark for this conservative approach, I first estimate the labor 
exchange decision assuming all households are constrained.  
Results of these estimation procedures are presented below.  Even for these rather 
unsatisfactory approaches to separating the sample by working capital constraint, the 
results offer considerable support for the model of labor exchange under working capital 
constraints presented in Chapter 2.  Before estimating the model of determinants of labor 
exchange, I begin by verifying the presence of returns to teamwork in agricultural 
production in the Indonesian sample.
4.3 Returns to Teamwork
The model presented in Chapter 2 shows that returns to teamwork are a necessary 
condition for use of labor exchange teams.  In this section, I test for the presence of 
returns to teamwork in the Indonesian data.  There has been little empirical research into 
the productivity advantages of teams, despite a large theoretical literature.  The limited 
evidence that exists generally finds positive returns to teamwork, but in production 
settings quite different from agriculture.55  I am not aware of any systematic evidence for 
or against a productivity advantage for teams in agricultural work.
55 See Hamilton et al (2003) for positive evidence for garment workers.  They cite a handful of other studies 
with evidence for law firms, medical practices, and other services firms and for manufacturing.
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The test of returns to teamwork used here involves estimation of an agricultural 
production function.  The production technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas and is 
estimated in log-log form.  One approach to identifying returns to teamwork in this 
estimation is to disaggregate hired labor into team labor and other hired labor and test 
that team labor has higher productivity.  However, such an approach may confound team 
effects and incentive effects if team labor is more likely to be performed under piece rate 
or output share contracts than wage contracts, which have lower effort incentives (Seiler, 
1984; Paarsch and Shearer, 2000; Lazear, 2000; and Oettinger, 2001).  Indeed, for the 
sample under consideration here, daily wages make up 60.7 percent of casual non-team 
labor contracts.  High incentive piece rate and output share arrangements make up only 
36.5 percent of these contracts, but they constitute 46.6 percent of team labor contracts.  
Exchange labor represents another 42.8 percent of team contracts.  The characteristics of 
exchange labor arrangements present both weaknesses and strengths in terms of effort 
incentives.  Weaknesses include technical difficulties of monitoring team production and 
the erosion of incentives on farms late in the rotation of exchange.  However, the 
reciprocity inherent in labor exchange in a village setting characterized by multiple 
interactions by agents across activities over time suggests that incentives arising from 
reciprocity and reputation may be quite strong.   This evidence suggests that team labor 
contracts may include higher effort incentives on average, depending on the strength of 
effort reciprocity operating in labor exchange.  In order to remove the incentive 
component to the test for returns to teamwork, the production function is estimated with 
hired labor hours disaggregated into non-team piece rates, piece rate teams, and other 
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hired labor including labor exchange.  The null hypothesis of no returns to teamwork is 
rejected if piece rate team labor is more productive than other piece rate labor. 
A practical problem with estimating a Cobb-Douglas production function in the common 
log-log form is the treatment of zero values for any of the inputs since all factors are 
essential under this technology.  This problem is particularly important in this case where 
labor is disaggregated into household labor and three forms of hired labor; many farmers 
do not use all four types of labor.  As a partial solution to this problem I follow MaCurdy 
and Pencavel (1986) and Jacoby (1993) and add a one to all inputs except land before 
taking logs.  The use of a shift parameter appears to provide an effective remedy as long 
as it does not have a significant effect on the relative productivity of the various sources 
of labor, which is the main concern here.  I address the appropriateness of this 
specification in the discussion of results below.
The dependent variable in the production function estimation is the log value of output.  
Inputs include the three kinds of hired labor, household labor hours, non-labor cost 
(including fertilizer, pesticides, seeds, etc.), area planted, and the value of farm 
equipment.  Dummy variables for two forms of irrigation (technical and simple) are 
included, as is a dummy for whether the plot is rated as dryland, which indicates soil 
quality.  For the sample used here, 74.8 percent of the plots were wetland and 18.7 
percent were dryland.  Dryland plots typically have lower yields.  Household head age 
and education are also used as regressors to control for differences in managerial ability. 
Season and province dummies are also included in the estimation.
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Complete production data are available for each household by plot and season, so 
individual plots are treated as the unit of observation.  As noted in Chapter 3, labor 
exchange is primarily used in rice and corn production.  These two crops were the 
primary commodity (measured by value of output) on over 70 percent of the 329 plots on 
which labor exchange was used in 1998-99.  The next most important crop on which 
labor exchange was used was garlic, which represented only 4.6 percent of labor 
exchange plots.  Therefore, in order to measure returns to teamwork for potential users of 
exchange labor, the sample was restricted to those plots on which rice or corn represented 
at least 50 percent of the value of production.  The sample was also restricted to include 
only plots on which some non-household labor was used.  This resulted in a sample size 
of 1031 plots. 
Several estimators of the production function are used to test for returns to teamwork.  
Least squares is employed as a point of reference, although it is biased if there are 
unobservable household or plot characteristics that are correlated with the inputs or if 
farmers simultaneously choose input and target output levels.  In order to address the 
resulting bias, an instrumental variables estimator is also used.  The four labor variables 
and non-labor cost are treated as endogenous in the IV estimation.  I also investigate the 
potential endogeneity of area planted.  Most farmers in the sample do not deviate from 
their land endowments when deciding how much land to plant:  for 69 percent of the 
plots in the sample, the area planted is equal to the area owned.  This suggests some 
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imperfection in land rental markets, which might justify treating area planted as 
exogenous in a particular season.  
The set of instruments used in IV estimation includes village price data and other village 
and household characteristics that affect factor demand.  Prices include village averages 
of male wage rates, the price of rice, and interest rates on loans taken by respondent 
households.  The share of adults in the village working as agricultural laborers in the 
1998 census is used to represent village labor supply conditions.  Using the 1998 census 
data to construct this variable creates a more complete measure of local labor supply than 
one based on the later 1998-99 sample data and also ensures that the variable pre-dates 
current labor demand.  By this construction, the share of adults working as agricultural 
laborers should be a good instrument because it will be highly correlated with the labor 
demand variables, but will be uncorrelated with unobserved contemporaneous shocks to 
output that are captured in the error term.  Another instrument is the village median 
distance to the market for agricultural crops, which also exogenously affects demand for 
factors.  The share of village land area planted in rice (constructed from households 
surveys) should affect prices, and therefore demand, for fertilizer and other factors.  
Exogeneity of this instrument requires that crop choice is determined primarily by 
technological factors such as soil quality and rainfall, and not because of 
complementarities in marketing and production across households.  An instrument for 
area planted is a dummy variable for whether the household has inherited any land, which 
is primarily a function of birth order in Indonesia and so is likely to be exogenous.  
Finally, several variables for the age and gender composition of household members are 
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included as factors determining the allocation of household labor time between farming 
and other activities.  At least for working-age household members, the relevant fertility 
decisions that determined the age composition of household members occurred 
sufficiently far in the past that the number of these individuals is plausibly exogenous.  
Below, I provide several tests of the relevance and exogeneity of these instruments.
The OLS and IV estimators are valid only under the assumption of independence of error 
terms across observations.  In order to address the possibility of correlation in error terms 
across plots within the same household, a random effects instrumental variables model 
was also estimated.  Here the data represent an unbalanced panel because the number of 
plots and seasons of cultivation varied by household.  Finally, the production function is 
also estimated in a model with village fixed effects to rule out the possibility that a 
finding of positive returns to teamwork arises only because piece rate teams are more 
common in villages with high average productivity.
The production function estimates are presented in Table 4.1.56  Parameter estimates 
differ across the four models, although the estimates are broadly similar in the random 
effects and pooled IV models.  A Hausman test for joint exogeneity of the four labor 
variables and non-labor cost rejected the OLS estimates in favor of the pooled IV 
estimates with a p-value of .0013.  Also a test for overidentifying restrictions using 
Hansen’s J-statistic for the pooled IV estimator yielded a p-value of .9109, failing to 
reject the validity of the instruments.  A separate issue concerns whether the set of 
56 Results of the first stage regressions predicting the endogenous labor and non-labor cost variables in the 
IV and random effects IV models are presented in Appendix C.
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instruments is highly correlated with the endogenous labor and non-labor costs variables.  
Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) note that weak instruments in this sense can lead to 
inconsistency in IV estimates and finite sample bias.  They suggest calculating the partial 
R-squared and conducting an F-test on the joint significance of “excluded” instruments, 
those not present as regressors in the production function.  These statistics are presented 
at the bottom of Tables C.1.1-C.1.5 for the first-stage estimates of the labor and non-labor 
cost variables for the pooled IV model.  The partial R-squared on excluded instruments is 
quite low for the household labor hours equation (partial 2R =.039) and the other hired 
labor hours equation (partial 2R =.054), but this statistic improves for the equations for 
non-team piece rate labor, piece rate team labor and non-labor cost to .089, .129, and 
.162, respectively.    The somewhat higher partial 2R  for the non-team piece rate and 
piece-rate team equations are reassuring given the importance of these variables in the 
test for returns to teamwork.  The F-test for significance of the excluded instruments 
rejects that these instruments are jointly zero a p-values below .001 for all five factor 
equations.  Overall, these results indicate a fairly strong set of instruments for the pooled 
IV model.
Finally, based on a regression not reported here in which area planted was added to the 
list of endogenous variables, a Hausman test failed to reject the exogeneity of area 
planted.  Similar tests lead to the conclusion that the random effects IV estimator is 
preferred to the OLS estimator but could not reject the pooled IV model for the random 
effects IV model.
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The results in Table 4.1 offer strong evidence of returns to teamwork for this sample of 
rice and corn farmers.  As shown from the hypothesis tests for returns to teamwork 
presented in Table 4.1, the contribution to production from piece rate team labor is 
significantly greater than that of other piece rate labor for all four estimators, though 
weakly so for the one with village fixed effects.  In the preferred random effects 
specification in column 3, the elasticity of output with respect to piece rate team labor is 
0.80 compared to an output elasticity of non-team piece rate labor of 0.08.  The marginal 
products of non-team piece rate labor and team piece rate labor calculated at the mean of 
the data are also presented at the bottom of Table 4.1.  These results show a substantial 
productivity advantage at the margin from labor organized in teams. 
I now address a possible concern, raised earlier, that the approach to dealing with zero-
valued inputs in this specification—adding a shift parameter equal to one to non-land 
inputs before taking logarithms—may affect the validity of the test of returns to 
teamwork.  The need for the shift parameter arises because zero-valued inputs violate the 
essentiality assumption for factors of production under the Cobb-Douglas functional 
form.  One concern is that this apparent violation of the essentiality assumption will 
produce unreliable estimates of relative factor productivity using this functional form.  
Employing an alternative functional form that does not assume essentiality, such as the 
Generalized Leontief, would test the restrictiveness of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function.  However, flexible functional forms of this type require estimation of a much 
larger number of parameters, which can lead to problems of multicollinearity.  Facing 
these alternatives, I preferred to use the Cobb-Douglas functional form and investigate 
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the potential implications of the shift parameter on the estimates of factor productivity 
and the hypothesis test for returns to teamwork.  
The role of the shift parameter is to preserve the zero-valued observations in the 
estimation.  A shift parameter valued at one is attractive because it returns zero-valued 
observations to zero after taking logs.  However, the use of a shift parameter in this 
specification raises two possible concerns for the test of returns to teamwork: (i) that 
including the zero-valued observations in the estimation distorts the measurement of 
factor productivity and (ii) that the size of the shift parameter relative to the uncensored 
data may bias productivity estimates.  In the data used to generate the estimates in Table 
4.1, more than half of the observations use no non-team piece rate labor and roughly 
ninety percent use zero piece rate team labor.  The first concern raised here is that a large 
number of censored observations for piece rate team hours may bias estimates of 
productivity for this factor upward.  To address this concern, I randomly dropped roughly 
half of the observations with zero piece rate team hours and estimated the pooled IV 
model on the remaining data (N=577).  The estimated elasticity of non-team piece rate 
hours was .06 and that of piece rate team hours was .60.  A t-test rejects equality of these 
coefficients (p-value = .020), which suggests that incorporating censored values for the 
piece rate team labor variable is not driving the finding of positive returns to teamwork.  
The second concern is the choice of shift parameter.  The shift parameter should not be 
large enough to significantly affect the relative productivity of the labor variables used in 
the test of returns to teams.  For the sample used in estimation, the average number of 
hours of labor hired under piece rate teams and non-team piece rate contracts for 
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households using each type of labor contract is 55.5 and 73.3 hours, respectively.  Adding 
1 to these variables appears to represent a small transformation.  However, as a check of 
the robustness of the test for returns to teamwork to the value of shift parameter, I also 
performed the tests after transforming the data by shift parameters of .1 and 10.  In the 
four models estimated with the three shift parameters, the null hypothesis of no 
productivity advantage for team labor is rejected below the five percent significance level 
for 10 out of 12 of the cases.  For the other two cases, I obtain a p-value of 0.082 on this 
hypothesis test in the village fixed effects model with a shift parameter equal to 1 (shown 
in column 4 of Table 4.1) and a p-value of 0.117 in the village fixed effects model with a 
shift parameter of .1.  I conclude that the test for returns to teamwork is quite robust to 
the choice of shift parameter.
Interestingly, other piece rate labor did not demonstrate an incentive effect.  Its 
coefficient in all four models is smaller than the coefficient on other hired labor, but this 
difference is not significant in any model except for the one using village fixed effects.  
As a precaution, I tested for a productivity advantage of piece rate team labor over other 
hired labor and reject equality of these coefficients for the IV estimators.  In the fixed 
effects regression, other hired labor has a larger coefficient than piece rate team labor, but 
again the difference is not significant.  It is worth noting that these results do not support 
a productivity advantage for household labor relative to (non-piece-rate) hired labor 
because of moral hazard, as assumed in the model in Chapter 2.  The coefficient on 
household labor hours is not significantly different from the coefficient on other hired 
labor in any of the models.  In a separate regression not shown here with hired labor 
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hours aggregated, household labor was more productive than hired labor (a coefficient of 
0.359 versus 0.296, respectively) but the difference was not significant.  This could arise 
even in the presence of moral hazard if hired labor is more prevalent in tasks with a 
higher return to labor hours.  This would be the case if household labor is devoted more 
heavily to tasks that require greater care and so more labor time, as observed by Eswaran 
and Kotwal (1985).
These results provide rare evidence of returns to teamwork in agricultural production and 
they contribute to a small literature that demonstrates productivity gains from team 
production in general.  They also establish a necessary condition for the use of labor 
exchange for this sample of rice and corn farmers in Indonesia.  Moreover, this evidence 
contradicts the claim made by Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), following the development of 
their model of the organization of agricultural production, that gains from teamwork are 
not a relevant justification for the hierarchical employer-employee relationship in 
agricultural settings:
Agriculture is one sector for which the explanation of hierarchical 
employment relationships on the basis of a presumed technological 
advantage of team production is not compelling.  Since the various 
production activities are necessarily spread out over time, it is possible for 
individual agents to operate as efficiently as would a team (p. 497).
The results here showing a productivity advantage for piece rate teams over individual 
piece rate workers refutes this assertion by Eswaran and Kotwal, at least for the 
Indonesian farms in this sample.  However, because I have shown that returns to 
teamwork are a necessary condition for labor exchange, all labor exchange teams 
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anywhere provide a counterexample to their claim.  In the Indonesian sample, these 
counterexamples arise in many different settings, for production of several crops and for 
various activities.  This suggests that the returns to teamwork in agriculture may be 
widespread.
Table 4.1: Cobb-Douglas Production Function Estimates of Returns to Teamwork
 Dependent Variable:+











 Non-team piece rate (PR) 0.091 *** 0.071 0.076 0.064 ***
      labor hours++ (0.024) (0.149) (0.135) (0.020)
 Piece rate team labor hours++ 0.233 *** 0.821 *** 0.799 *** 0.130 ***
(0.046) (0.295) (0.182) (0.034)
 Other hired labor hours++ 0.154 *** 0.309 0.334 * 0.179 ***
(0.054) (0.197) (0.203) (0.025)
 Household labor hours++ 0.084 *** 0.621 ** 0.594 *** 0.073 ***
(0.021) (0.246) (0.150) (0.019)
 Non-labor cost++ 0.239 *** 0.087 0.033 0.201 ***
(0.060) (0.169) (0.132) (0.032)
 Area planted 0.179 * 0.030 0.047 0.129 ***
(0.091) (0.123) (0.097) (0.035)
 Value of farm equipment -0.007 -0.021 -0.015 -0.004 ***
(0.013) (0.035) (0.028) (0.011)
 Technical irrigation dummy -0.257 * -0.360 -0.286 * -0.358 ***
(0.136) (0.235) (0.170) (0.112)
 Simple irrigation dummy -0.165 -0.056 -0.015 0.009
(0.185) (0.257) (0.182) (0.101)
 Dryland dummy -0.415 *** -0.270 -0.326 -0.470 ***
(0.135) (0.217) (0.211) (0.120)
 Household head age 0.288 0.109 0.134 0.202
(0.176) (0.275) (0.203) (0.132)
 Household head education 0.146 ** 0.287 ** 0.284 *** 0.099 **
(0.065) (0.129) (0.090) (0.050)
N 1031 1031 1031 1031
R2 0.378 -- 0.220 0.328
 p-value: F(19,1001); F(19, 6); 
 Wald chi2(19); F(14, 987)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test: Returns to Teamwork
Test for equality of non-team PR 
and PR team effects (p-value):




 Non-team piece rate labor hours 4.623 8.871 8.742 2.968
(1.204) (18.428) (15.413) (0.928)
 Piece rate team labor hours 40.608 349.421 314.365 20.709
(7.964) (125.746) (71.891) (5.469)
+Parameter estimates for season and province dummies are omitted.  All explanatory variables except land are 
in log form after adding a shift parameter equal to one.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Pooled models use 
Huber/White/sandwich robust standard errors adjusted for clustering.  (++) Indicates an endogenous variable, 
instrumented in IV models.  The marginal product of the jth input on the kth plot is calculated as 
jkkjjk LYMP ˆβ̂=  where jβ̂  is the parameter estimate representing the output elasticity of the jth factor and 
kŶ  is predicted value of output.  Marginal products are calculated from the means of the data.  Standard errors 




4.4 The Determinants of Participation in Labor Exchange If All Households Are 
Working Capital Constrained
In this section, I estimate the determinants of the farmer’s decision to participate in a 
labor exchange team assuming that all farmers are working capital constrained.  In the 
next section, I consider alternative divisions of the sample into constrained and 
unconstrained regimes.  The probit models for labor exchange participation are estimated 
at the plot level for each household by season.  Using plot-specific data on labor 
exchange demand makes it possible to control for technological factors such as plot size 
and type of irrigation as well as crop choice and plot ownership status.  Differentiating 
labor exchange use by season helps to account for differences in growing conditions and 
labor market conditions during the agricultural year.
4.4.1 The Choice of Explanatory Variables
I define working capital holdings in each season as the sum of savings and loans 
outstanding at the beginning of the season plus new loans taken during the season.57  The 
theoretical model in Chapter 2 shows that the level of working capital, land endowments 
and other assets have no effect on the probability of using labor exchange for households 
that are unconstrained in their access to working capital, but do affect the labor exchange 
decision in constrained households.  These effects differ by mode of production, but a 
general pattern of effects of these endowments on labor exchange emerged from the 
model.  For farmers with the lowest levels of working capital or land (laborer-cultivators 
57 I provide a detailed description of the approach used to construct this measure of working capital in 
Appendix D.
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in the model), these endowments are positively related to demand for labor exchange.  As 
endowments increase, their effect on demand for labor exchange depends on 
substitutability of team size with land and on supervision costs.  Working capital and land 
endowments are most likely to have a negative effect on demand for labor exchange at 
moderate to high endowment levels, where the mode of production also includes hiring 
market labor on farm.  It should be possible to identify these effects of working capital 
endowments on demand for labor exchange in the labor exchange participation decision, 
which is driven in part by the level of returns to teamwork and the search costs associated 
with finding labor exchange teammates.  Those factors that increase demand for labor 
exchange also raise the benefits to participation in labor exchange teams, which increases 
the probability that the household will participate.  
Although the effects of working capital and other variables differ by mode of production, 
I estimate the decision to participate in labor exchange for the entire farming sample 
rather than by mode of production.  The latter approach would involve classifying 
households according to the four market labor regimes of Table 2.1 and estimating the 
decision to use labor exchange separately for each one.  These market labor regimes 
correspond to the modes of production described by Roemer (1982) and Eswaran and 
Kotwal (1986): laborer-cultivator, self-cultivator, small capitalist, and large capitalist.  
This empirical strategy was rejected for several reasons.  First, the classification of 
households into modes of production is sensitive to the reference period.  If the length of 
a time period is taken to be one season, there is sufficient slack in agricultural activities 
that many households would be classified as simultaneously buying and selling labor.  
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For the 1691 household observations by season in the farming sample in labor exchange 
villages, the four market labor regimes contain 21.8, 17.5, 26.9 and 1.9 percent of the 
observations, respectively.58  The remaining 31.9 percent of observations are households 
that both hired and supplied paid market labor during the season.  This mode of 
production, identified in the second row of Table 2.1, was ruled out in the Eswaran and 
Kotwal (1986) model, but arises in the model in Chapter 2 because of returns to 
teamwork.  However, the model in Chapter 2 rules out the use of labor exchange with this 
mode of production, so no predictions of a systematic relationship between working 
capital endowments and labor exchange are possible for this alternative mode of 
production.  Using a shorter reference period, say the duration of a farming activity (e.g., 
planting, weeding), would reduce the number of households classified as simultaneously 
buying and selling market labor, but is inconsistent with the model.  Another practical 
consideration for not estimating the labor exchange decision by mode of production is the 
reduced precision of parameter estimates given the small number of observations that 
would fall into some modes after dividing the sample by mode of production and, later, 
by working capital constraint status.  
Given these difficulties in classifying households by mode of production, a more robust 
empirical strategy is to estimate the labor exchange decision for the entire farming 
sample and account for differences in the effects of key explanatory variables, such as 
working capital and land endowments, across modes of production by appropriately 
defining regressors.  For example, entering these endowment variables in the model in 
58 These classifications ignore labor exchange and classify households according to demand and supply of 
household and paid market labor only.
135
quantiles should approximate the continuum of modes of production that emerge as 
endowments increase.  The data suggest that such a strategy is valid and may identify the 
pattern of effects of these variables on participation labor exchange described by the 
model.  Table 4.2 presents average working capital endowments and area of owned land 
by the four market labor regimes from Chapter 2, with a residual category for those 
simultaneously hiring and selling paid labor.  Average working capital holdings and land 
endowments rise monotonically across the four market labor regimes as predicted by 
Eswaran and Kotwal (1986).  According to the model in Chapter 2, those simultaneously 
hiring and selling paid labor could have endowments anywhere along this continuum.  In 
this sample endowments for this mode of production are below those of self-cultivators.  
These results suggest that endowment levels can serve as a reliable proxy for mode of 
cultivation in estimation of the labor exchange decision.
Non-land assets should have similar effects on labor exchange as working capital to the 
extent that they represent viable sources of collateral for borrowing.  Otherwise, stocks of 
these assets will have a weak association with the labor exchange decision.  I measure the 
net value of non-land assets as the sum of all non-farm business assets, household assets, 
livestock, and farm equipment, net of debt used to finance these assets.  
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Table 4.2: Working Capital and Land Endowments 
by Market Labor Regime











Small capitalist 2.949 1.494
Large capitalist 3.510 1.748
Simultaneously hire/sell paid labor 0.661 0.855
Land endowments are measured by land area owned.  In addition to the endowment 
effect of owned land as a source of collateral for working capital, operated land area 
affects the level of returns to teamwork and the search costs for finding potential labor 
exchange teammates through the plot size distribution.  If the area of a farmer’s plot is a 
common local plot size, the farmer will have lower search costs for finding labor 
exchange teammates.  Also, farmers with a great deal of other land under cultivation will 
be less able to devote time to working on other farmer’s plots through labor exchange.  I 
capture these effects in a separate specification of the model by replacing land 
endowments with two variables: the area of the plot in that observation and the area of all 
other plots planted during the same season.  These effects of plot size and size of other 
plots do not vary systematically by working capital constraint status.  The effect of plot 
size relative to the village distribution of land is also captured by the share of village 
sample plots within ten percent of the area of the plot for that observation.  As this share 
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increases, search costs for labor exchange teammates will decline, increasing the 
probability that the farmer will join a labor exchange team.59
If paid labor markets are subject to transactions costs like those in the model from 
Chapter 2, the size of the local labor market will affect demand for labor exchange by 
changing the relative magnitude of search costs for paid and exchange labor.  For 
example, in villages where land is abundant and most households are engaged in farming, 
search costs for paid labor will be high because few landless households provide a source 
of hired labor.  I use the share of adults in the village that report agricultural laborer as 
their primary or secondary occupation in the 1998 village census as a proxy measure for 
the size of the agricultural labor market during the 1998-99 agricultural year.  This should 
be a good measure of the local availability of hired workers because it includes all adults 
in every household living in the immediate neighborhood or kampung.  I also use the 
average village hourly wage for time rate contracts by season to control for local wage 
rates.  The effect of wage rates depends on whether the household is a net buyer or net 
seller of labor.  For net sellers of labor, an increase in the wage rate reduces demand for 
labor exchange by increasing the opportunity cost of time, but it also raises liquidity.  The 
liquidity effect increases demand for labor exchange as the scale of operation expands.  
For net buyers of labor, higher wages raise the price of market substitutes for labor 
exchange, making labor exchange more attractive.  In the empirical model, I interact the 
wage rate with dummy variables for net buyers and net sellers of labor to identify these 
effects.
59 The means of these variables in the plot-level data for the farming sample in labor exchange villages are 
presented in the first column of Table 4.2.
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A number of plot-specific characteristics other than area are also included as regressors to 
control for differences in growing conditions.  I include dummy variables for whether the 
plot has technical irrigation or simple irrigation as possible regressors.  The former is a 
more mechanized system involving water pumps and the later relies on gravity to deliver 
the water.  In the farming sample in labor exchange villages, 11.1 percent of plots planted 
use technical irrigation and 15.0 percent use a form of simple irrigation.  These variables 
provide a test for whether reliance on labor exchange is inconsistent with advances in 
agricultural technology.  In the case of irrigation, these inconsistencies may arise because 
use of exchange labor on irrigated plots would require coordination of scheduling of the 
water delivery and the work team’s activities.  As a control for another measure of 
technological advancement, I include indicator variables for the use of high yielding 
variety (HYV) seeds interacted with crop-specific indicators for rice and corn.  Adoption 
of HYV seeds may have competing effects on the use of labor exchange.  It will increase 
labor demand overall and may increase team labor demand, depending on the technology.  
However, the use of HYV seeds may also indicate a level of commercialization and 
access to markets that makes reliance on non-market forms of exchange unnecessary.
I include the number of plantings on the plot during the 1998-99 agricultural year as a 
measure of demand for team labor arising from the need to complete tasks quickly.  
However, a negative association between labor exchange use and the number of plantings 
may arise if labor exchange is more common on crops that are planted less frequently or 
in areas where the intensity of agricultural activity is low.   An indicator for whether the 
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plot is owned captures whether land ownership affects labor exchange use.  Ownership
could reduce demand for labor exchange by increasing access to capital to finance paid 
labor.  It will also increase the farmer’s motivation to invest in the land, which would be 
important if farming practices by labor exchange teams are more likely to include soil 
conservation activities.
I include household demographic and education variables as measures of labor demand 
and managerial ability.  As shown in Chapter 2 for self-cultivators using labor exchange, 
an increase in the number of household members reduces demand for external team labor 
but also relaxes the time constraint, which has a countervailing effect.  For other modes 
of production, no unambiguous effect of household size on labor exchange can be 
derived, but it is reasonable to expect that the substitution effect of a larger household 
labor team will usually outweigh the endowment effect from having more household 
members.  Household head age could be an important determinant of participation in 
labor exchange teams, but the direction of its effect may not be systematic.  As noted in 
Chapter 1, labor exchange teams are often formed among social equals, and so may be 
homogenous in age.  However, labor exchange teams may still form among both older 
and younger farmers separately.  The average age of these groupings will determine the 
effect measured in the labor exchange probit regressions.  In general, older farmers may 
be more likely to use labor exchange due to greater experience and familiarity with local 
operation of the institution.  I also include household head education as a control for 
managerial ability, access to financial markets, and predisposition to non-market 
reciprocal exchange.  I expect managerial ability to reduce supervision costs, possibly 
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more so for paid labor than for exchange labor.  If education increases credit market 
access, it will increase demand for labor exchange on small farms, but may reduce it on 
larger farms, as shown in Chapter 2.  Education may also affect preferences for entering 
reciprocal exchange relationships, although the sign of this effect depends on the nature 
of the education in ways that are not discernable in the data.
In estimation, the sample is restricted to farmers in villages with the labor exchange 
institution (the 1998-99 “labor exchange villages”) because only farmers in these villages 
have the opportunity to participate in labor exchange, as argued in Chapter 3.  Therefore, 
my estimates of the decision to use labor exchange can be interpreted as conditional on 
the presence of the labor exchange institution in the village.  Including farmers in villages 
without the labor exchange institution in the sample would lead to biased estimates of the 
effects of explanatory variables on the farmer’s labor exchange decision.  It would also 
improperly reduce the fraction of the variance in labor exchange decisions that can be 
explained because there is likely to be greater heterogeneity in unobservable village and 
household characteristics across labor exchange and non-labor exchange villages.  The 
interpretation of estimates on this broader sample would also no longer conform to the 
model in Chapter 2 because the dependent variable would indicate whether a farmer 
chose to use labor exchange and had access to it.  This empirical strategy confounds two 
separate events, a decision by the farmer and a constraint based on access to labor 
exchange.  It is also important to note that restricting estimation to the sample of 
households in labor exchange villages would lead to selection bias if farmers were able to 
migrate from non-labor exchange to labor exchange villages in order to take advantage of 
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labor exchange.  Most farmers in the sample own at least some of the land that they farm, 
and land sales transactions are relatively infrequent in the data.  This suggests that 
potential selection bias due to labor-exchange-induced migration is likely to be very 
small.
4.4.2 The Effect of Working Capital, Land Endowments, and Other Assets
Table 4.3 presents estimates of probit models of the labor exchange participation decision 
by plot for the entire farming sample from labor exchange villages under the assumption 
that all farmers are working capital constrained.  Farmers used labor exchange on 16.2 
percent of plots by season in this sample.  These models differ in their treatment of 
unobserved household effects across plots, but in each model seasonal effects are 
modeled as fixed because the number of seasons is small (Judge et al., 1985, p. 537).  In 
the first three models of the labor exchange decision, plot observations are pooled across 
households using partial maximum likelihood probit estimators with different 
explanatory variables.  In Model 1, working capital is included as a continuous regressor 
and land is entered as total area owned to measure its endowment effect.  In Model 2, 
indicators for quintiles of working capital are used to allow the effect of working capital 
to vary by levels.  Model 3 substitutes plot area and area of other plots operated in the 
same season for total land area owned.  Model 4 is a random effects probit model that 
accounts for possible correlation of the error term across plots operated by the same 
household.  
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If all farmers are working capital constrained, it is not necessary to control for selection 
on working capital constraint status in estimation.  In this case, the likelihood function for 
the decision to use labor exchange in (4.6) simplifies to a binomial probit, with 
observations varying by household, Ni ,...,1= , by plot, Jj ,...,1= , and by season, 
Tt ,...,1= :
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where Φ  is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.  Because β  and uσ
are not separately identified, I use the common normalization that 1=uσ .  With seasonal 
effects fixed, they can be omitted from the remainder of the discussion.  A remaining 
issue is the choice of estimator when there may be multiple plot observations for each 
household.  A tractable approach is the pooled probit model using a partial maximum 
likelihood estimator (PMLE), as described in Wooldridge (2002, pp. 401-405; 482-483).  
Let ( )jj XyD |  be the distribution of jy  given jX  and let ( )σγβ ,,;| jjj Xyf  be the 
corresponding density for the jth plot.  The simplification provided by the partial 









is a conditional distribution of the complete vector iy .  Although ( )σγβ ,,;| jjj Xyf  is 
the correct density for ijy  given ijX  for the jth plot, the product of these densities may 
not be the density for the vector iy  given some X .  The PMLE maximizes the expected 
value of the partial log likelihood for each observation i
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as long as the densities ( )σγβ ,,;| jjj Xyf  are correctly specified.  The attraction of the 
pooled PMLE is that it is straightforward to estimate and that the parameter estimates are 
consistent and asymptotically normal even if the error terms are arbitrarily correlated 
across plots (Wooldridge, 2002).  The random effects probit model in Model 4 is a more 
efficient estimator if observations within households are correlated.  
The selection of explanatory variables in the pooled probit models was constrained by 
degrees of freedom restrictions imposed by the sample design.  The asymptotic 
distribution of the F statistic for a Wald test of joint significance of regressors has degrees 
of freedom based on the number of clusters in the sample.  This limits the number of 
explanatory variables that can be included in the model to 22, the number of labor 
exchange villages in the sample minus one degree of freedom for the constant term.  With 
five province indicators and two season indicators, the maximum number of remaining 
regressors is 15.  As a result, some variables that were not significantly different from 
zero were dropped from the estimation in each specification.  In a few cases, variables 
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that were statistically significant were omitted from the regression in order to meet this 
degrees-of-freedom restriction.  The remaining variables included in the models are quite 
robust to model specification in Models 1-3.  F tests for joint significance of all 
regressors, presented near the bottom of Table 4.3, yield significance levels below seven 
percent for Models 1 and 2 and below one percent for Model 3.  Korn and Graubard 
(1990) show that a Bonferroni t statistic has more power than an F-distributed Wald test 
when the number of explanatory variables approaches the degrees of freedom set by the 
number of clusters in the sample.  The Bonferroni measure rejects the null hypothesis that 









where is  is the standard error of iβ̂  and kdt 2α  is the upper k2α  point of a t distribution 
with d degrees of freedom.  The Bonferroni adjusted p-value is defined as 
( )ibi kpp ,1min= ,
where ip  is the p-value on a t test for the significance of iβ̂ .  I present the p-value for the 
Bonferroni-adjusted t statistics near the bottom of Table 4.3.  This test rejects the null 
hypothesis at p-values below one percent for all three models.  
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For the pooled probit models, the pseudo-R2 was .281, .234, and .239 for Models 1-3, 
respectively.  The predicted probability of using labor exchange on a sample plot at the 
mean of the explanatory variables ranges from .079 to .096 in Models 1-3, while the 
fraction of plots on which labor exchange is observed is 0.162.  In Model 1, 33.7 percent 
of plots on which labor exchange was used ( )1=iy  were predicted to have labor 
exchange ( )( )5.ˆ >Φ βiX .  In Models 2 and 3, the share of labor exchange plots correctly 
predicted to have labor exchange fell to 22-24 percent.  The share of all labor exchange 
outcomes ( )0or 1 == ii yy  correctly predicted by each model was roughly 85 percent.  
These results suggest a reasonable model fit.
In Model 1 in Table 4.3, holdings of working capital have a significant negative effect on 
the probability of using labor exchange on the given plot.60  This effect is the average 
across all modes of production observed in the data.  Recall from Chapter 2 that the effect 
of working capital holdings on demand for labor exchange for working capital
constrained households is positive at low levels of working capital, but depends on 
technology and market factors at higher levels and may be negative there.  If the 
assumption that all of these households are working capital constrained is correct, the 
negative parameter estimate implies that the effect is indeed negative for households with 
moderate-to-large endowments of working capital and land and that this effect dominates, 
on average, the positive relationship between liquidity and labor exchange use among 
households with lower working capital.  The marginal effects and elasticities of 
60 In all models presented here in which province and season indicator variables are used, the omitted 
province is South Sulawesi and the omitted seasonal indicator is the one for crops grown on an annual 
basis.
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explanatory variables for the models in Table 4.3 are presented in Appendix E, Table E.1.  
In Model 1, the size of the effect of the working capital endowment on the probability of 
using labor exchange is small, with an elasticity at the mean of the data of  -.065.  This 
minor role for imperfect capital markets may be due to the countervailing effects of 
working capital on demand for labor exchange at different working capital endowment 
levels.  Also, the estimated effect of working capital on the labor exchange decision of 
working capital constrained households would be biased downward if some of these 
households are not constrained.  Nonetheless, this small but significant negative effect 
lends some support to the popular belief in existing literature that the prevalence of labor 
exchange is negatively associated with liquidity.
A better test of the theory in Chapter 2 can be conducted by allowing the effect of 
working capital on the labor exchange participation decision to vary by the size of the 
working capital endowment, as described in Section 4.4.1.  Model 2 in Table 4.3 presents 
estimates of the labor exchange participation decision in which the level of working 
capital holdings has been replaced with dummy variables indicating the household’s 
season-specific designation in quintiles of working capital endowments generated from 
all farming households in labor exchange villages across all seasons.  In this sample, 42.4 
percent of households fall into the first quintile, which includes all those with non-
positive holdings of working capital.61  As a result, there is no second quintile and the 
third quintile contains less than 20 percent of the observations.  The fifth quintile is the 
61 Working capital holdings in the rainy season include net income from all activities in the preceding dry 
seasons, which leads to negative working capital holdings for some households in the rainy season.  See 
Appendix D for a detailed description of the construction of this measure of working capital.  The working 
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omitted category in estimation.  Median holdings of working capital by ascending 
quintiles are Rp. 0, Rp. 133,333, Rp. 877,003, and Rp. 5 million, respectively.  An F test 
and a Bonferroni adjusted t test on the coefficients on the working capital quintile 
indicators shows that they have a significant effect on the probability of using labor 
exchange, with p-values of .063 and .034, respectively.
The parameter estimates for quintiles of working capital strongly support the theoretical 
predictions from the model.  As an example, consider the effect of a change in the 
quintile of working capital holdings on the probability of using labor exchange for 
households in Central Java during the rainy season.62  At the mean value of the other 
explanatory variables in Central Java during the rainy season, having working capital 
holdings in the first quintile (effectively zero working capital) makes the probability of 
using labor exchange 18.2 percent.  Having working capital endowments in the third, 
fourth and fifth quintiles leads to probabilities of using labor exchange of 25.1 percent, 
22.7 percent, and 13.6 percent, respectively.  This implies that an increase in working 
capital holdings from the first to the third quintile raises the probability of using labor 
exchange by 6.9 percent, but that further increases in working capital quintiles starting 
from the third and fourth quintiles reduce the probability of using labor exchange by 2.4 
percent and 9.1 percent, respectively.
These results are consistent with the model of labor exchange in Chapter 2.  The model 
predicts that farmers with the lowest endowments of working capital operate as laborer-
capital variable was left negative for these observations because this reflects an unmeasured ability to 
borrow or some unreported savings in the dry season.
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cultivators and have a positive relationship of working capital endowment levels to 
demand for labor exchange.  As working capital endowments grow and farmers move 
into the self-cultivator, small-capitalist and large capitalist modes of production, the 
relationship depends, among other things, on substitutability of team size and labor time 
for land and on supervision costs.  The empirical evidence from Model 2 indicates that 
the negative effect of working capital holdings on exchange labor demand dominates 
countervailing effects at high levels of working capital.  Just above the median level of 
working capital holdings, further increases in working capital reduce the probability of 
joining a labor exchange team.  This is the dampening effect of liquidity on labor 
exchange use that is frequently cited in the sociological literature.  However, in this 
sample that effect only arises in the upper half of the working capital distribution.
Endowments of non-land assets have no effect on the probability of using labor 
exchange, which suggests that these assets are not a significant source of collateral for 
borrowing and that they were correctly classified as fixed, rather than working capital.
62 The pattern of effects across working capital quintiles is similar in other provinces and other seasons.
Table 4.3: Determinants of Participation in Labor Exchange, Farming Sample
Dependent Variable:  Means Model
    Indicator for Labor Exchange Use (1) (2) (3) (4)






















Working capital: credit taken or outstanding 2.142 -0.016**
      plus savings by season, Rp. mn. (0.389) (0.007)
First quintile of working capital 0.422 0.192 0.188 0.137
(0.045) (0.163) (0.146) (0.138)
Third quintile of working capital 0.145 0.428** 0.436** 0.390***
(0.023) (0.177) (0.163) (0.176)
Fourth quintile of working capital 0.230 0.350** 0.362*** 0.272**
(0.023) (0.127) (0.117) (0.096)
Value of non-land business, household, and 6.281 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007
      farm assets net of credit financing, 1998 (0.806) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Number of household members 4.812 -0.055** -0.082*** -0.081*** -0.049
(0.134) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.037)
Number of plantings on this plot, 1998-99 1.914 -0.260*** -0.271*** -0.256*** -0.121**
(0.106) (0.075) (0.078) (0.075) (0.070)
Indicator for simple irrigation 0.150 0.344* 0.315* 0.414** 0.463***
(0.044) (0.198) (0.183) (0.189) (0.150)
Indicator for plot being owned, not leased 0.821 -0.352** -0.363*** -0.310** -0.276**
(0.027) (0.126) (0.126) (0.122) (0.125)
Indictor for HYV seeds used in corn 0.058 0.827*** 0.603** 0.587** 0.713***
      production (0.025) (0.221) (0.244) (0.278) (0.155)




Table 4.3  (continued)
Means Models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln of plot area -0.940 0.185*** 0.197***
(0.139) (0.063) (0.050)
Area of other plots planted this season 0.307 -0.078
      by this household (hectares) (0.049) (0.067)
Share of village sample plots within 0.118 1.123** 0.754 0.757 0.786**
      10% of this plot’s area by season (0.010) (0.503) (0.503) (0.477) (0.370)
Share of adults in village working as 0.167 -1.005** -1.176** -1.219**
      an agricultural laborer, 1998 census (0.028) (0.432) (0.491) (0.510)
Average village hourly wage for time 1.360 -0.464 -0.862***
      rate contracts, by season (Rp. ‘000) (0.087) (0.287) (0.253)
Average village hourly wage × Indicator for 0.609 0.820** 0.860***
     net seller of labor (0.068) (0.292) (0.103)
Average village hourly wage × Indicator for 0.555 1.144*** 1.193***
     net buyer of labor (0.036) (0.302) (0.072)
Household head age (years) 49.007 -0.008* -0.010** -0.009** -0.009*
(0.876) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Household head education level (years) 4.745 -0.026 -0.011
(0.329) (0.017) (0.015)
Lampung province indicator 0.258 -1.302*** -1.124*** -1.049*** -0.938***
(0.099) (0.222) (0.269) (0.282) (0.162)
Central Java province indicator 0.190 -0.493** -0.404* -0.277 -0.157
(0.087) (0.218) (0.202) (0.219) (0.129)
East Java province indicator 0.135 -1.944*** -1.700*** -1.547*** -1.648***
(0.076) (0.286) (0.305) (0.319) (0.223)
West Nusa Tenggara province indicator 0.164 -1.016*** -1.029*** -0.998*** -0.835***
(0.079) (0.267) (0.240) (0.286) (0.132)
North Sulawesi province indicator 0.081 -1.075** -0.718* -0.785* -0.888***
(0.058) (0.446) (0.393) (0.412) (0.228)
(continued…)
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Table 4.3  (continued)
Means Models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rainy season indicator 0.377 0.918*** 1.213*** 1.189*** 0.790***
(0.026) (0.258) (0.274) (0.262) (0.117)
Dry season indicator for both dry seasons 0.299 0.886*** 1.142*** 1.121*** 0.776***
(0.029) (0.242) (0.252) (0.243) (0.059)
Constant -0.212 0.170 0.228 -0.028
(0.398) (0.324) (0.342) (0.063)
Log (partial-)likelihood -641.59 -683.60 -677.77 -542.47
Observations 2009 2017 2017 2009 2009
Number of households  818
Psuedo-R2 0.2809 0.2338 0.2392 0.3082
p-value: F(21,2); F(21,2); F(21,2); LR 
chi2(23)
0.0666 0.0570 0.0045 0.0000
Bonferroni model t test (Prob>t): 0.0000 0.0003 0.0016
Predicted probability at mean of X 0.1616 0.0794 0.0962 0.0939 0.0844
Proportion of variance explained by 
household-level error component, ρ ;
LR p-value for H0: ρ̂ =0
0.8195
0.000
For the pooled models, standard errors in parentheses are based on the Huber/White/sandwich robust estimator of 
variance, adjusted for clustering in sample design.  The p-values for the test of joint significance of all regressors 
are presented below the psuedo-R2 near the bottom of the table.  The p-values for Bonferroni-adjusted t statistics 
for the test of joint significance of all regressors are reported in the next line.  For the random effects model, the 
reported estimates of the slope coefficients and their standard errors were transformed to make them comparable to 
the estimates for the pooled probit models using the approach described in Arulampalam (1999).  The 
transformation for the slope coefficients, for example, involves multiplying all estimates by ρ̂1− .  Asterisks 
indicating significance levels for the random effects probit refer to results of Wald tests performed prior to 
transforming the estimates.  In all models, South Sulawesi is the omitted province.  The omitted season indicator is 
for annual crops.  Marginal effects and elasticities are presented in Appendix E, Table E.1.  
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
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In the model of labor exchange in Chapter 2, land endowments relax the working capital 
constraint in a manner similar to that of working capital.  However, in Model 1 total land 
area owned has a positive effect on the probability of using labor exchange, although the 
effect is insignificant (p-value = 0.322).  This could signify that the effect of land 
endowments on demand for labor exchange is positive over more of the distribution of 
farm size.  Alternatively, because land area owned is correlated with the size of operated 
plots (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.478), this coefficient may pick up effects of 
operated area on search costs for labor exchange teammates in addition to the endowment 
effect.  In order to rule out multiple interpretations of land area owned, I replaced this 
variable with the value of land owned in March 1998 in Model 1.63  In this probit 
regression, the sign on the coefficient on value of land owned was negative, but 
insignificant (p-value = 0.198).  Moreover, collinearity between the value of land owned 
and working capital weakened the size and significance of the working capital parameter, 
providing further evidence that the estimated effect of land value is not reliable.64
4.4.3 The Role of Search Costs, Returns to Teamwork, and the Structure of Labor 
Exchange
As a more direct test of the role of land in affecting returns to teamwork and search costs 
for labor exchange teammates, I replaced land area owned in Model 1 with the natural 
logarithm of operated plot area for the observed plot and the size of all other plots 
operated during the same season.  Results of this specification are shown in Model 3.  
63 In the interest of space, results from this estimation are not shown.  They are available from the author 
upon request.
64 I also estimated a model in which the value of land owned was replaced with indicators for land value 
quintiles, in a treatment similar to that of working capital in Model 2.  An F-test failed to reject that the land 
value quintiles have no effect on the probability of using labor exchange (p-value=.237).
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The size of the plot has a significant positive effect on participation in labor exchange.  
Other area under cultivation had the expected negative sign, but was insignificant.  The 
positive effect of plot size may be capturing greater use of exchange labor in more remote 
villages with larger farms, an indication that thin labor markets increase demand for labor 
exchange.  Although the province dummy variables should remove much of the effect of 
regional variation in plot sizes, a model with village fixed effects would test this 
explanation.  However, conditioning the fixed effects out of the likelihood function in a 
probit model is computationally difficult, and leads to inconsistent estimates of the 
parameters of interest.  Moreover, the number of fixed effects to be estimated increases 
with the number of households.  This is what Neyman and Scott (1948) refer to as the 
“incidental parameters” problem.  Chamberlain (1984) shows that it is possible to obtain 
consistent estimates of the parameters of interest in this setting by estimating a logit 
model with village fixed effects.  I estimated Chamberlain’s model for this problem.  The 
logarithm of plot area remained positive and significant (p-value = .012), which 
eliminates labor market imperfections as the source of the positive plot size effect.65  An 
alternative explanation is that returns to teamwork only emerge in larger plots.  Plots in 
this sample are fairly small; median plot size is just 0.41 hectares.  
The other land variable that captures search costs for labor exchange teammates is the 
share of village plots within ten percent of the size of the plot for that observation.  This 
measures the importance of the size of the pool of potential labor exchange teammates in 
the decision to use labor exchange.  Results for Models 1 show that this variable has a 
positive, significant and reasonably large effect on the probability of using labor 
65 Complete results of this model are available upon request.
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exchange.  This variable loses significance and the measured effect declines somewhat in 
Models 2 and 3.  Across the three models, the elasticity of the probability of participating 
in labor exchange with respect to this variable is ranges from .16 to .25 (see Appendix 
Table E.1).  This provides evidence that farmers assemble labor exchange teams that are 
homogeneous in plot size.  It may be that the coordination costs of operating teams with 
plots of varying size are high or that farmers prefer to avoid making cash side payments 
to compensate teammates for additional hours worked on the larger farms.  The latter 
motivation is consistent with constraints on liquidity.  These results also demonstrate that 
the coordination between farmers required by the structure of the labor exchange 
institution creates constraints on their ability to participate.  
The effect of wage rates on participation in labor exchange is captured in Model 1 by the 
village wage rate entered in levels as well as interacted with indicators for whether the 
household is a net seller or net buyer of labor.  Of the 1613 household observations by 
season in this sample, 735 are net sellers of labor, 633 are net buyers of labor, and the rest 
are autarkic with respect to the labor market.  The effect of wage rates on either net 
sellers or net buyers of labor in this specification is given by the sum of the coefficients 
on the wage and the wage interacted with the appropriate indicator.  The estimates from 
Model 1 show that local wage rates have a positive effect on the probability of 
participating in labor exchange for both net sellers and net buyers of labor, and that this 
effect is larger for net buyers.  The p-value on a Wald test for joint significance of the 
wage variables is .002.  As described in the previous section, an increase in wage rates 
can have two effects on net sellers of labor.  Higher wages can attract more labor supply 
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off-farm in the labor market, at the expense of labor time spent on farm or in labor 
exchange.  A countervailing effect is that more liquidity from higher wages increases 
demand for labor exchange teams as the farming operation expands.  The positive effect 
of wages for net sellers in Model 1 implies that this liquidity effect dominates the labor 
supply effect for this sample of farmers.  The large positive effect of wages on 
participation in labor exchange for net buyers of labor is expected, as farmers respond to 
higher wage bills by shifting to this non-market substitute for team labor.  The marginal 
effect of an increase in wages for net sellers or net buyers of labor is the sum of the 
marginal effects of the wage and its interaction with the group dummy from Appendix 
Table E.1: .053 for net sellers and .101 for net buyers.  The corresponding elasticities at 
the mean of the data are .404 and .702, respectively.  These results are significant because 
they demonstrate that farmers are quite responsive to changes in the price of market labor 
when deciding on their participation in the non-market labor institution.  This suggests 
that labor exchange is a viable substitute for team labor hired in the market in these 
villages.  Moreover, this fairly high degree of price responsiveness suggests that market 
labor and labor exchange operate side-by-side.  If labor exchange teams were most 
common where paid labor markets were very thin, a change in the wage rate would have 
no effect on the probability of using labor exchange.
These wage variables were not included as regressors in Models 2 and 3 because of the 
degrees of freedom limitations set by the number of sample clusters.  Instead, the wage 
variables were replaced in these models with the share of village adults working as 
agricultural laborers in the 1998 census.  The share of village adults working as 
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agricultural laborers has a significant negative effect on the probabality of using labor 
exchange in both models.  This does not necessarily indicate market failure in village 
labor markets because an increased supply of laborers could reduce wage rates and 
demand for labor exchange in a market in equilibrium.  I investigate this issue further in 
Model 4.  
Plots using simple irrigation are significantly more likely to be included in labor 
exchange, as are plots of corn planted with HYV seeds.  Because these plots are likely to 
have higher yields, this demonstrates some synergies between output-enhancing 
investments and labor exchange use.  However, other estimates show that technical 
irrigation has no effect on the use of labor exchange, suggesting that these synergies 
dissolve for more advanced, mechanized irrigation technologies.
The number of plantings per year has a significant negative effect on the probability of 
using labor exchange.  This contradicts the argument that greater cropping intensity raises 
demand for sources of team labor by increasing the time pressure on farming activities.  
Instead, farms that plant more crops in a year may be more commercialized and make 
greater use of fertilizer, for example, which would reduce demand for labor exchange at 
higher levels of working capital endowments.  Also, plots that are owned by the farmer 
are significantly less likely to participate in labor exchange.  This may reflect the role of 
owned land as a source of collateral.  A more direct effect is that, other things equal, 
farmers with rented plots have lower current liquidity available for hiring paid laborers 
because of their rental obligations.
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The negative effect of household size on the probability of using labor exchange shows 
that the substitution effect of household labor for exchange labor is larger than the time 
endowment effect of additional household members, as expected.  Based on the estimated 
marginal effects of household size from Model 2, the addition of one household member 
to a two-person household in Central Java with average characteristics for that province 
reduces the probability of using labor exchange by 6.1 percent in the rainy season.  For a 
three-person household otherwise in the same condition, one additional member reduces 
the probability of using labor exchange by 2.9 percent.
Household head education level has a negative effect on the probability of participating 
in labor exchange, although this coefficient is not significant in Models 1 or 2.  However, 
household head age has a negative and significant affect on labor exchange use.  Older 
farmers are less likely to use labor exchange, although the size of this effect is small.  
Province dummy variables confirm high prevalence of labor exchange use in South 
Sulawesi and Central Java.  Also, t-tests show that labor exchange is used more on 
seasonal crops than on annual crops, but that the difference in labor exchange prevalence 
between the rainy season and dry seasons is not significant in Models 1-3.  
4.4.4 A Household Random Effects Model of the Decision to Participate in Labor 
Exchange
In Model 4 in Table 4.3, I use a household random effects probit estimator to account for 
correlation of observations across households.  Guilkey and Murphy (1993) indicate that, 
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although the slope coefficients are consistently estimated by a pooled probit model, 
inference based on a pooled probit model may be unreliable because the standard errors 
can be severely biased.  The random effects probit model is estimated using numerical 
integration methods based on Guass-Hermite quadrature similar to those proposed by 
Butler and Moffitt (1982).  A pseudo-R2 measure was calculated for this model based on 
a log-likelihood value of zero representing a perfect model fit.  Following Judge et al 
(1985), let 1L  be the value of the log-likelihood for random effects model estimated here, 
and let 0L  be the value of the log-likelihood of a model estimated with only a constant.  
A measure of model fit for discrete models is given by 011 LL− , which rescales the 
value of the model log-likelihood into the unit interval between a model with perfect 
prediction and the “constant-only” model with zero predictive power.  This pseudo-R2 for 
the random effects model was .308.  The same information on 1L  and 0L  can be used to 
construct the likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that the slope coefficients are 
jointly zero.  This null hypothesis is rejected with p-value .000, as shown in Table 4.3.  
The estimated proportion of total variance contributed by the household-level variance 
component is ρ̂ =.827.  A likelihood ratio test rejects that ρ̂ =0 with a p-value of .000, 
which indicates that the random effects probit estimator is preferred to the pooled probit 
estimator.  
The results for Model 4 are broadly consistent with those presented for Models 1-3.  
Random effects estimates for the value of non-land assets, number of plantings, use of 
simple irrigation, plot ownership, use of high-yielding-variety seeds for corn, plot area, 
and household head age are similar to estimates from the pooled probit models.
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In Model 4, quintiles of working capital have a significant effect on the probability of 
using labor exchange.  The p-values for a 2χ -distributed Wald test and a Bonferroni t 
test of the joint significance of the indicators for working capital quintiles are .024 and 
.020, respectively.  The pattern of effects of working capital on participation in labor 
exchange is similar to the results from the pooled probit estimators in Models 2 and 3.  
Working capital has a positive effect on labor exchange use at low levels of working 
capital, and a negative effect at higher levels of working capital.  Repeating the example 
applied to Model 2 for households in Central Java during the rainy season, moving from 
the first to the third quintile of working capital holdings in Model 4 leads to a 7.7 percent 
increase in the probability of using labor exchange, but similar moves starting from the 
third and fourth working capital quintiles are associated with declines in the probability 
of using labor exchange of 3.8 and 7.5 percent, respectively.  
A notable result from Model 4 is that the share of adults in the village working as an 
agricultural laborer in the 1998 census continues to have a negative, significant effect on 
labor exchange use even after controlling for the local wage rate.  This indicates that the 
effect of a larger supply of workers in the labor market in reducing reliance on labor 
exchange does not operate through lower wages for paid labor.  Instead, a larger pool of 
paid laborers must lead to declining search costs for paid labor transactions.66  This result 
66 Another possible interpretation of this effect is that an increase in the village share of adults working as 
laborers lowers a given households’ probability of participating in labor exchange because it reduces the 
size of the pool of potential labor exchange teammates.  However, the average share of adults working as 
agricultural laborers in the labor exchange villages is only 16.7 percent and the 75th percentile is 23.4 
percent.  It is unlikely at these levels that incremental increases in labor force participation would crowd 
out labor exchange.
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provides evidence of transactions costs to hiring paid labor in these villages and shows 
that these transactions costs have a statistically significant effect on a farmer’s probability 
of using labor exchange.
The role of wages is somewhat different here than in Model 1, but remains consistent 
with the predictions of the analysis in Chapter 2.  Although net buyers of labor continue 
to increase their probability of using labor exchange as wages increase (elasticity of .333, 
see Table E.1), there is no effect of wages on labor exchange use for net sellers of labor 
(elasticity of -.002).  According to these estimates for net sellers of labor, the liquidity 
effect of higher wages, which increases labor exchange demand through a larger scale of 
operation, is completely offset by the labor supply effect that pulls household labor time 
away from the farm and into the market.
In this specification of the model, the negative effect of household size on the probability 
of using labor exchange is no longer significant (p-value .176), as it was in the pooled 
probit models.  This weakens the argument that returns to team size or number of people 
working on the farm is an important determinant of the decision to use labor exchange.  
Although the significance of ρ̂  suggests that this random effects specification with a 
household-level variance component is more appropriate for these data, it is more 
difficult to estimate the slope coefficient and standard error on variables, such as 
household size, that are constant within household-level observations in the random 
effects model.  Parameters on these variables were more likely to shift with changes in 
model specification such as changes in included explanatory variables or points of 
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quadrature in the numerical integration.  Therefore, I would not completely disregard the 
results of the pooled probit models for household size, despite the outcome of the test of 
model specification.
4.5 The Determinants of Participation in Labor Exchange If Only Some Households 
are Working Capital Constrained
Estimates of the determinants of participation in agricultural labor exchange in the 
previous section were obtained under the assumption that all households in the farming 
sample in labor exchange villages were working capital constrained in all seasons in 
1998-99.  These estimates provided considerable support for the model of labor exchange 
developed in Chapter 2.  A major validation of the model concerned the pattern of the 
effects of working capital on participation in labor exchange at various levels of working 
capital holdings.  Several other variables reflecting search costs in the labor market, 
working capital constraints, and the structure of labor exchange arrangements also 
behaved as predicted by the model.  However, the effects of land endowments did not 
support the model and results on the role of household size were inconclusive.  These 
shortcomings may be due to misclassification of households as working capital 
constrained.  If some farming households in labor exchange villages were unconstrained 
in their access to working capital during part or all of the 1998-99 agricultural year, 
estimates of the determinants of participation in labor exchange are biased.  Thus, even 
where the sign and significance of the slope estimates support the general conclusions of 
the model, the size of the true effects may be different.  A more careful examination of 
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which households are likely to be working capital constrained in each season should 
provide more accurate estimates of labor exchange determinants and can provide the 
basis for tests of the robustness of measured effects to model specification.
In this section, I estimate the switching regression model for a farmer’s decision to use 
labor exchange from (4.2) and (4.3) subject to an unobserved working capital constraint.  
I develop an assignment rule to divide the sample into working-capital-constrained and -
unconstrained households in each season based on predicted working capital holdings 
using the methodology described in Section 4.2.  Based on this division of the sample, I 
estimate the likelihood function in (4.6) for the decision to participate in labor exchange 
subject to possible working capital constraints.  Under the assignment rule, constrained 
households in each season are those with no savings, borrowing or lending.  Results 
based on this assignment rule are presented in Model 5 in Table 4.4.  In order to test the 
robustness of the results to the choice of assignment rule, I estimate (4.6) again under an 
alternative assignment rule with a more relaxed working capital constraint.  Under the 
alternative assignment rule, households with intermediate levels of working capital 
holdings (those in the third working capital quintile) are moved from the unconstrained 
group to the constrained group based on the original assignment rule.  Estimates based on 
this alternative assignment rule are presented in Model 6 in Table 4.4.
In order to assist in the estimation of the likelihood function, I first estimate probit 
models for the decision to use labor exchange separately for the two sub-samples of 
households predicted to be working-capital-constrained or -unconstrained in each model, 
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with a Heckman correction for selection into the relevant sub-sample.  These two-step 
estimators provide consistent estimates of 1β  and 2β  and two separate consistent 
estimates of γ  from (4.6) for each model.  After arbitrarily selecting the estimate of γ
from the probit with sample selection that includes 1β , I used these estimates of 1β , 2β , 
and γ  as starting values for maximization of the likelihood function in (4.6).  The first 
panel of Table 4.4 presents estimates of γ , the determinants of the probability of being 
working capital constrained, for Models 5 and 6 and the second panel presents the 
corresponding estimates of 1β  and 2β , the determinants of participation in labor 
exchange subject to being working capital constrained or unconstrained, respectively.  
Both Models 5 and 6 are pooled models that do not allow for correlation in the error 
terms across plot and season observations within a household.  
4.5.1 The Determinants of the Probability of Being Working Capital Constrained
The probability that a household is working capital constrained in a particular season is a 
function of beginning-of-period holdings of land; farm equipment and livestock; and 
business and household assets net of outstanding credit taken to finance the purchase of 
each type of asset.  Most of these are illiquid assets.  They affect working capital holdings 
through their ability to serve as collateral for loans.  Land is the most common asset used 
as collateral, and so should be closely associated with working capital.  Farm assets may 
also substantially reduce the probability of being working capital constrained because 
they include livestock, which are more liquid than the other assets.  
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Access to credit is affected in part by the size of the credit market.  The share of 
households in the village using credit is used as a proxy for the size of this market.  I 
expect that the explicit and implicit cost of credit will be declining in market size.  As a 
measure of explicit cost of credit and returns to savings, the average village interest rate 
is included with a quadratic term.  I include a plot-level indicator for whether high 
yielding variety seeds are used, to indicate relatively commercialized farming.  The age 
and education of the household head are included to control for life-cycle effects on 
savings and managerial ability.  The natural logarithm of the number of household 
members is used to account for the scale of household consumption expenditure.  A 
variable that indicates if the household head has a white-collar occupation accounts for 
whether professionals have better access to credit markets.  The expected sign of the 
effect of the value of assets, use of high yielding variety seeds, and white-collar 
occupation is negative and the expected sign of the other household characteristics is 
positive.  Province and season indicator variables are also included to control for 
unobserved fixed regional and seasonal differences in the size of working capital 
holdings.  
In Model 5, the value of land owned and of farm asset holdings reduces the probability of 
being working capital constrained, as expected.  In order to interpret the magnitude of 
these effects, marginal effects from the likelihood function in (4.6) must be calculated.  
The marginal effect of an explanatory variable on any of the joint, conditional and 
marginal outcome probabilities may be of interest.  For now, I consider the effect of an
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incremental change in a continuous explanatory variable jδ  from 1X , 2X , or W  on the 








I derive the analytical expression for these marginal effects in Appendix F, relying on the 
similarity of the likelihood function in (4.6) to the bivariate probit and using results from 
Christofides, Stengos, and Swidinsky (1997) and Christofides, Hardin, and Stengos, 
(2000).  
At the mean of the data, the marginal effects of land owned and farm asset holdings on 
the probability of being working capital constrained are -.001 and -.015, respectively.67
These figures imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in holdings of these assets 
reduce the marginal probability of being working capital constrained by 4.9 percent and 
5.8 percent, respectively.  Although the effect of farm assets is small, its significance 
probably reflects the ease of converting livestock into cash.68
Also in Model 5, households in villages with larger credit markets are significantly less 
likely to be working capital constrained.  This does not necessarily indicate the presence 
of credit market failures.  The result could reflect greater credit supply in a credit market 
67 In calculating the marginal effect of farm asset holdings on the probability of being working capital 
constrained, I assumed that the effect of farm assets in the labor exchange equation is identical to the effect 
of all non-land assets, a more aggregated variable.   
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in equilibrium, although it is also consistent with lower transaction costs of receiving 
loans in imperfect credit markets.  The interest rate does not affect the probability of 
being working capital constrained.  This may be due to the competing role the interest 
rate plays in savings and credit decisions.  This result would also obtain if there are fixed 
transactions costs to participation in rural financial markets.  
Although the effect is not significant, use of high yielding variety seeds reduces the 
probability of being constrained as expected.  This may arise because the corresponding 
increase in yields leads to greater savings or to increased demand for complementary 
inputs like fertilizer.  Household head education significantly reduces the probability of 
being constrained, as does the household head having a professional occupation.  Either 
education and white-collar job status are associated with lower risk by lenders or they 
reduce transactions costs for obtaining loans.
At the mean of the data, the predicted marginal probability of being working capital 
constrained according to the assignment rule in Model 5 is .376.  This closely predicts the 
observed share of constrained households under this assignment rule, which is .397.  
Estimation of the switching regression in (4.6) is severely constrained by the degrees of 
freedom restrictions from the asymptotic theory for the model F test.  For this likelihood 
function, the degrees of freedom restriction is violated if the total number of regressors in 
1X , 2X  and W is greater than 23, the number of clusters in the sample.  I discussed the 
68 Data on borrowing in the 1998-99 PATANAS survey show no use of livestock as a form of collateral for 
loans.
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implications of this restriction in Section 4.4.2 for the estimates of the labor exchange 
decision estimated on the full sample under the assumption that all households are 
working capital constrained.  For the models presented in Table 4.3 in that section, the 
selection of included regressors was adapted to make sure this restriction was not 
violated.  For estimation of the full likelihood function in (4.6) in which only some 
households are classified as working capital constrained, meeting this restriction leads to 
a severe reduction in the number of included regressors.  In the estimates for Model 5 in 
Table 4.4, this degrees of freedom restriction was violated.  In general, this leads to 
biased estimates of the standard errors and renders the model F test that all regressors are 
jointly zero invalid.  In practice, it is not known whether t statistics for significance of 
individual regressors and F tests based on a small number of regressors will be severely 
affected.  
One alternative approach could be to limit the size of the regressor matrices to meet the 
restriction.  The effect of this restriction for estimation of the full likelihood function is so 
severe as to render the results meaningless.  However, because this restriction is fixed by 
sample design and does not change with the order of the model being estimated, another
alternative is to derive estimates of the parameters for (4.6) by estimating pieces of the 
likelihood function, one at a time.  For example, I could estimate the probability of using 
labor exchange conditional on being working capital constrained, which would eliminate 
2β  from the estimation.  Estimates of 2β  could then be obtained by estimating the 
probability of using labor exchange conditional on being unconstrained in working 
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An early application to estimating likelihood functions of this form is provided in van de 
Ven and van Praag (1981).  Of course, estimating the parameters of the model in (4.6) in 
this way results in a loss of efficiency.  The parameter estimates would be consistent if 
the degrees of freedom saved by estimating the likelihood function in parts in this way is 
sufficient that the full 1X , 2X , and W matrices can be included in the estimation.  
However, if significant regressors must be excluded in order to meet the degrees of 
freedom restriction when estimating (4.9.a) or (4.9.b), the parameter estimates for the 
remaining variables will be inconsistent due to omitted variable bias.  Thus, there is a 
tradeoff between bias in the regressors when estimating partial models versus bias in the 
standard errors for the full model.  There is no easy way to assess the relative 
implications of these sources of bias.  For comparison, I have estimated equations (4.9.a) 
and (4.9.b) for Model 5, with some regressors excluded in order to keep the total number 
169
of parameters to be estimated, including the constant term, to 23.  Results of these 
estimates are provided in Appendix Table G.1.
The first panel of Table G.1 presents the two estimates of γ  from (4.9.a) and (4.9.b).  In 
many respects, these results are encouraging.  They provide broad support for the model 
of labor exchange under working capital constraints.  The signs of all of the coefficients 
in γ  are the same as in the full model in (4.6).  Moreover, the Wald test for joint 
significance of the explanatory variables has a p-value less than .0001 for both estimates. 
Support for the estimates of γ  from the full model of (4.6) in Table 4.4 is mixed.  
Estimates of some parameters in γ  from Table G.1 are close in size to their counterparts 
in Table 4.4, but many are not.  These differences may arise because of changes in the 
specification of some variables that were required to meet the degrees of freedom 
restriction.  These differences may also be due to omitted variable bias caused by 
excluding significant variables such as the indicator for plot ownership. The significance 
of estimates for farm assets, share of village households using credit, and white-collar 
household head occupation are maintained in Table G.1.  Interest rates and household 
size become significant in Table G.1, but only at the 10 percent level.  The greatest cause 
for concern is that land assets are no longer significant here, despite having a p-value of 
.038 in Model 5 from Table 4.4.69  In summary, these results provide additional support
for the overall model of labor exchange under working capital constraints, but they 
suggest some caution in interpreting significance levels of estimates based on the full 
model in (4.6).
69 I compare results for estimates of 1β  and 2β  below, after reviewing those results from Table 4.4. 
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Before analyzing the estimates of 1β  and 2β  for Model 5, I consider the estimates of γ
from Model 6, in which the assignment rule for working capital constraint status is 
changed to broaden the working capital constrained regime to include households with 
intermediate levels of working capital holdings.  Under the new assignment rule for 
Model 6, households in the third working capital quintile were added to the existing 
cohort of working capital constrained households identified by the assignment rule for 
Model 5.   Recall that in Model 5 households with non-positive savings and credit 
outstanding in the current season were classified as working capital constrained.  This 
included all households in the first two working capital quintiles.  To this group was 
added any household in the other quintiles that lent money during the season.  This 
relaxation of the working capital constraint threshold in Model 6 is warranted because the 
threshold in Model 5 is conservative and may have led to many constrained households 
being classified as unconstrained.  Results from Model 6 provide an informal test of the 
robustness of the results from Model 5 to the working capital constraint classification.
The estimates of γ  from Model 6 are broadly consistent with those from Model 5.  
Excluding province and season indicator variables, only the estimate for household head 
age changes sign, and this estimate is insignificant in both models.  Both the value of land 
owned and the value of farm assets reduce the probability of being working capital 
constrained, but the magnitude of the effect is larger in Model 6.  At the mean of the data, 
a one-standard-deviation increase in land assets and farm assets leads to reductions in the 
probability of being working capital constrained of 12.9 percent and 8.3 percent, 
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respectively.  The effect of an increase in the village share of households using credit is 
also much larger under the new assignment rule.  The effect of the interest rate on the 
probability of being working capital constrained is now negative and significant at the 
five percent level.  This suggests that this price dominates in the savings decision, since 
its sign should have the opposite effect on credit use.  That the effect of higher interest 
rates dominates in the savings decision rather than the credit decision is somewhat 
surprising because most households in the sample do not save assets in a form that is 
directly affected by interest rates (e.g., interest-bearing savings accounts).
The logarithm of the number of household members also has a significant negative effect 
on the probability of being working capital constrained in Model 6.  It may be that the 
households with moderate working capital holdings that are included in the constrained 
group under the new assignment rule are better able to take advantage of the additional 
earning potential represented by an increase in household size.  As in Model 5, household 
head education and white-collar occupation have significant negative effects on the 
probability of being working capital constrained, but the size of the effect of education is 
much larger than before.  As with household size, there may be some synergies between 
education and the level of working capital holdings that enable those with some liquidity 
to take greater advantage of their education.
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4.5.2 Determinants of Participation in Labor Exchange by Working Capital Constrained 
and Unconstrained Households 
The second panel of Table 4.4 presents the determinants of the decision to use labor 
exchange on the observed plot for constrained and unconstrained households under the 
two working capital constraint assignment rules in Models 5 and 6.  These results lend 
considerable support to the model of labor exchange presented in Chapter 2.  The 
estimates yield mixed evidence on the appropriateness of the method of sample 
separation used here.  By some measures, both assignment rules classify too many 
working capital constrained households as unconstrained.  As a result, most of the 
estimated effects of the determinants of labor exchange participation do not differ 
significantly between the constrained and unconstrained regimes.  Pair-wise Wald tests of 
equality of coefficients for each explanatory variable across the two regimes 
( )kjH jj ,...,1: 210 =∀= ββ  failed to reject that the coefficients were equal for each 
variable in Model 5 except the wage level and some of the province dummies. In Model 
6, the same tests failed to reject the equality of the coefficients across regimes for all 
variables except area of other plots planted this season, household head age, and some 
province dummies.  
The estimated correlation coefficient between the error terms of the working capital 
constraint equation and the labor exchange participation equation for constrained
(unconstrained) households, u1ρ ( )u2ρ , is positive (negative) in both models.  In Model 5, 
u1ρ  is just insignificant and u2ρ  is just significant at the ten percent level.  In Model 6, 
u1ρ , is significant at the ten percent level and u2ρ  is significant at the one percent level.  
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Although these significance levels are weak, they generally support estimating the labor 
exchange participation decision in this switching regression framework rather than as a 
univariate probit independent of working capital constraint status.  Moreover, the signs of 
the correlation coefficients indicate that unobserved factors that contribute to the 
probability of being working capital constrained are positively associated with using 
labor exchange in the working capital constrained group and negatively associated with 
using labor exchange for the unconstrained group.70  This provides new evidence on the 
relationship between working capital constraints and labor exchange participation.  
Unobserved factors lead to a positive relationship between the probability of being 
constrained and using labor exchange for those with zero or low working capital holdings 
and a negative relationship for those with relatively high working capital.  Because this 
relationship is driven by unobservable factors, it does not contradict the earlier result that 
an increase in working capital holdings has an inverted U-shaped relationship to the
probability of using labor exchange.  However, this new evidence suggests a more 
complex relationship between the level of working capital endowments and the 
probability of using labor exchange.  
Despite the mixed support for the chosen sample separation, the significance of 
individual coefficients varies across regimes in a manner consistent with the model of 
labor exchange for some variables, though not for others.  I review these results 
presently.  The model in Chapter 2 showed that holdings of working capital should have 
no effect on the decision to use labor exchange for unconstrained households.  This result 
70 Wald tests of equality of the correlation coefficients ( )uuH 210 : ρρ =  rejected the null hypothesis in 
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is not supported in Table 4.4, where working capital holdings are negatively associated 
with the probability of using labor exchange, with a higher significance level in Model 6 
where the unconstrained group has higher average working capital holdings.  These 
results are consistent with the estimates from Table 4.3 in which the entire sample was 
treated as working capital constrained.  In Models 2-4 in Table 4.3, the effect of working 
capital holdings on labor exchange use was negative starting with the third working 
capital quintile.  Since the coefficient in Table 4.4 measures the average effect of working 
capital for quintiles 3-5 in Model 5 and quintiles 4-5 in Model 6, this outcome is not 
surprising.  Because this pattern of effects in Models 2-4 accords so closely with the 
predictions of the analytical model for working capital constrained households, I interpret 
these results as evidence in favor of the entire sample being working capital 
constrained.71
A difficulty presented by using zero working capital holdings as the threshold for the 
assignment rule of working capital constraint status in Model 5 is that the level of 
working capital cannot meaningfully be included as a regressor for constrained 
households.  This shortcoming is also present in Model 6, where most households have 
no working capital.  As a result, I did not include the working capital variable in either 
specification for constrained households.  
As in the models in which all households were treated as working capital constrained, the 
value of non-land assets does not have a significant effect on the decision to use labor 
Model 5 (p-value=.001) and Model 6 (p-value=.000).
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exchange for either constrained or unconstrained households in either model in Table 4.4.  
However, in an alternative specification of the model described below in which land area 
owned replaced the logarithm of plot area and area of other plots planted this season, 
non-land assets had a weakly significant (p-value=.087) negative effect on the probability 
of using labor exchange for working capital constrained households and an insignificant 
effect for unconstrained households.  This pattern of effects is consistent with the labor 
exchange model in Chapter 2.  If non-land assets can act as collateral in the credit market, 
then the liquidity effect of these assets on labor exchange use for working capital 
constrained households will change from positive to negative as liquidity increases and 
may be negative on average. 
The model also predicts that land endowments will have no effect on labor exchange use 
for unconstrained households, but will affect the decision to use labor exchange for 
constrained households.  Land area owned was not included in the preferred model 
specifications in Table 4.4 so that the logarithm of plot size and area of other plots 
cultivated could be included as regressors without facing severe multicollinearity.  
Separate regressions were estimated to test for the effect of land endowments, in which 
land area owned replaced plot size and area of other plots cultivated.  The parameter 
estimates and standard errors for the land area owned variable from these regressions are 
reported at the bottom of Table 4.4.72  In both Models 5 and 6, land area owned is 
positive and significant below the five percent level for the working capital constrained 
cohort and has no significant effect in the unconstrained cohort.  A Wald test rejected 
71 I attempted to estimate the model again under the assignment rule that all households except those in the 
highest working capital quintile are working capital constrained, but this model did not converge.
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equality of the coefficient for land area owned in the constrained and unconstrained 
cohorts in Models 5 and 6 (p-value = .007 and .028, respectively).  One interpretation of 
the positive sign of this coefficient for the constrained sub-sample is that this group must 
contain many households in the labor-cultivator mode of production, where working 
capital and land endowments have an unambiguous positive effect on exchange labor 
demand.  Alternatively, if many farmers are operating under other modes of cultivation, 
the positive coefficient implies that the effect of increasing demand for team labor arising 
from expanding land holdings exceeds the benefits of increased access to market labor 
arising from improved access to credit, which would reduce the probability of using labor 
exchange. 
The effects of household size provide further support for the model in Chapter 2 and for 
the sample separation used here.  An increase in household size significantly reduces the 
probability of using labor exchange for working capital constrained households in 
Models 5 and 6 (p-value = .055 and .052, respectively), but not for unconstrained 
households.  Demand for labor exchange is not sensitive to household size for 
unconstrained households operating in modes of production that include labor market 
participation due to separability of production and consumption decisions.  For self-
cultivators in unconstrained households, expansions of land area operated attenuate the 
effects of increases in household size on demand for labor exchange.  However, in 
working capital constrained households, increases in household size reduce the 
probability of using labor exchange if the substitution effect of household labor for 
exchange labor dominates the time endowment effect, as expected.
72 Complete results for the model specification including land area owned are available upon request.
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The effects of use of simple irrigation, high-yielding variety seeds, and the share of 
village plots within ten percent of the area of the observed plot are not expected to differ 
depending on whether the household is working capital constrained.  Indeed, these 
regressors mostly show the same pattern of effects as when the regressions were 
estimated on the whole sample (see Table 4.3), demonstrating the robustness of these 
effects across various model specifications.  
The area of the cultivated plot is positively associated with demand for labor exchange 
for both constrained and unconstrained households, as in the estimates for the full sample 
from Table 4.3.  However, the area of other plots cultivated this season by the same 
household had no effect on the labor exchange decision when all households were treated 
as constrained in Table 4.3, but has a significant negative effect for the unconstrained 
group in Table 4.4.  Apparently, households that are not working capital constrained and 
are cultivating other plots are less likely to use labor exchange on a given plot, probably 
because labor exchange requires too much household labor time.  One explanation for 
why only unconstrained households behave in this manner is that their greater access to 
liquidity makes them more productive and raises their opportunity cost of time spent in 
labor exchange relative to that of constrained households.
An increase in the wage rate raises the probability of participating in labor exchange for 
net buyers and net sellers of labor in both the constrained and unconstrained sub-samples. 
This is the same effect seen when the entire sample was treated as constrained in Table 
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4.3.  However, for the constrained group these effects are larger than for the 
unconstrained group or for the full sample, particularly in Model 5.  The substitution of 
exchange labor for paid market labor is more sensitive to the price of paid labor for those 
who are more liquidity constrained.  
Finally, I return to the estimates of the labor exchange switching regression obtained 
through estimation of the likelihood function in parts in order to satisfy the degrees of 
freedom restriction imposed by clustered sampling (see Appendix G).  The number of 
explanatory variables in the labor exchange participation equation was reduced in order 
to meet the restriction.  Results from these estimates are similar for the working capital 
variable (for unconstrained households), for the value of non-land assets, and for the 
wage variables.   However, for working capital constrained households, the effects of 
household size, simple irrigation, and share of village plots of similar size disappear in 
these estimates.  It is not possible to determine whether these changes in results are due to 
biased standard errors in the complete model estimates in Table 4.4 or to omitted variable 
bias in the restricted model estimates in Appendix Table G.1.
In summary, this attempt to divide the sample into working capital constrained and 
unconstrained cohorts based on the level of working capital holdings has mixed effects 
on the ability of the estimates to satisfy the predictions of the analytical model in Chapter 
2.  The effects of working capital on labor exchange use were better explained when all 
households were treated as constrained.  The effect of non-land assets appeared to be 
more consistent with the model for one specification in which the sample was divided by 
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working capital holdings.  Land assets and household size had the expected effects only 
in the switching regression model.  Also, the estimates of the switching regression model 
were robust to the alternative division of the sample considered here.  Overall, applying 
the additional structure to the model using the switching regression approach provided 
important additional insights into determinants of participation in labor exchange in the 
presence of working capital constraints.  However, it is not possible to conclude, based 
on the models considered so far, whether it is more accurate to classify only the 
households with low working capital holdings or all households in the sample as working 
capital constrained.
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Table 4.4: Switching Regression Estimates of Probability of Participating in 
Labor Exchange Subject to a Working Capital Constraint 
Estimates of γ : Model
Determinants of the Probability of Being 
Working Capital Constrained
(5) (6)










Value of land owned net of outstanding -0.003** -0.007***
    land debt, 1998, Rp. mn (0.001) (0.002)
Value of non-farm business, household assets -0.002 -0.006
    net of outstanding related debt, 1998, Rp. mn (0.003) (0.004)
Value of livestock and farm equipment -0.057*** -0.075***
    net of outstanding farm debt, 1998, Rp. mn (0.016) (0.012)
Share of village households using credit -1.724*** -2.290***
(0.521) (0.292)
Village average interest rate -0.010 -0.010**
(0.009) (0.005)
Village average interest rate squared 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Indicator for use of HYV seeds -0.119 -0.063
(0.154) (0.114)
Ln of number of household members -0.155 -0.243*
(0.111) (0.130)
Household head age (years) 0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Household head education (years) -0.027** -0.050***
(0.013) (0.014)
Indicator for white collar household head -0.851** -0.797***
    occupation (0.343) (0.282)
Lampung province indicator 1.383*** 1.424***
(0.391) (0.201)
Central Java province indicator 0.192 0.554***
(0.329) (0.152)
East Java province indicator 0.629* 0.704***
(0.374) (0.220)
West Nusa Tenggara province indicator 0.574 0.952***
(0.423) (0.174)
North Sulawesi province indicator 0.541** 0.802***
(0.273) (0.206)
Rainy season indicator 0.196 -0.128
(0.127) (0.127)






Table 4.4:  (continued)





Determinants of the Probability of Using 
Labor Exchange on this Plot
Model Model
(5) (6) (5) (6)
































Working capital: credit taken or out- -0.013* -0.014**
    standing plus savings, Rp. mn. (0.008) (0.007)
Non-land business, household, farm assets -0.009 -0.010 -0.003 -0.001
    net of credit financing, 1998, Rp. mn (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004)
Number of household members -0.064* -0.061* -0.022 -0.018
(0.034) (0.031) (0.037) (0.039)
Indicator for simple irrigation 0.719*** 0.525** 0.501* 0.518**
(0.225) (0.242) (0.287) (0.246)
Indicator for plot being owned, not leased -0.335** -0.279** -0.317** -0.419***
(0.141) (0.132) (0.127) (0.127)
Indicator that corn is at least half of the 0.312 0.146 0.155 0.333**
    value of production on this plot (0.314) (0.258) (0.174) (0.161)
Indictor for HYV seeds used in corn 0.817 0.545 0.741*** 0.869***
    production (0.623) (0.602) (0.189) (0.196)
Ln of plot area 0.163* 0.171** 0.179** 0.149**
(0.090) (0.082) (0.072) (0.074)
Area of other plots planted this season -0.037 -0.017 -0.245** -0.345***
    by this household (0.161) (0.116) (0.116) (0.123)
Share of village sample plots within 1.465** 1.532*** 1.252* 1.217*
    10% of this plot’s area, by season (0.664) (0.514) (0.644) (0.726)
Average village hourly wage for time -0.027 -0.579 -0.828*** -0.697**
     rate contracts, by season (Rp. ‘000) (0.376) (0.435) (0.319) (0.336)
Average village hourly wage × Indicator 0.869*** 0.936*** 0.916*** 0.761**
    for net seller of labor (0.322) (0.280) (0.320) (0.375)
Average village hourly wage × Indicator 1.048*** 1.212*** 1.353*** 1.254***
    for net buyer of labor (0.322) (0.312) (0.365) (0.392)
Household head age (years) -0.009 -0.013** -0.007 0.000
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Household head education level (years) 0.004 -0.025 -0.031 -0.011
(0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023)
Lampung province indicator -0.619 -0.740** -1.314*** -1.261***
(0.396) (0.342) (0.213) (0.210)
(continued…)
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Table 4.4:  (continued)





Determinants of the Probability of Using 
Labor Exchange on this Plot
Model Model
(5) (6) (5) (6)
































Central Java province indicator 0.183 0.042 -0.440 -0.499*
(0.245) (0.257) (0.303) (0.271)
East Java province indicator -1.286** -1.469*** -2.022*** -1.970***
(0.610) (0.562) (0.463) (0.412)
West Nusa Tenggara province indicator -0.457 -0.291 -0.755* -1.041***
(0.439) (0.406) (0.426) (0.337)
North Sulawesi province indicator -0.842 -0.397 -1.183** -1.566***
(0.575) (0.553) (0.486) (0.434)
Constant -1.589** -0.457 -0.045 -0.564
(0.631) (0.678) (0.431) (0.400)
Correlation coefficient of error terms for 0.517 0.578* -0.754* -0.694***
   constraint regime and labor exchange use (0.326) (0.312) (0.445) (0.247)
Log partial-likelihood -1789.58 -1748.63
Observations 2009 2009
Selected Parameters from Other 
Specifications
Land area owned 0.161*** 0.130** 0.002 0.027
(0.054) (0.052) (0.050) (0.056)
Starting values were taken from estimates of a two-stage probit model of the decision to use labor 
exchange with a correction for sample selection into working capital constrained or unconstrained 
regimes.  The standard errors in parentheses are based on the Huber/White/sandwich robust estimator of 
variance, adjusted for clustering in sample design.  South Sulawesi is the omitted province.  The 
omitted season indicator in the working capital constraint equation is for annual crops.  
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%.
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4.6 Estimating Participation in Labor Exchange Under Working Capital Constraints 
Using the EM Algorithm
As shown in the previous section, using informed but arbitrary assignment rules to 
classify households as working capital constrained improves the ability of the empirical 
model to explain many of the determinants of the decision to use labor exchange under 
imperfect factor markets, with some limitations.  The Expectation-Maximization (EM) 
algorithm provides an attractive alternative to arbitrary classification for the type of 
model estimated here.  The algorithm treats the unobserved working capital constraint as 
an incomplete data problem and uses the properties of the data to select the parameters of 
the model and the assignment of observations to regimes that maximize the value of the 
likelihood function.  
The primary shortcoming of the EM algorithm in this setting is that the likelihood 
function for this switching regression with a discrete dependent variable is not well 
behaved.  The presence of local maxima and minima makes models of this type 
notoriously difficult to estimate.  Because the EM algorithm relies on iterative estimation 
of the likelihood function for different separations of the data, it runs the risk of 
encountering peaks or valleys as it moves along the likelihood function, which would 
make it impossible to identify the global maximum.  In applying the EM algorithm to the 
labor exchange model, I was unable to achieve convergence of the algorithm at 
commonly accepted convergence criteria.  However, if more liberal convergence criteria 
are applied the parameter estimates from late iterations suggest a substantial reassignment 
of observations to regimes and a new set of estimates of the labor exchange model.  
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These estimates provide interesting evidence on the determinants of participation in labor 
exchange.
4.6.1 An EM Algorithm for the Discrete Choice Endogenous Switching Regression
Although early versions of the EM algorithm appeared elsewhere, the seminal paper by 
Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977) provides the first general version of the algorithm and 
its properties and gives the algorithm its name.73  The algorithm provides an approach to 
maximum likelihood estimation for incomplete data.  In the empirical model of labor 
exchange with imperfect capital markets, the data are incomplete in the sense that the 
indicator ik  from (4.5) that identifies households that are working capital constrained in 
each season is not observed.  This data omission leads to the incomplete data form of the 
likelihood function IL  in (4.4).  The complete data form of the likelihood function that 
could be estimated if ik  were observed for each observation is 
CL  in equation (4.6).  The 
EM algorithm estimates the parameters of the incomplete data likelihood function by 
taking advantage of its relationship to the complete data form of the likelihood function, 
as described below.  
The approach of the EM algorithm for this model is to start with an estimate of 
parameters from the complete data form of the likelihood function, 01β̂ , 02β̂ , 0γ̂ , 01ˆ uσ , 
and 02ˆ uσ , for some separation of the data, ( )nkkk ,...,1= , where the superscript indexes 
iterations of the algorithm and a zero superscript refers to starting values of the parameter 
73 For an expanded treatment on the EM algorithm, see McLachlan and Krishnan (1997).
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estimates.  These estimates are used to construct a new indicator, 1ˆ iπ , equal to the 





































The computation of this predicted marginal probability of household i being working 
capital constrained is the E-step of the algorithm.  The vector ( )1111 ˆ,...,ˆˆ nπππ =  provides 
the sufficient statistics of the complete data given the incomplete data.  In the M-step, the 
parameters of the likelihood function are estimated again with 1ˆ iπ  replacing ki in the 




( ){ ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )}
1 2
2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
, , , | , , ,
     ln , , 1 ln , ,
  1 ln , , 1 1 ln , , .
C C
i u u
i i i i u i i i i u
i
i i i i u i i i i u
LLF L y X W
y X W y X W
y X W y X W
β γ σ σ π
π β γ ρ π β γ ρ
π β γ ρ π β γ ρ
=
= Φ + − Φ − −
+ − Φ − − + − − Φ − −
∑
The expectation 1ˆ iπ  is not binary like ki, but takes on values in the [0,1] interval because 
each observation could belong to either regime with some positive probability.  In the 
next iteration of the algorithm, the E-step creates a new vector 2π̂  of predicted 
probabilities that households are working capital constrained and the M-step obtains new 
estimates of the parameters 21β̂ , 22β̂ , 2γ̂ , 21ˆ uσ , and 22ˆ uσ .  This procedure is repeated until 
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successive iterations of the algorithm do not change the estimated coefficients more than 
some small convergence criterion.  Approximate asymptotic standard errors for the 
coefficients are obtained numerically from the inverse of the second derivative matrix of 
the log likelihood function, taking into account the clustered sample design.  
According to Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977), the EM algorithm provides consistent 
estimates of the parameters from the incomplete data form of the likelihood function and 
will converge to a maximum (subject to limitations of the data) provided that the 
likelihood function satisfies two criteria.  First, the incomplete data form of the likelihood 
function must equal the sum of the complete data form of the likelihood function over all 
possible realizations of the missing data
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where the set K of all possible realizations of the k vector has 2n elements.  Second, 
successive iterations of the algorithm must increase the value of the likelihood function in 
order to guarantee that the procedure will move toward a maximum.  I will not prove that 
these two criteria are met for likelihood functions IL  in (4.4) and CL  in (4.6).  However, 
a simple exercise, not repeated here, verifies that the first criterion is met in the simple 
case where n=3.  I also do not establish the second criterion here, but successive 
iterations of the EM algorithm implemented for this model met that criterion as well.
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It is important to keep in mind that the EM algorithm cannot claim to identify the true 
realization of the working capital constraint classification vector, k.  Such as task would 
require identification of k’s 2n arguments, which is not feasible.  Rather, the EM 
algorithm provides estimates of the parameters of the incomplete data form of the 
likelihood function, which in cases like this one cannot be estimated through a standard 
Newton-Raphson algorithm.  The EM algorithm does not solve the incomplete data 
problem.  It provides a tractable approach to working around it in order to estimate the 
parameters of the incomplete data model. 
In estimating the model for the decision to participate in labor exchange via the EM 
algorithm, I used parameter estimates from Model 5 in Table 4.4 as starting values to 
compute 1π̂  in the E-step of the first iteration.  To my knowledge, this study is the first 
application of the EM algorithm for a discrete choice endogenous switching regression 
model.74
4.6.2 Estimates of the Model of Labor Exchange Participation from the EM Algorithm 
In estimation via the EM algorithm, the routine to maximize the log likelihood function 
in (4.11) converged for the first fourteen iterations and then failed.  At each iteration, the 
value of the log likelihood function was higher than in the previous one.  In addition, the 
maximum difference between the parameter estimates in the current iteration 
( ( )t ujt ujtjtjtj 21 ,,, σσγβα =  for j=1,…,p, where p is the total number of parameters) and 
those from the last iteration fell monotonically from one iteration to the next.  A summary 
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of the value of the log likelihood function and the maximum difference in matched 
parameter estimates between iterations is provided in Table 4.5.  These results suggest 
that the algorithm itself was well behaved.
Table 4.5: Summary of Results of the 
EM Algorithm by Iteration
















The failure of convergence at the fifteenth iteration probably indicates a discontinuity in 
the likelihood function in the neighborhood of the parameter values for that iteration.  
This is a common outcome in models with multiple discrete endogenous variables.  
Unfortunately, the failure to converge implies that I cannot conclude that the resulting 
parameter estimates are the ones that maximize the likelihood function.  Because the 
algorithm achieved successively higher values of the log likelihood function and the 
parameter estimates were converging, the estimates from the fourteenth iteration may still 
74 I would like to thank Marc Nerlove for suggesting the EM algorithm for this problem.
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be informative.  In addition, these parameters achieved a higher value of the log 
likelihood function than those in Models 5 and 6 from the discrete choice endogenous 
switching regressions in Table 4.4 for their respective separations of the data, k.  The 
values of the log likelihood in Models 5 and 6 were –1789.58 and –1748.63, respectively.  
In the fourteenth iteration of the EM algorithm, the value of the log likelihood function 
was –1726.28.  A likelihood ratio test of these models could be performed if they were 
hierarchically nested, which is not the case here.  
Results of the fourteenth iteration of the EM algorithm are presented as Model 7 in Table 
4.6.  The standard errors presented in parentheses are based on a quadratic approximation 
to the log likelihood function centered on the estimated parameter values.  If the log 
likelihood is not quadratic, then this approximation of the variance is poor.  This probably 
explains the low standard errors in the working capital constraint equation in the first 
panel in Table 4.6.  Standard errors for the labor exchange participation equations for the 
two regimes are more reasonable, but the results for the working capital constraint 
equation suggest that results of the hypothesis tests indicated by the asterisks in Table 4.6 
should be treated with caution.
The parameter estimates of the determinants of working capital constraints differ 
considerably from those in Models 5 and 6, which is not surprising given that these 
estimates reflect a different implied separation of the observations into constrained and 
unconstrained regimes.  In Model 5, 39.7 percent of the observations were classified as 
working capital constrained.  In the results from the fourteenth iteration of the EM 
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algorithm, 44.4 percent of the observations were more likely to lie in the constrained 
regime in the sense that 5.ˆ 14 >iπ .  However, a substantial number of observations were 
reclassified by the EM algorithm, with only 55.7 percent of those identified as working 
capital constrained in Model 5 being more likely to fall into this regime based on the 
results of the EM algorithm.  Despite the differences in parameter estimates for the 
working capital constraint equation between Models 5 and 6 and Model 7, only one 
variable changed sign.
For the labor exchange participation equations, the parameter estimates from Model 7 are 
much closer in magnitude to those in Models 5 and 6.  Only two coefficients in these 
equations changed sign in Model 7, but neither was significant in any of the models.  
Although I view these results with some caution, the estimates of the probability of 
participating in labor exchange in each regime in Model 7 lead to some intriguing 
alternative results that suggest that these parameter estimates may be a better fit of the 
model.  Most notably, the estimated effect of working capital on labor exchange use for 
unconstrained households is smaller in Model 7 and is insignificant.  This satisfies the 
prediction from the model in Chapter 2 that working capital holdings have no effect on 
the labor exchange participation decision for unconstrained households.  It suggests that 
households in the unconstrained regime in the new division of the sample have a higher 
probability of being unconstrained in Model 7 than in Models 5 and 6, where this 
parameter was significant.  
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Plot size has a positive effect on the probability of using labor exchange for both 
constrained and unconstrained households in Model 7 as in Models 5 and 6, but Wald 
tests indicate that this effect is significantly larger for the constrained group only in 
Model 7.  Plot size affects the probability of using labor exchange by changing the size of 
returns to teamwork and by increasing liquidity in this specification.  This result for 
Model 7 is consistent with a larger positive liquidity effect for working capital 
constrained households, as predicted by the model for households in the lower half of the 
working capital endowment distribution.  Also, the area of other plots planted this season 
has a significant (insignificant) negative effect on labor exchange use for constrained 
(unconstrained) households in Model 7.  These significance outcomes are opposite to
those in Models 5 and 6.  This result could arise if liquidity constrained households are 
less able than unconstrained households to meet their labor needs on other plots through 
the labor market.  Many of the other estimates of the labor exchange participation 
determinants are consistent with those in Models 5 and 6.  Although the results for the 
estimates from the EM algorithm are qualified by the failure of the algorithm to converge 
by accepted convergence criteria, they suggest a meaningful reclassification of the data 
that provide a somewhat better fit to the model of labor exchange developed here.
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Table 4.6: Estimates of Probability of Participating in Labor Exchange 
with Unobserved Working Capital Constraints Using the EM 
Algorithm
Estimates of γ : Model
Determinants of the Probability of Being 
Working Capital Constrained
(7)
Value of land owned net of outstanding -0.010***
    land debt, 1998, Rp. mn (0.001)
Value of non-farm business, household assets -0.016***
    net of outstanding related debt, 1998, Rp. mn (0.002)
Value of livestock and farm equipment -0.009*
    net of outstanding farm debt, 1998, Rp. mn (0.005)
Share of village households using credit 0.331***
(0.112)
Village average interest rate 0.030***
(0.002)
Village average interest rate squared -0.000***
(0.000)
Indicator for use of HYV seeds -0.794***
(0.036)
Ln of number of household members 0.028*
(0.016)
Household head age (years) -0.001*
(0.000)
Household head education (years) -0.013***
(0.004)
Indicator for white collar household head -0.071
    occupation (0.107)
Lampung province indicator 0.214***
(0.035)
Central Java province indicator -0.586***
(0.026)
East Java province indicator -0.623***
(0.022)
West Nusa Tenggara province indicator -0.552***
(0.017)
North Sulawesi province indicator -0.301***
(0.022)
Rainy season indicator 1.130***
(0.035)





Table 4.6:  (continued)







Determinants of the Probability of Using 
Labor Exchange on this Plot
Model
(7) (7)
Working capital: credit taken or outstanding -0.008
     plus savings by season, Rp. mn. (0.005)
Value of non-land business, household, farm -0.003 0.002
    assets net of credit financing, 1998, Rp. mn (0.005) (0.004)
Number of household members -0.042** -0.042*
(0.020) (0.023)
Indicator for simple irrigation 0.348* 0.476***
(0.197) (0.163)
Indicator for plot being owned, not leased -0.213* -0.186*
(0.111) (0.096)
Indicator that corn is at least half of the -0.029 0.270**
     value of production on this plot (0.217) (0.135)
Indictor for HYV seeds used in corn 1.077*** 0.849***
     production (0.353) (0.158)
Ln of plot area 0.193*** 0.114**
(0.072) (0.052)
Area of other plots planted this season -0.183** -0.107
     by this household (0.087) (0.066)
Share of village sample plots within 1.113*** 0.934***
     10% of this plot’s area, by season (0.348) (0.344)
Average village hourly wage for time -0.524* -0.687**
      rate contracts, by season (Rp. ‘000) (0.303) (0.320)
Average village hourly wage × Indicator for 0.760*** 0.954***
     net seller of labor (0.267) (0.312)
Average village hourly wage × Indicator for 1.050*** 1.273***
     net buyer of labor (0.282) (0.324)
Household head age (years) -0.009*** -0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Household head education level (years) -0.008 -0.016
(0.014) (0.014)
Lampung province indicator -1.480*** -1.229***
(0.188) (0.138)
Central Java province indicator -0.310** -0.431***
(0.139) (0.127)
East Java province indicator -1.775*** -1.721***
(0.307) (0.306)
West Nusa Tenggara province indicator -0.780*** -0.910***
(0.216) (0.212)





Correlation coefficient of error terms for -0.729*** -0.893***
  constraint regime and labor exchange use (0.076) (0.052)
Log partial-likelihood -1726.28
Observations 2009 2009
The standard errors in parentheses are based on the Huber/White/sandwich robust 
estimator of variance, adjusted for clustering in sample design.  South Sulawesi is 
the omitted province.  The omitted season indicator in the working capital 
constraint equation is for annual crops.  * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 
5%; *** Significant at 1%.
4.7 Conclusion
This empirical investigation of the determinants of agricultural labor exchange explains 
many of the characteristics of the farming technology, asset endowment distribution, and 
labor and credit markets that condition labor exchange use for this sample of Indonesian 
farmers.  The results also provide considerable support for the model of labor exchange 
use across various modes of production presented in Chapter 2.  
I find strong evidence for returns to teamwork in rice and corn production, the crops for 
which labor exchange is most commonly used.  Until now, there has been little rigorous 
evidence of returns to teamwork in agriculture.  This establishes a necessary condition for 
labor exchange.  It also refutes claims made elsewhere that returns to teamwork are likely 
to be small in agriculture.  Indeed, because the model demonstrates that returns to 
teamwork are a necessary condition for labor exchange, the considerable presence of 
labor exchange in developing countries across the globe provides additional empirical 
evidence for returns to teamwork in agriculture.  
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The estimates of determinants of participation in labor exchange teams in which all 
households are assumed to be working capital constrained validate the pattern of effects 
of liquidity on labor exchange use for constrained households predicted in the model 
from Chapter 2.  At low levels of working capital endowments, liquidity has a positive 
effect on participation in labor exchange, but this effect reverses direction in the upper 
half of the distribution of working capital endowments.  The negative relationship 
between working capital and labor exchange use is the one most commonly cited in the 
literature on labor exchange.  However, the confirmation of a positive relationship for 
households with low holdings of working capital explains the counterexamples in the 
literature.  Chibnik and de Jong (1989) and Worby (1995) show that use of labor 
exchange increased along with liquidity from new commercial farming opportunities in 
Peru and Zimbabwe.  Farmers in these settings were relatively poor, and probably had 
low holdings of working capital before the introduction of new commercial crops.  These 
empirical results show that the institution of labor exchange can be an engine of growth 
in farm incomes at low levels of development.  Labor exchange provides a source of team 
labor for poor farmers when credit and labor markets are imperfect.  Aside from landless 
laborers, these farmers are at the greatest disadvantage in the development process.
The results from the models in which all households are assumed to be working capital 
constrained also show that the size of the local paid labor market reduces demand for 
labor exchange even after controlling for wage levels.  I argue that this is evidence of 
transactions costs in the paid labor market.  The responsiveness of participation in labor 
exchange teams to wages in the paid labor market shows that labor exchange coexists 
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with paid labor markets in the Indonesian sample.  Labor exchange raises welfare and 
further contributes to development by providing a substitute source of team labor.
When the sample is separated into cohorts based on whether the working capital 
constraint is binding, estimates from discrete choice endogenous switching regressions in 
Models 5 and 6 verify a number of other predictions of the model.  The distribution of 
land and other assets, imperfections in the credit market, crops grown, and wage rates are 
all shown to affect the use of labor exchange in a manner consistent with the theory.
One important inconsistency with the theory from Models 5 and 6—that working capital 
holdings significantly affect the decision to participate in labor exchange for households 




This dissertation investigates the economics of agricultural labor exchange in rural areas 
of developing countries.  In labor exchange, farmers form a work team that supplies labor 
on each team member’s farm in succession.  The central features of these arrangements 
include joint agricultural production by team members, the reciprocal exchange of labor 
time (possibly delayed) between each pair of team members, no monetary payments, and 
the rotating accrual of private benefits to the host farmer on each farm.  Although labor 
exchange teams have existed for centuries and remain common in much of Southeast 
Asia, Africa, and parts of Latin America, they have received almost no attention from 
development economists.  I investigate the motivation for the formation of labor 
exchange teams by considering the individual farmer’s decision to participate in labor 
exchange.  The analysis focuses on the role of the two most prominent motivations for 
labor exchange raised in the sociological literature: credit and labor market imperfections 
and the technological benefits of teamwork.  These motivations are heavily influenced by 
the farmer’s endowments of working capital, land (or rights to its use), and labor (via 
household size).  I also investigate how participation in labor exchange is constrained by 
the characteristics of the exchange arrangement in the context of agricultural production.  
The reciprocal exchange of labor time and the team production setting suggest that the 
local distribution of land and the degree of heterogeneity in crop choice, plot size, 
irrigation technology and human capital may all condition labor exchange use.  
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I develop a theoretical model of labor exchange in which an agricultural household 
chooses land area and allocates labor supply and demand across activities and labor 
arrangements given a production technology with positive returns to teamwork, possible 
quantity constraints in the credit market, and transaction costs for labor transactions.  In 
addition, non-household labor exhibits moral hazard and so must be supervised.  This 
model expands the set of possible modes of production defined by net position in the 
labor market as described by Eswaran and Kotwal (1986).   The model explains demand 
for labor exchange as a function of a farmer’s endowments of land, capital assets, and 
household size, working capital constraints and search costs for finding labor or off-farm 
employment.  In the empirical section of the research, I test some assumptions and 
implications of the model for the decision to participate in labor exchange for a sample of 
Indonesian farmers from the PATANAS data set, which I helped to collect in 1999.  The 
analytical and empirical models substantially expand current knowledge about how factor 
market imperfections, returns to teamwork and other technological considerations 
contribute to the adoption and persistence of this non-market institution.  The results have 
important implications for our understanding of factor transactions in rural areas of 
developing countries, for the role of non-market institutions in the process of 
development, and for how contractual forms in labor transactions are conditioned by 
technology.  
By allowing for possible returns to teamwork and the availability of labor exchange, the 
theoretical model in Chapter 2 generalizes existing models of the organization of 
agricultural production.  The models by Feder (1985), Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), and 
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Carter and Zimmerman (2000), rule out the simultaneous purchase and sale of labor by 
working capital constrained households.  Supervision costs associated with employing 
non-household labor make it unprofitable to finance labor expenditures on farm by 
supplying labor off-farm.  The model developed here shows that this common 
phenomenon can be explained by positive returns to teamwork.  Lemma 2.1 shows that 
when external (paid or exchange) labor exhibits moral hazard, returns to teamwork are a 
necessary condition for simultaneously employing labor on farm and supplying labor off 
farm.  A corollary is that returns to teamwork are a necessary condition for labor 
exchange.  There are other explanations for simultaneously hiring and supplying labor in 
the market, including contractual indivisibilities, specialization, land fragmentation 
(Bardhan, 1982), and skill heterogeneity within the household (Sadoulet, de Janvry and 
Benjamin, 1998).  However, of these returns to teamwork is the only relevant explanation 
for the decision to use labor exchange.  
Results from Chapter 2 also show that because each hour of labor employed under labor 
exchange must be reciprocated with labor time off farm, labor exchange can only 
substitute for team labor demand from the market.  I rule out a mode of production in 
which farmers simultaneously sell labor in the market, hire market labor and participate 
in labor exchange as empirically improbable.  Therefore, for agricultural activities that 
exhibit returns to teamwork, labor exchange offers an alternative to simultaneously 
buying and selling labor in the market.  Which mode of production obtains depends on 
relative search costs for each type of labor transaction. 
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In the model by Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), four modes of production arise along an 
activity continuum along a scale of access to working capital.  A farmer’s holdings of 
working capital completely determine the optimal choice of mode of production, from 
laborer-cultivators, to self-cultivators, to small capitalists, to large capitalists as working 
capital increases.  With possible returns to teamwork and the availability of labor 
exchange, I show that 12 distinct modes of production arise as a function of the four 
market labor regimes identified by Eswaran and Kotwal, as well as the degree of returns 
to teamwork and the relative size of search costs for each type of labor transaction.  The 
new typology indicates that, with returns to teamwork and depending on relative search 
costs, labor exchange may be optimal for farmers with working capital holdings 
consistent with any of the first three market labor regimes.  Only those with the largest 
farms, who are in the upper tail of the working capital distribution, would never find it 
profitable to choose labor exchange.  They devote all of their time to supervision of hired 
labor and can obtain labor teams from the market.  
The final results from the theoretical model concern the effects of household working 
capital, land, and labor endowments on demand for labor exchange.  For households that 
are not working capital constrained, demand for labor exchange is independent of 
holdings of working capital and land endowments.  However, if the working capital 
constraint is binding, the effects of working capital or land endowments (which differ 
only by a scalar in this model) on demand for labor exchange differ by mode of 
production.  With returns to teamwork, farmers at the bottom of the working capital 
distribution will operate as laborer-cultivators using labor exchange.  For these farmers, 
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an increase in working capital endowment has a positive effect on demand for labor 
exchange as more land is brought in, raising demand for team labor.  For self-cultivators 
using labor exchange, whether greater access to working capital increases or decreases 
demand for labor exchange depends on the production and supervision technologies, on 
preferences, and on the relative substitutability of team size or labor time for land.  For 
small capitalists using labor exchange, an increase in working capital has a positive 
endowment effect on demand for labor exchange and a negative substitution effect 
through improved access to paid labor.  In summary, the model from Chapter 2 shows 
that the effect of working capital holdings on demand for labor exchange is positive at 
low levels of working capital and may be positive or negative as working capital 
endowments increase.  Observers have claimed a negative overall effect of working 
capital holdings on labor exchange.  If true, then the relationship does turn negative near 
the top of the working capital distribution, leading to an inverted U shape.
The main empirical results are presented in Chapter 4.  The model in Chapter 2 identifies 
returns to teamwork as a necessary condition for the use of labor exchange, so I first test 
for the presence of returns to teamwork in the Indonesian data in order to validate this 
result.  For this test, I restrict the sample to rice and corn farmers because farmers 
growing these crops are the most likely to use labor exchange.  The test, based on 
estimation of a plot-level Cobb-Douglas agricultural production function, involves 
comparing estimates of the productivity of piece-rate labor to piece-rate team labor.  By 
restricting the comparison to piece-rate labor contracts, I remove the incentive effect of 
these high-powered contracts, which are more common in team production, from the pure 
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team effect.  Estimates across several specifications, including pooled OLS, pooled IV, 
household random effects IV, and village fixed effects, all support higher productivity of 
labor performed in teams.  This establishes the necessary condition for use of labor 
exchange for this sample.  In addition, these results provide rare evidence of returns to 
teamwork in agriculture and they contribute to limited empirical evidence of a 
productivity advantage of team production in general.  This finding suggests that the 
model of the organization of agricultural production with returns to teamwork and labor 
exchange developed here is more appropriate for this sample than the reduced model of 
Eswaran and Kotwal (1986).  Moreover, this evidence contradicts the claim by Eswaran 
and Kotwal (1986) that returns to teamwork are not a valid motivation for the hierarchical 
employer-employee relationship in agriculture.  Because returns to teamwork are a 
necessary condition for labor exchange, labor exchange teams everywhere serve as 
counterexamples to their claim.  Where labor exchange teams are found or where farmers 
simultaneously hire and supply labor to the market, the model developed here may be a 
more appropriate representation of the organization of production.
In Chapter 4, I develop an empirical model of participation in labor exchange subject to 
working capital constraints based on the analytical model of labor exchange demand in 
Chapter 2.  The effects of endowments, transaction costs and prices on the labor 
exchange participation decision should be comparable to their effects on labor exchange 
demand since these effects should be robust at the corner solution to the demand 
problem.  I take several approaches to estimating the participation decision because the 
effects of many of these determinants of labor exchange depend on whether the farmer is 
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working capital constrained, and this constraint is unobserved.  I begin by assuming that 
all households are working capital constrained and estimate the plot-level decision to use 
labor exchange in a pooled probit model and a probit model with household random 
effects.  The estimates provide broad support for the model of labor exchange in Chapter 
2.  The most striking result is that the effect of working capital endowments on the 
decision to use labor exchange displays the inverted U shape hypothesized.  Using 
quintiles of season-specific working capital holdings as explanatory variables, I show that 
moving from quintiles one or two to the third quintile of working capital holdings 
increases the probability of participating in labor exchange, but that subsequent increases 
in working capital quintiles, starting with the third or the fourth, reduce the probability of 
using labor exchange.  If the characterization of all households as working capital 
constrained is correct, this suggests that access to capital reduces reliance on non-market 
labor exchanges only for farmers in the upper half of the working capital distribution.  On 
average, farmers with working capital endowments below the median use labor exchange 
to enhance the productivity of additional capital.  
Also in this model, an increase in the wage rate for paid labor increases the probability of 
participating in labor exchange for net buyers of labor, which suggests active substitution 
between paid labor and exchange labor.  It must be that both market and non-market 
labor sources are available to many of these Indonesian farmers.  Also, in the random 
effects specification, an increase in the size of the local agricultural labor force reduces 
the probability of using labor exchange, even controlling for the wage rate.  A larger 
supply of workers in the paid labor market reduces reliance on non-market exchange, 
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independent of the price, suggesting that there are transaction costs to hiring paid labor in 
these villages.  In other results from this model, plots using simple irrigation are 
significantly more likely to be included in labor exchange, which indicates that labor 
exchange use is consistent with at least this low level output-enhancing investment.  
Household size reduces the probability of using labor exchange in the pooled probit 
models, as expected.  
In order to test whether these results are robust to the assumption that all households are 
working capital constrained, I develop two assignment rules to divide the sample by 
season into working capital constrained and unconstrained regimes based on observed 
holdings of working capital.  Under the first rule, all households with no savings, 
borrowing or lending are classified as constrained.  Most of the households classified as 
constrained under this rule fell in the first two quintiles of working capital holdings.  
Under the second rule, households in the third working capital quintile were added to the 
constrained cohort from the first rule.  Separately for each assignment rule, I estimated a 
three-equation model explaining the probability of being working capital constrained as 
well as the decision to participate in labor exchange as a function of being constrained or 
unconstrained under the assignment rule.  The resulting model leads to a discrete 
endogenous switching regression, which I estimated by maximum likelihood.
The first equation in this model explains the determinants of the probability of being 
working capital constrained.  Estimates for this equation were similar under either 
assignment rule.  Results show that the value of land owned and the value of livestock 
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and farm equipment were negatively associated with the probability of being working 
capital constrained.  Also, households in villages with larger credit markets are 
significantly less likely to be constrained.  Under the second assignment rule, the village 
interest rate has a negative effect on the probability of being constrained.  This indicates 
that the role of the interest rate operates more through savings than borrowing.  The 
probability of being working capital constrained also declines with household head 
education and if the household head has a white-collar occupation.  
Estimates of the discrete endogenous switching regression provide mixed support for the 
method of sample separation based on the two assignment rules.  Both assignment rules 
appear to classify too many households as unconstrained.  As a result, most estimated 
effects of the decision to participate in labor exchange do not differ significantly between 
households in the two regimes.  However, the estimated correlation coefficients between 
the working capital constraint equation and the corresponding labor exchange 
participation equation were significant, although weakly in all but one case.  
Estimates of the decision to participate in labor exchange from the switching regressions 
provided substantial support for the model in Chapter 2, but again provide mixed 
evidence on the appropriateness of the method of sample separation used here.  Because 
constrained households have little or no working capital holdings under the two 
assignment rules, it is not possible to test for the inverted U shape in the relationship 
between working capital holdings and participation in labor exchange for constrained 
households.  For households classified as unconstrained under both assignment rules, 
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working capital holdings had a significant negative effect on the probability of 
participating in labor exchange.  This contradicts the predictions of the theoretical model 
in Chapter 2 for unconstrained households.  When considered along with the previous 
results, this provides evidence that neither assignment rule properly classifies households 
as unconstrained in access to capital.  
In the model specification including land endowments (area owned) rather than plot size 
constraints (operated plot area and area of other plots), the value of non-land assets has a 
negative effect on the probability of using labor exchange for working capital constrained 
households and no significant effect for unconstrained households.  This supports the 
regime assignment rules used here and suggests that these assets provide some liquidity, 
probably as collateral, for constrained households.  The estimated effects of land 
endowments and household size provide further support for the regime switching model, 
which treats households with relatively large working capital endowments as 
unconstrained.  Under either assignment rule, land area owned has no effect on the 
probability of using labor exchange for unconstrained households, as predicted by the 
theory.  Land endowments have a significant positive effect on labor exchange use for 
constrained households, which is consistent with many of these households being in the 
laborer-cultivator market labor regime.  Also, an increase in household size significantly 
reduces the probability of using labor exchange for working capital constrained 
households, but not for unconstrained households.  This is consistent with the theoretical 
model.  Demand for labor exchange is independent of household size in unconstrained 
households operating in modes of production that include labor market participation due 
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to separability of production and consumption decisions.  In working capital constrained 
households, larger households are less likely to use labor exchange if the substitution 
effect of household labor for market labor dominates the time endowment effect.  The 
estimated effects of simple irrigation technology, high-yielding variety seeds, and the 
wage rate from the regime switching models are generally consistent with results from 
the model in which all households are treated as constrained.  Also, in the preferred 
estimates from both specifications, the share of village plots within ten percent of the area 
of the observed plot increases the probability of using labor exchange.  The estimated 
coefficients for this variable, which measures the size of the pool of potential labor 
exchange teammates, indicate that homogeneity of plot size is an important constraint on 
the operation of labor exchange teams.
Based on these results, it appears that applying the additional structure provided by the 
switching regression model provided additional insights into the likely determinants of 
labor exchange participation, but it is not possible to draw a definitive conclusion about 
the most appropriate division of the sample into working capital constrained and 
unconstrained regimes.
In a final attempt to overcome the unobserved working capital constraint classification, I 
estimated the switching regression model for labor exchange participation using the EM 
algorithm.  This algorithm treats the unobserved constraint as a missing data problem and 
uses the properties of the data to assign observations to regimes and solve for the 
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters.  Although the algorithm failed to 
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converge according to accepted convergence criteria, a more relaxed convergence 
criterion permits examination of the final iteration before failure.  Estimates of the model 
from this iteration provide further insights into the determinants of labor exchange.  For 
example, working capital holdings have no significant effect on the probability of using 
labor exchange for unconstrained households for this model.  However, there is no 
significant effect for constrained households either.  The latter result could arise from a 
linear specification for the working capital variable if the true relationship is nonlinear, or 
inverted-U shaped.  Also, plot size has a positive effect on the probability of using labor 
exchange for both constrained and unconstrained households, as in the earlier results 
from the regimes switching models based on arbitrary regime assignment.  However, the 
size of this effect is significantly larger for constrained households only in the results 
using the EM algorithm.  This suggests a larger positive liquidity effect of land area for 
constrained households and is consistent with the theory.
These results demonstrate the dependence of this type of labor arrangement on 
production technology.  Labor exchange arises only in the presence of returns to 
teamwork and is constrained by the plot sizes of team members.  The latter result 
suggests that labor exchange is better suited to villages with a relatively homogenous 
distribution of land and where land fragmentation is limited.
These results also have important implications for our understanding of the role of labor 
exchange in the process of development.  Labor exchange does not exist only in very 
remote villages with thin labor markets and limited commercial development, as a 
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symptom of “backward agriculture”.  Rather, these results show that the labor exchange 
institution operates in many areas simultaneously with active labor markets, substituting 
for the market when paid labor transaction costs are high.  Farmers show surprising 
flexibility in their use of labor exchange across seasons and activities for the same plot.  
Their participation in these teams responds to local wage rates and to the size of the 
agricultural labor force.  Although the availability of labor exchange appears to reduce 
reliance on the labor market, thereby slowing the market’s development, labor exchange 
provides an important source of team labor when labor markets fail.
If the process of economic development is characterized by a reduction in the agricultural 
labor force as workers migrate to other sectors, labor exchange may be an important 
source of team labor during the development transition.  The finding of an inverted U 
shape in the relationship of working capital holdings to labor exchange participation 
suggests that labor exchange can provide a vehicle for poor farmers achieve efficiency 
gains in the presence of returns to teamwork in production.  As access to capital 
improves, farmers with limited capital holdings can use labor exchange as a means to 
expand their operations when labor markets are thin.  In this way, labor exchange 
complements the process of development at its early stages.  Sociologists have debated 
whether labor exchange will continue to operate as rural areas of developing countries 
become more developed.  These results suggest that the agricultural labor exchange 
institution is likely to persist much longer than many have suspected, and may only be 
eliminated in the final stages of development, when farms become more agglomerated 
and mechanization is widespread.  
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Appendix A: Details of First-Order Conditions and Comparative Statics for the 
Labor Exchange Model
(A1) The Model of Labor Exchange
The Lagrangean for the problem in equation (2.6) is 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )[ ]












The corresponding Kuhn-Tucker first-order necessary conditions for maximization are
(A1.a) ( ) 011 =+−≡ vfA λφ ,  0>A ,
(A1.b) 02 =−′+−≡ µφ ufR ,  0>R ,
(A1.c) ( ) ( ) ( ) 01112 ≤+−+++−≡ TcwTcf FFF µλφ ,  0≥F ,
(A1.d) ( ) ( ) ( ) 011 32 ≤+′−+−+−′−≡ MMM cswfcsf µλφ ,  0≥Mn ,
(A1.e) ( ) ( ) 0132 ≤+′+−++′−≡ EEE csfcsf µφ ,  0≥En ,
(A1.f) ( ) 0≥−−−−−−−≡ EEMMFEH ncncTFcLsnFRnTµφ ,  0≥µ ,
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(A1.g) ( ) ( ) 0≥−−−+≡ AAvnFwB Mλφ ,  0≥λ ,
where, iGi ∂∂=φ for i=A, R, F, µ, and λ, and jj nG ∂∂=φ for j=M,N.  Also, if , i=1,2,3, 
denotes the first partial derivative of the production function with respect to its ith 
argument. In condition (A1.a), A>0 by the assumption that these households are 
cultivators and that A is essential.  In condition (A1.b), R>0 by the assumption that the 
marginal utility of leisure is infinite when R=0.  Each other coupling of inequalities in 
conditions (A1.c)-(A1.g) are subject to a third condition for complementary slackness 
that requires the product of the left-hand-sides of the two inequalities to equal zero.  
The concavity of ( )⋅⋅,U , the strict quasiconcavity of ( )⋅⋅⋅ ,,f  and the convexity of ( )⋅s
guarantee that there is a unique solution to the problem in (6), and that the first-order 
conditions are sufficient for a maximum.  
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 for self-cultivating farmers using labor exchange
Here, I determine the effect of an increase in access to working capital on demand for 
labor exchange for self-cultivating farmers using labor exchange.  The relevant choice 
variables are A, R, and En .  Hours worked on farm, H, are determined as a residual 
category in the time constraint, which has already been substituted into the production 
function in the Lagrangean in (A1) in this Appendix.  Also, 0>H  implies 0=µ .  To 
simplify the analysis, I substitute the working capital constraint for A in the Lagrangean.  
The resulting first order conditions are:
(A2.1.a) 02 =′+− uf , and
(A2.1.b) ( ) 032 =++′− ffcs E , 
where arguments of the production and utility functions have been omitted for simplicity, 
and subscripts denote first partial derivatives with respect to the numbered argument.  
















f u s c f f dB








  ′′ ′ + + −   ′ ′ ′ ′′  + − + − + − +     
   = ′+ −   
 
Let ∆  denote the 2-by-2 matrix in (A2.2).  By the strict quasiconcavity of ( )⋅⋅⋅ ,,f  and the 
strict concavity of ( )⋅u , it must be true that 0>∆ .  Applying Cramer’s Rule, the effect 
of an increase in the working capital endowment on demand for labor exchange is given 
by






By strict quasiconcavity of the production function and substitutability of factors in 
production ( )jiff ijii ≠>> ,0and0 , and by concavity of the utility of leisure ( )0<′′u , a 
sufficient condition for 0>
∗
Bd
dnE  is ( ) 01213 ≥+′− fcsf E , or , after substituting from 
(A2.1.b), 
0123132 ≥− ffff .
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Similarly, a sufficient condition for 0<
∗
Bd











 for small-capitalist-cultivators using labor 
exchange
For farmers operating as small capitalists with labor exchange, the choice variables are A, 
R, H, Mn , and En .  After substituting the time and working capital constraints for H and 
A, respectively, the relevant first order conditions are 
(A3.1.a) 02 =′+− uf , 
(A3.1.b) ( ) 01 321 =+−′−+− ffcsfv
w
M ,  and
(A3.1.c) ( ) 032 =++′− ffcs E .
Evaluating the comparative statics for this system of equations is substantially more 
complicated than for the case of self-cultivators using labor exchange presented in (A2).  
The added complexity arises because of the higher order of the problem and because Mn
enters all three arguments of the production function following the substitution of the two 
constraints.  Using Cramer’s Rule, the effect of an increase in working capital on demand 
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where ∆ is the Hessian matrix for the Langrangean for this problem, search costs for 
paid labor and exchange labor are assumed to be identical ( )ccc EM == , and 
( ) 321 1 iiiim ffcsfv
w
f +−′−+−= ,  for 3or ,2,1=i .
A second order sufficiency condition for the solution to equations (A3.1) to be a 




 is the 
opposite of the sign of the 3-by-3 determinant in (A3.2).  In general, the sign of this 
expression is indeterminate.  
If leisure is fixed, the sign of the effect of additional working capital on demand for labor 
exchange is given by the sign of the determinant of the second trailing principal minor of 
the detailed matrix in (A3.2): 
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(A3.3)
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where ijC  is the (signed) cofactor for the ith row and jth column of the Hessian matrix of 
second derivatives of the production function.  Although the expression on the left-hand-
side of (A3.3) cannot be signed in general, if 1>+′ cs , then 0<
∗
Bd
dnE .  To see this, note 
that under constant returns to scale in the production function there are decreasing returns 
in any two of the arguments: 0212221133 >−= fffC  and 0213331122 >−= fffC .  By strict 
quasiconcavity of the production function and substitutability of all factor pairs, 0<iif , 
and jif ij ≠> ,0 .  This implies the last four terms in (A3.3) are all negative.  The second 
term is negative as long as 5.>+′ cs .  A sufficient condition for negativity of the first 
and third terms is 1>+′ cs .  
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 for laborer-cultivators using labor exchange
Farmers operating in this mode of production have A, R, H, F, and En  as choice 
variables.  After substituting the time and working capital constraints for H and A, 
respectively, the relevant first order conditions are 
(A4.1.a) 02 =′+− uf , 







w F ,  and
(A4.1.c) ( ) 032 =++′− ffcs E .
For simplicity, assume equal search costs per worker in labor exchange and off-farm 
work, cTcc FE == .  Using Cramer’s Rule, the effect of an increase in working capital 
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where ∆  is the Hessian matrix for the Langrangean for this problem.  Equation (A4.2) 
can be simplified considerably into 


















where ijC  is the (signed) cofactor for the ith row and jth column of the Hessian matrix of 
second derivatives of the production function.  The expression in (A4.3) is positive.  A 
second order sufficiency condition for the solution to equations (A4.1) to be a maximum 
is that the determinant of ∆  be negative.  The strict quasiconcavity of ( )⋅⋅⋅ ,,f  and the 
strict concavity of ( )⋅u  ensure that this is satisfied, and also implies that <′′u 0.  The 
cofactor 212221133 fffC −=  is positive by constant returns to scale of the production 
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function.  The other two cofactors are positive by the quasiconcavity of ( )⋅⋅⋅ ,,f  and the 
assumption of substitutability of all pairs of its arguments.
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 for self-cultivators using labor exchange
After substituting the time and working capital constraints, the Lagrangean for this 
problem is








and the relevant first order conditions are:
(A5.2.a) 02 =′+− uf , and
(A5.2.b) ( ) 032 =++′− ffcs E . 
Totally differentiating with respect to B  and applying Cramer’s Rule leads to the 
expression







where ∆  is the Hessian matrix for the Langrangean for this problem. By strict 
quasiconcavity of the production function, substitutability of factors in production, and 
strict concavity of ( )⋅u , 0>∆ , 0<′′u , 0<iif , and jif ij ≠> ,0 .  Therefore, the term 
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( )( )2322 TffcsTu E −+′′′  is positive.  By these properties and constant returns to scale in 
the production function, the remaining terms are negative. 
Appendix B:  The 1998-99 PATANAS Survey Sample Villages




Village ID: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Lampung Gunung Rejo Air Naningan Sumber Rejo Komering Putih Beringin Kota Napal
L. Selatan Tangganus L. Tengah L. Tengah L. Utara L. Utara
banana coffee rice cassava pepper sugarcane
Central Java Cepogo Karangwungu Kwadungan Gun. Karang Tengah Larangan Karangmoncol Mojoagung
Boyolali Klaten Temanggung Banjarnegara Brebes Pemalang Pati
milk rice tobacco vegetables red onion rice sugarcane
East Java Gerih Selosari Terung Kulon Sungun Legowo Brondong Wiyurejo
Ngawi Kediri Sidoarjo Gresik Lamongan Malang
rice rice rice shrimp fish vegetables
West Nusa Gonjar Sengkol Karang Baru Plampang Sukadamai
     Tenggara Lombok Teng. Lombok Teng. Lombok Timur Sumbawa Dompu
rice, tobacco rice garlic, onion cattle cashew
North Sulawesi Rumoong Atas Pakuweru Wailan Karegesan Mogoyunggung
Minahasa Minahasa Minahasa Minahasa Bolaang M.
clove coconut horticulture nutmeg rice
South Sulawesi Margolembo Baroko Selli Polo Padang Rumbia Batupanga
Luwu Enrekang Bone Tator Jeneponto Polmas
rice vegetables rice, soybean coffee corn, mango chocolate
  * Villages in bold type had agricultural labor exchange in 1998-99.
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Table B.2: Number of Household Observations by Village, 1998-99 PATANAS survey
Province Village,
by ID Number
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Subtotal
Lampung 42 43 43 49 44 45 266
Central Java 49 45 45 41 39 35 47 301
East Java 49 48 48 26 27 45 243
West Nusa Tenggara 44 47 28 47 47 213
North Sulawesi 43 44 45 38 43 213
South Sulawesi 43 46 44 41 43 41 258
TOTAL 1,494224
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Appendix C: First- stage Estimates of Factor Demands for Production Function 
Estimation
Table C.1.1: First- stage Estimates of Piece Rate Labor Hours for Production 
Function Estimation by Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable:
Piece rate labor hours
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
Area planted 0.303 0.057 5.300 0.000
Technical irrigation dummy 1.248 0.158 7.910 0.000
Simple irrigation dummy -0.495 0.151 -3.280 0.001
Value of farm equipment 0.013 0.018 0.750 0.453
Dryland dummy -0.732 0.188 -3.890 0.000
Household head age 0.048 0.254 0.190 0.851
Household head education 0.016 0.085 0.190 0.847
Rainy season 1998-99 dummy -0.656 0.922 -0.710 0.477
Dry season 1998 dummy -0.572 0.925 -0.620 0.536
Province dummy for Lampung 0.415 0.198 2.100 0.036
Province dummy for Central Java -0.086 0.225 -0.380 0.703
Province dummy for East Java 0.327 0.211 1.550 0.122
Province dummy for West Nusa Tenggara -0.197 0.212 -0.930 0.352
Province dummy for North Sulawesi 0.082 0.241 0.340 0.734
Share of agric. laborers in village adults, ‘98 census -2.603 0.612 -4.260 0.000
Village average interest rate 0.002 0.001 2.890 0.004
Share of total village area planted in rice 1.668 0.295 5.660 0.000
Village median distance to market for crops 0.093 0.021 4.360 0.000
Number of children age 0-5 years 0.109 0.142 0.770 0.441
Number of children age 6-11 years -0.227 0.118 -1.930 0.054
Number of male children age 12-15 years 0.057 0.168 0.340 0.733
Number of female children age 12-15 years -0.190 0.166 -1.140 0.253
Number of male children age 16-19 years 0.092 0.166 0.560 0.578
Number of female children age 12-15 years 0.134 0.172 0.780 0.437
Number of males age 20 years and older 0.258 0.181 1.430 0.154
Number of females age 20 years and older 0.225 0.220 1.020 0.306
Village average rice price by season 0.908 0.351 2.590 0.010
Village average male wage by season 0.236 0.404 0.580 0.560
Plot inheritance dummy -0.276 0.107 -2.560 0.010
Constant -0.659 1.484 -0.440 0.657
N 1031
Adjusted R2 0.281
 p-value: F(29,1001) 0.000
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments:   0.0886
Test of excluded instruments:
  F( 15,  1001) =     6.48
  Prob > F      =   0.0000
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Table C.1.2: First- stage Estimates of Piece Rate Team Labor Hours for Production 
Function Estimation by Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable:
Piece rate team labor hours
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
Area planted 0.025 0.035 0.710 0.477
Technical irrigation dummy 0.242 0.097 2.490 0.013
Simple irrigation dummy 0.200 0.093 2.150 0.031
Value of farm equipment 0.020 0.011 1.830 0.068
Dryland dummy -0.195 0.116 -1.680 0.093
Household head age 0.158 0.156 1.010 0.313
Household head education 0.092 0.053 1.760 0.079
Rainy season 1998-99 dummy -2.924 0.568 -5.150 0.000
Dry season 1998 dummy -2.940 0.569 -5.160 0.000
Province dummy for Lampung 0.587 0.122 4.820 0.000
Province dummy for Central Java 1.917 0.139 13.840 0.000
Province dummy for East Java 0.305 0.130 2.350 0.019
Province dummy for West Nusa Tenggara 0.458 0.130 3.520 0.000
Province dummy for North Sulawesi 1.085 0.148 7.310 0.000
Share of agric. laborers in village adults, ‘98 census -1.480 0.377 -3.930 0.000
Village average interest rate 0.000 0.001 -0.170 0.866
Share of total village area planted in rice 1.503 0.182 8.280 0.000
Village median distance to market for crops 0.054 0.013 4.140 0.000
Number of children age 0-5 years -0.163 0.087 -1.870 0.062
Number of children age 6-11 years -0.008 0.073 -0.120 0.907
Number of male children age 12-15 years -0.108 0.103 -1.040 0.299
Number of female children age 12-15 years -0.214 0.102 -2.100 0.036
Number of male children age 16-19 years 0.112 0.102 1.100 0.271
Number of female children age 12-15 years -0.143 0.106 -1.350 0.177
Number of males age 20 years and older -0.014 0.111 -0.120 0.903
Number of females age 20 years and older 0.050 0.135 0.370 0.710
Village average rice price by season 0.375 0.216 1.740 0.083
Village average male wage by season -2.150 0.249 -8.630 0.000
Plot inheritance dummy 0.176 0.066 2.660 0.008
Constant 2.736 0.914 2.990 0.003
N 1031
Adjusted R2 0.309
 p-value: F(29,1001) 0.000
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments:   0.1292
Test of excluded instruments:
  F( 15,  1001) =     9.90
  Prob > F      =   0.0000
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Table C.1.3: First- stage Estimates of Other Hired Labor Hours for Production 
Function Estimation by Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable:
Other hired labor hours
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
Area planted 0.148 0.046 3.250 0.001
Technical irrigation dummy -0.572 0.126 -4.550 0.000
Simple irrigation dummy -0.339 0.120 -2.830 0.005
Value of farm equipment 0.108 0.014 7.600 0.000
Dryland dummy -0.266 0.150 -1.770 0.077
Household head age 0.116 0.202 0.570 0.568
Household head education 0.122 0.068 1.790 0.074
Rainy season 1998-99 dummy -0.009 0.734 -0.010 0.990
Dry season 1998 dummy -0.086 0.736 -0.120 0.907
Province dummy for Lampung -0.234 0.158 -1.490 0.138
Province dummy for Central Java -0.772 0.179 -4.310 0.000
Province dummy for East Java -0.537 0.168 -3.200 0.001
Province dummy for West Nusa Tenggara 0.126 0.169 0.750 0.456
Province dummy for North Sulawesi 0.326 0.192 1.700 0.090
Share of agric. laborers in village adults, ‘98 census 1.738 0.487 3.570 0.000
Village average interest rate 0.000 0.001 -0.500 0.614
Share of total village area planted in rice -0.669 0.235 -2.850 0.004
Village median distance to market for crops -0.066 0.017 -3.870 0.000
Number of children age 0-5 years 0.291 0.113 2.570 0.010
Number of children age 6-11 years 0.082 0.094 0.880 0.380
Number of male children age 12-15 years 0.343 0.134 2.560 0.011
Number of female children age 12-15 years -0.181 0.132 -1.370 0.170
Number of male children age 16-19 years -0.141 0.132 -1.070 0.286
Number of female children age 12-15 years -0.300 0.137 -2.180 0.029
Number of males age 20 years and older -0.069 0.144 -0.480 0.634
Number of females age 20 years and older -0.060 0.175 -0.350 0.730
Village average rice price by season -0.802 0.280 -2.870 0.004
Village average male wage by season 0.071 0.322 0.220 0.825
Plot inheritance dummy 0.005 0.086 0.060 0.950
Constant 5.294 1.182 4.480 0.000
N 1031
Adjusted R2 0.208
 p-value: F(29,1001) 0.000
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments:   0.0541
Test of excluded instruments:
  F( 15,  1001) =     3.81
  Prob > F      =   0.0000
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Table C.1.4: First- stage Estimates of Household Labor Hours for Production 
Function Estimation by Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable:
Household labor hours
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
Area planted 0.231 0.055 4.180 0.000
Technical irrigation dummy 0.187 0.152 1.230 0.220
Simple irrigation dummy -0.295 0.146 -2.030 0.043
Value of farm equipment -0.001 0.017 -0.050 0.957
Dryland dummy -0.071 0.182 -0.390 0.697
Household head age -0.100 0.245 -0.410 0.683
Household head education -0.386 0.082 -4.680 0.000
Rainy season 1998-99 dummy -0.869 0.891 -0.980 0.330
Dry season 1998 dummy -0.840 0.893 -0.940 0.347
Province dummy for Lampung -0.557 0.191 -2.920 0.004
Province dummy for Central Java -0.668 0.217 -3.070 0.002
Province dummy for East Java -1.519 0.204 -7.460 0.000
Province dummy for West Nusa Tenggara -0.430 0.204 -2.100 0.036
Province dummy for North Sulawesi -1.537 0.233 -6.600 0.000
Share of agric. laborers in village adults, ‘98 census -0.908 0.591 -1.540 0.125
Village average interest rate -0.003 0.001 -3.170 0.002
Share of total village area planted in rice -0.522 0.285 -1.830 0.067
Village median distance to market for crops 0.025 0.021 1.230 0.221
Number of children age 0-5 years 0.088 0.137 0.650 0.519
Number of children age 6-11 years -0.053 0.114 -0.470 0.640
Number of male children age 12-15 years 0.206 0.162 1.270 0.204
Number of female children age 12-15 years 0.147 0.160 0.920 0.358
Number of male children age 16-19 years 0.182 0.160 1.140 0.255
Number of female children age 12-15 years 0.358 0.167 2.150 0.032
Number of males age 20 years and older 0.327 0.175 1.870 0.062
Number of females age 20 years and older 0.391 0.213 1.840 0.066
Village average rice price by season 0.012 0.339 0.030 0.973
Village average male wage by season 0.326 0.391 0.830 0.404
Plot inheritance dummy -0.036 0.104 -0.350 0.726
Constant 6.787 1.433 4.740 0.000
N 1031
Adjusted R2 0.171
 p-value: F(29,1001) 0.000
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments:   0.0385
Test of excluded instruments:
  F( 15,  1001) =     2.67
  Prob > F      =   0.0005
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Table C.1.5: First- stage Estimates of Non-Labor Cost for Production Function 
Estimation by Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable:
Non-labor cost
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
Area planted 0.311 0.038 8.240 0.000
Technical irrigation dummy 0.191 0.104 1.830 0.067
Simple irrigation dummy -0.440 0.099 -4.430 0.000
Value of farm equipment 0.083 0.012 7.020 0.000
Dryland dummy -0.519 0.124 -4.180 0.000
Household head age -0.133 0.168 -0.790 0.428
Household head education 0.076 0.056 1.350 0.177
Rainy season 1998-99 dummy -0.214 0.608 -0.350 0.725
Dry season 1998 dummy -0.451 0.610 -0.740 0.460
Province dummy for Lampung 0.214 0.130 1.640 0.101
Province dummy for Central Java 0.018 0.148 0.120 0.901
Province dummy for East Java 0.301 0.139 2.170 0.031
Province dummy for West Nusa Tenggara 0.017 0.140 0.120 0.903
Province dummy for North Sulawesi 1.388 0.159 8.730 0.000
Share of agric. laborers in village adults, ‘98 census 0.480 0.403 1.190 0.234
Village average interest rate 0.000 0.001 0.320 0.747
Share of total village area planted in rice 0.397 0.194 2.040 0.041
Village median distance to market for crops 0.052 0.014 3.720 0.000
Number of children age 0-5 years -0.162 0.093 -1.740 0.083
Number of children age 6-11 years -0.101 0.078 -1.300 0.195
Number of male children age 12-15 years 0.197 0.111 1.780 0.076
Number of female children age 12-15 years 0.089 0.109 0.820 0.414
Number of male children age 16-19 years 0.008 0.109 0.070 0.940
Number of female children age 12-15 years 0.089 0.114 0.780 0.435
Number of males age 20 years and older 0.493 0.119 4.130 0.000
Number of females age 20 years and older 0.218 0.145 1.500 0.133
Village average rice price by season -0.348 0.232 -1.500 0.133
Village average male wage by season -2.896 0.267 -10.860 0.000
Plot inheritance dummy -0.069 0.071 -0.980 0.329
Constant 7.195 0.979 7.350 0.000
N 1031
Adjusted R2 0.307
 p-value: F(29,1001) 0.000
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments:   0.1619
Test of excluded instruments:
  F( 15,  1001) =     12.90
  Prob > F      =   0.0000
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Table C.2.1: First- stage Estimates of Piece Rate Labor Hours for Production 
Function Estimation by Random Effects Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable:
Piece rate labor hours
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
Area planted 0.274 0.056 4.900 0.000
Technical irrigation dummy 1.123 0.158 7.100 0.000
Simple irrigation dummy -0.405 0.150 -2.710 0.007
Value of farm equipment 0.011 0.019 0.580 0.563
Dryland dummy -0.786 0.185 -4.250 0.000
Household head age 0.166 0.267 0.620 0.534
Household head education 0.044 0.089 0.500 0.618
Rainy season 1998-99 dummy -0.708 0.869 -0.810 0.416
Dry season 1998 dummy -0.641 0.871 -0.740 0.462
Province dummy for Lampung 0.297 0.210 1.420 0.156
Province dummy for Central Java -0.069 0.239 -0.290 0.774
Province dummy for East Java 0.241 0.228 1.060 0.291
Province dummy for West Nusa Tenggara -0.228 0.214 -1.070 0.287
Province dummy for North Sulawesi 0.057 0.256 0.220 0.822
Share of agric. laborers in village adults, ‘98 census -2.550 0.629 -4.050 0.000
Village average interest rate 0.002 0.001 2.750 0.006
Share of total village area planted in rice 1.662 0.311 5.350 0.000
Village median distance to market for crops 0.095 0.021 4.420 0.000
Number of children age 0-5 years 0.101 0.148 0.680 0.495
Number of children age 6-11 years -0.171 0.125 -1.370 0.172
Number of male children age 12-15 years -0.011 0.180 -0.060 0.949
Number of female children age 12-15 years -0.283 0.176 -1.610 0.107
Number of male children age 16-19 years 0.093 0.175 0.530 0.597
Number of female children age 12-15 years 0.122 0.182 0.670 0.503
Number of males age 20 years and older 0.146 0.196 0.750 0.456
Number of females age 20 years and older 0.183 0.229 0.800 0.423
Village average rice price by season 0.777 0.383 2.030 0.042
Village average male wage by season 0.124 0.428 0.290 0.772
Plot inheritance dummy -0.238 0.107 -2.230 0.026
Constant -0.648 1.497 -0.430 0.665
N 1031
 p-value: Wald chi(29) 0.000
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Table C.2.2: First- stage Estimates of Piece Rate Team Labor Hours for Production 
Function Estimation by Random Effects Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable:
Piece rate team labor hours
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
Area planted 0.025 0.034 0.740 0.460
Technical irrigation dummy 0.177 0.097 1.810 0.070
Simple irrigation dummy 0.168 0.092 1.830 0.067
Value of farm equipment 0.018 0.012 1.490 0.137
Dryland dummy -0.158 0.114 -1.390 0.163
Household head age 0.169 0.164 1.030 0.304
Household head education 0.091 0.055 1.670 0.095
Rainy season 1998-99 dummy -2.894 0.535 -5.410 0.000
Dry season 1998 dummy -2.941 0.537 -5.480 0.000
Province dummy for Lampung 0.567 0.129 4.390 0.000
Province dummy for Central Java 1.815 0.147 12.310 0.000
Province dummy for East Java 0.336 0.140 2.390 0.017
Province dummy for West Nusa Tenggara 0.437 0.132 3.320 0.001
Province dummy for North Sulawesi 1.019 0.158 6.460 0.000
Share of agric. laborers in village adults, ‘98 census -1.453 0.387 -3.750 0.000
Village average interest rate 0.000 0.001 -0.080 0.936
Share of total village area planted in rice 1.534 0.191 8.020 0.000
Village median distance to market for crops 0.050 0.013 3.770 0.000
Number of children age 0-5 years -0.155 0.091 -1.700 0.090
Number of children age 6-11 years -0.020 0.077 -0.270 0.791
Number of male children age 12-15 years -0.091 0.111 -0.820 0.412
Number of female children age 12-15 years -0.247 0.108 -2.280 0.022
Number of male children age 16-19 years 0.112 0.108 1.040 0.299
Number of female children age 12-15 years -0.119 0.112 -1.060 0.288
Number of males age 20 years and older 0.017 0.121 0.140 0.890
Number of females age 20 years and older 0.007 0.141 0.050 0.960
Village average rice price by season 0.385 0.236 1.630 0.102
Village average male wage by season -1.984 0.263 -7.530 0.000
Plot inheritance dummy 0.145 0.066 2.210 0.027
Constant 0.025 0.034 0.740 0.460
N 1031
 p-value: Wald chi(29) 0.000
232
Table C.2.3: First- stage Estimates of Other Hired Labor Hours for Production 
Function Estimation by Random Effects Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable:
Other hired labor hours
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
Area planted 0.170 0.045 3.810 0.000
Technical irrigation dummy -0.547 0.126 -4.340 0.000
Simple irrigation dummy -0.315 0.119 -2.650 0.008
Value of farm equipment 0.110 0.015 7.190 0.000
Dryland dummy -0.264 0.147 -1.790 0.073
Household head age 0.136 0.212 0.640 0.521
Household head education 0.124 0.070 1.760 0.079
Rainy season 1998-99 dummy -0.051 0.692 -0.070 0.942
Dry season 1998 dummy -0.083 0.694 -0.120 0.905
Province dummy for Lampung -0.211 0.167 -1.270 0.206
Province dummy for Central Java -0.700 0.191 -3.670 0.000
Province dummy for East Java -0.626 0.182 -3.450 0.001
Province dummy for West Nusa Tenggara 0.105 0.170 0.610 0.539
Province dummy for North Sulawesi 0.356 0.204 1.750 0.080
Share of agric. laborers in village adults, ‘98 census 1.757 0.501 3.510 0.000
Village average interest rate 0.000 0.001 -0.300 0.765
Share of total village area planted in rice -0.659 0.247 -2.660 0.008
Village median distance to market for crops -0.066 0.017 -3.850 0.000
Number of children age 0-5 years 0.289 0.118 2.450 0.014
Number of children age 6-11 years 0.103 0.100 1.030 0.301
Number of male children age 12-15 years 0.340 0.143 2.380 0.017
Number of female children age 12-15 years -0.195 0.140 -1.390 0.163
Number of male children age 16-19 years -0.124 0.139 -0.890 0.372
Number of female children age 12-15 years -0.289 0.145 -1.990 0.046
Number of males age 20 years and older -0.119 0.156 -0.770 0.444
Number of females age 20 years and older 0.014 0.182 0.080 0.940
Village average rice price by season -0.883 0.305 -2.900 0.004
Village average male wage by season 0.156 0.340 0.460 0.646
Plot inheritance dummy 0.048 0.085 0.560 0.573
Constant 5.174 1.191 4.340 0.000
N 1031
 p-value: Wald chi(29) 0.000
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Table C.2.4: First- stage Estimates of Household Labor Hours for Production 
Function Estimation by Random Effects Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable:
Household labor hours
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
Area planted 0.226 0.054 4.180 0.000
Technical irrigation dummy 0.086 0.153 0.560 0.573
Simple irrigation dummy -0.365 0.144 -2.530 0.011
Value of farm equipment -0.001 0.018 -0.060 0.951
Dryland dummy -0.048 0.178 -0.270 0.787
Household head age -0.226 0.257 -0.880 0.380
Household head education -0.383 0.085 -4.480 0.000
Rainy season 1998-99 dummy -0.789 0.839 -0.940 0.347
Dry season 1998 dummy -0.738 0.841 -0.880 0.380
Province dummy for Lampung -0.493 0.202 -2.430 0.015
Province dummy for Central Java -0.642 0.231 -2.780 0.006
Province dummy for East Java -1.432 0.220 -6.510 0.000
Province dummy for West Nusa Tenggara -0.355 0.206 -1.720 0.085
Province dummy for North Sulawesi -1.489 0.247 -6.020 0.000
Share of agric. laborers in village adults, ‘98 census -0.883 0.607 -1.450 0.146
Village average interest rate -0.003 0.001 -3.220 0.001
Share of total village area planted in rice -0.425 0.300 -1.420 0.157
Village median distance to market for crops 0.022 0.021 1.080 0.281
Number of children age 0-5 years 0.105 0.143 0.740 0.462
Number of children age 6-11 years -0.050 0.121 -0.420 0.678
Number of male children age 12-15 years 0.197 0.173 1.130 0.257
Number of female children age 12-15 years 0.183 0.170 1.080 0.280
Number of male children age 16-19 years 0.203 0.169 1.200 0.230
Number of female children age 12-15 years 0.358 0.176 2.030 0.042
Number of males age 20 years and older 0.452 0.189 2.390 0.017
Number of females age 20 years and older 0.439 0.221 1.990 0.047
Village average rice price by season 0.091 0.370 0.250 0.806
Village average male wage by season 0.283 0.413 0.680 0.494
Plot inheritance dummy -0.032 0.103 -0.310 0.756
Constant 6.940 1.445 4.800 0.000
N 1031
 p-value: Wald chi(29) 0.000
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Table C.2.5: First- stage Estimates of Non-Labor Cost for Production Function 
Estimation by Random Effects Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable:
Non-labor cost
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
Area planted 0.307 0.038 8.140 0.000
Technical irrigation dummy 0.142 0.107 1.330 0.184
Simple irrigation dummy -0.442 0.101 -4.390 0.000
Value of farm equipment 0.083 0.013 6.440 0.000
Dryland dummy -0.509 0.124 -4.090 0.000
Household head age -0.134 0.180 -0.750 0.455
Household head education 0.077 0.060 1.290 0.198
Rainy season 1998-99 dummy -0.237 0.586 -0.400 0.686
Dry season 1998 dummy -0.455 0.587 -0.770 0.439
Province dummy for Lampung 0.205 0.141 1.450 0.146
Province dummy for Central Java 0.033 0.161 0.210 0.836
Province dummy for East Java 0.289 0.154 1.880 0.060
Province dummy for West Nusa Tenggara -0.002 0.144 -0.010 0.989
Province dummy for North Sulawesi 1.368 0.173 7.930 0.000
Share of agric. laborers in village adults, ‘98 census 0.479 0.424 1.130 0.259
Village average interest rate 0.000 0.001 0.560 0.574
Share of total village area planted in rice 0.417 0.210 1.990 0.046
Village median distance to market for crops 0.046 0.014 3.200 0.001
Number of children age 0-5 years -0.169 0.100 -1.690 0.091
Number of children age 6-11 years -0.092 0.084 -1.090 0.276
Number of male children age 12-15 years 0.160 0.121 1.320 0.187
Number of female children age 12-15 years 0.029 0.119 0.240 0.808
Number of male children age 16-19 years 0.026 0.118 0.220 0.826
Number of female children age 12-15 years 0.118 0.123 0.960 0.338
Number of males age 20 years and older 0.492 0.132 3.730 0.000
Number of females age 20 years and older 0.268 0.154 1.730 0.083
Village average rice price by season -0.381 0.258 -1.470 0.140
Village average male wage by season -2.758 0.288 -9.570 0.000
Plot inheritance dummy -0.048 0.072 -0.670 0.502
Constant 7.105 1.009 7.040 0.000
N 1031
 p-value: Wald chi(29) 0.000
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Appendix D: The Definition of the Seasonal Measure of Working Capital
A number of practical issues had to be resolved in defining the measure of working 
capital from the 1998-99 PATANAS survey.  As described in Chapter 3, I define working 
capital holdings as the sum of savings and new or outstanding credit.  The most difficult 
issues in defining these variables concerned accounting for differences in savings and 
credit holdings across seasons and measuring the size of loans outstanding at any point in 
time. In order to obtain precise estimates of the determinants of the plot-specific labor 
exchange decision, it was necessary to estimate the probit model by season.  This made it 
possible to take advantage of the very detailed plot-level data on labor demand by 
contract type and to capture the substantial variability in labor markets and growing 
conditions across seasons.  However, savings were recorded only in March 1998 and 
March 1999.  Profits from farming and other activities during the dry seasons in the first 
half of this year could have substantially changed the savings of households as they 
entered into the rainy season, when most production and the majority of labor exchanges 
occur.  To account for this, I constructed a variable that measured savings in two seasons, 
the rainy season in 1998-99 and the combined dry seasons in 1998.  Savings in the dry 
seasons equaled savings in March 1998.  To construct savings in the rainy season, I 
added to March 1998 savings total income from all sources during the dry seasons 
(including income from farming, non-agricultural businesses, labor and asset sales) and 
subtracted estimates of food and non-food expenditures from March – October 1998.  I 
also constructed a seasonal measure of credit outstanding.  
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In each season, I measured credit available for working capital as the sum of credit 
outstanding at the beginning of the season plus the value of loans taken during the season.  
For each loan outstanding between March 1998 and March 1999, the respondent was 
asked to provide the amount borrowed, the date of loan initiation, the interest rate or total 
amount due at termination, the value of payments made by March 1999, and the date 
when the final loan payment was due, if known.75  For many loans, not all of this 
information was provided.  In some cases, where interest rates were missing, I used 
median interest rates for other households in the village.  Assuming uniform repayment 
rates, I constructed measures of credit outstanding in March 1998 and October 1998, the 
beginning of the dry seasons and rainy season, respectively.  To these amounts, I added 
the value of loans taken during the season to construct the final seasonal credit variable.  
This approach to measuring seasonal credit use probably contributed some measurement 
error to the credit variable constructed.  Nonetheless, I believe the approach provides the 
best possible measure of loans taken during the period.
75 Other information was collected on each loan including the lending source and types and amounts of 
collateral used.
Appendix E: Marginal Effects and Elasticities of Probit Model Estimates
Table E.1: Marginal Effects and Elasticities of Probit Models from Table 4.3 
Dependent Variable:  Models
    Indicator for Labor Exchange Use 
    by Plot, Season
(1)
Pooled Probit: 
Working capital in 




Quintiles of working 
capital
(3)
Pooled Probit: Plot 














Working capital: credit taken or outstanding -0.002 -0.065
      plus savings by season, Rp. mn.
First quintile of working capital 0.033 0.143 0.032 0.142 0.021 0.106
Third quintile of working capital 0.088 0.110 0.089 0.113 0.072 0.104
Fourth quintile of working capital 0.067 0.143 0.069 0.149 0.046 0.115
Value of non-land business, household, and -0.001 -0.055 0.000 -0.012 0.000 -0.022 -0.001 -0.085
      farm assets net of credit financing, 1998
Number of household members -0.008 -0.491 -0.014 -0.696 -0.014 -0.692 -0.008 -0.435
Number of plantings on this plot, 1998-99 -0.038 -0.926 -0.046 -0.919 -0.043 -0.876 -0.019 -0.425
Indicator for simple irrigation 0.060 0.095 0.062 0.083 0.083 0.111 0.088 0.127
Indicator for plot being owned, not leased -0.061 -0.539 -0.072 -0.529 -0.059 -0.454 -0.048 -0.417
Indictor for HYV seeds used in corn 0.192 0.089 0.141 0.062 0.134 0.060 0.161 0.075
      production
Land area owned 0.007 0.112 0.011 0.147














Area of other plots planted this season -0.013 -0.043
      by this household
Share of village sample plots within 0.166 0.245 0.129 0.157 0.127 0.159 0.120 0.170
      10% of this plot’s area by season
Share of adults in village working as -0.171 -0.298 -0.197 -0.351 -0.187 -0.375
      an agricultural laborer, 1998 census
Average village hourly wage for time -0.069 -- -0.132 --
      rate contracts, by season
Average village hourly wage × Indicator for 0.121 0.404 0.132 -0.002
     net seller of labor (*)
Average village hourly wage × Indicator for 0.169 0.702 0.183 0.333
     net buyer of labor (*)
Household head age (years) -0.001 -0.768 -0.002 -0.858 -0.002 -0.786 -0.001 -0.808
Household head education level (years) -0.004 -0.232 -0.002 -0.097
Lampung province indicator -0.133 -0.625 -0.139 -0.514 -0.130 -0.484 -0.108 -0.445
Central Java province indicator -0.059 -0.173 -0.058 -0.135 -0.041 -0.094 -0.022 -0.054
East Java province indicator -0.125 -0.488 -0.139 -0.407 -0.130 -0.374 -0.120 -0.409
West Nusa Tenggara province indicator -0.095 -0.313 -0.113 -0.302 -0.109 -0.292 -0.088 -0.255
North Sulawesi province indicator -0.085 -0.162 -0.082 -0.103 -0.084 -0.114 -0.081 -0.132
Rainy season indicator 0.162 0.642 0.253 0.808 0.243 0.801 0.140 0.547
Dry season indicator for both dry seasons 0.168 0.492 0.258 0.604 0.248 0.598 0.148 0.425
The marginal effects of continuous variables are calculated as ( ) ( ) ii XXX ββφβ ˆˆˆ =∂Φ∂ , evaluated at the mean of the data.  For binary variables, marginal 
effects are the difference in ( )β̂XΦ  when the indicator changes from 0 to 1, with all other regressors evaluated at their means.  Elasticities for all variables 
are calculated from the continuous variable form of the marginal effects.  Elasticities of wages for net sellers and net buyers of labor (*) are the full elasticities. 
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Appendix F: Calculation of Marginal Effects for the Switching Regression in 
Equation (4.6)
I derive the analytical expression for the marginal effect of an explanatory variable, jδ , 
on the marginal probability of being working capital constrained in the switching 








I rely on the similarity of the likelihood function in (4.6) to the likelihood function for the 
bivariate probit model.  The expression for the analogous marginal effect on marginal 
probabilities in the bivariate probit is provided in Christofides, Stengos, and Swidinsky 
(1997) and Christofides, Hardin, and Stengos, (2000).  Assume that the explanatory 
variable, jδ , appears in the 1X  matrix as j1β  and in the W  matrix as jγ .  The marginal 
effect for the joint probability of using labor exchange and being working capital 
constrained is (ignoring observation subscripts)
(F.2)










































are the probability of participating in labor exchange conditional on being working 
capital constrained and the probability of being working capital constrained conditional 
on participating in labor exchange, respectively.  Likewise, the marginal effect of a 
continuous explanatory variable on the joint probability of not using labor exchange and 
being working capital constrained is
(F.3)










































Because the marginal probability of being working capital constrained is the sum of the 
joint probabilities when working capital constrained,
(F.4) ( ) ( ) ( )WXkyWXkyWXk ,|1,0Pr,|1,1Pr,|1Pr ==+==== ,
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the expression for the marginal effect in (F.1) (and (4.8)) is the sum of (F.2) and (F.3), 
which simplifies to 
(F.5)








If the variable of interest does not appear in the labor exchange participation equation, 
then (F.5) simplifies to 






which is the marginal effect in the univariate probit model.  
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Appendix G: Estimating the Switching Regression by Parts in Order to Satisfy 
Degrees of Freedom Restrictions: Estimates of (4.9.a) and (4.9.b)
for Model 5
Table G.1: Estimates of the Probability of Participating in Labor Exchange 
Conditional on Working Capital Constraint Status
Model 5
 Equation (4.9.a) Equation (4.9.b)
Estimates of γ .  
Dependent Variable:  Indicator for Being 
Working Capital Constrained
Value of land owned net of outstanding -0.003 -0.003
    land debt, 1998, Rp. mn. (0.002) (0.002)
Value of livestock and farm equipment -0.069*** -0.065***
    net of outstanding farm debt, 1998, Rp. mn. (0.016) (0.019)
Share of village households using credit -1.213** -0.998*
(0.518) (0.546)
Ln of village average interest rate -0.147* -0.123*
(0.079) (0.073)
Ln of number of household members -0.190* -0.192*
(0.105) (0.112)
Indicator for white collar household head -1.019*** -0.949**
    occupation (0.342) (0.379)
Java regional indicator -0.464** -0.419*
(0.213) (0.225)




Estimates of 21 ,ββ .  










Working capital: credit taken or outstanding -0.012**
     plus savings by season, Rp. mn. (0.005)
Value of non-land business, household, farm -0.008 -0.004
     assets net of credit financing, 1998, Rp. mn (0.008) (0.004)
Number of household members -0.047 -0.041
(0.036) (0.034)
Indicator for simple irrigation 0.162 0.282
(0.228) (0.243)
Indictor for HYV seeds used in corn production 0.757* 0.880***
(0.423) (0.266)
Ln value of land area owned, 1998, Rp. mn. -0.077 -0.270***
(0.061) (0.046)
Share of village sample plots within 0.859 0.805**
     10% of this plot’s area, by season (0.633) (0.386)
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Average village hourly wage for time -0.102 -0.624**
      rate contracts, by season (Rp. ‘000) (0.311) (0.262)
Average village hourly wage × Indicator for 0.618** 0.581***
     net seller of labor (0.253) (0.215)
Average village hourly wage × Indicator for 0.877*** 1.183***
     net buyer of labor (0.268) (0.238)




Correlation coefficient 0.804*** 0.634***
(0.131) (0.234)
Log partial-likelihood -1408.76 -1628.78
Observations  1930  1930
p-value: Wald chi2(10); Wald chi2(10) 0.0000 0.0000
Estimates are for the likelihood functions in (4.9.a) and (4.9.b).  The assignment rule for working 
capital constraints is that a household is constrained in the given season if it has no borrowing, 
savings, or lending.  Starting values were taken from estimates of a two-stage probit model of the 
decision to use labor exchange with a correction for sample selection into working capital 
constrained or unconstrained regimes.  The standard errors in parentheses are based on the 
Huber/White/sandwich robust estimator of variance, adjusted for clustering in sample design.  The 
p-values for Wald tests of joint significance of all regressors are presented.  The Java regional 
indicator variable includes the provinces of Central Java and East Java.  North Sulawesi or South 
Sulawesi provinces are indicated by the Sulawesi regional indicator.  By this construction, the 
omitted provinces in the working capital constraint equation are Lampung and West Nusa 
Tenggara.  All seasonal indicators are omitted in order to conserve degrees of freedom.  * 
Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%.
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